BUSHWALK
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Network device
BUSHWALK is a Perl webshell associated with UNC5221 that targets compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It embeds malicious functionality into a legitimate CGI component, providing persistent remote access for arbitrary command execution and file writing. Its command-execution action returns command output encrypted with RC4 and encoded with Base64, while its file-writing action decodes supplied content and appends it to an attacker-specified file. Malicious functionality is activated through a specific HTTP request parameter value.
BUSHWALK was deployed in targeted operations that bypassed Ivanti's January 2024 mitigations, with the mitigation bypass tracked as CVE-2024-21893. Its deployment formed part of post-exploitation activity against internet-facing VPN infrastructure. BUSHWALK was also observed during the intrusion into MITRE's Networked Experimentation, Research, and Virtualization Environment, where a variant contained modified command-handling logic and an additional data-export routine.
Associated vulnerabilities
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The group has been observed using other distinct malware including CHAINLINE backdoor, FRAMESTING webshell, WIREFIRE webshell, LIGHTWIRE webshell, BUSHWALK webshell.
In our previous blog post, we described a mitigation bypass that was used to drop a newly identified BUSHWALK webshell.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
“cyber threat actors are exploiting… vulnerabilities… affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways… used in a chain of exploits to enable… bypass authentication… execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.” / “Volexity… observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE)”
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
“Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).”
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) is a web shell that has the ability to execute arbitrary commands or write files.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can embed into the legitimate `querymanifest.cgi` file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can encrypt the resulting data generated from C2 commands with RC4.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can Base64 decode and RC4 decrypt malicious payloads sent through a web request’s command parameter.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
the adversary used the Ivanti help website as a staging area for data exfiltration
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
BEEFLUSH ... communicated with several internal IP addresses making POST requests.
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can write malicious payloads sent through a web request’s command parameter.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The adversary exfiltrated data from the NERVE using command-and-control infrastructure.
Observables
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.