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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

BUSHWALK

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Network device

BUSHWALK is a Perl webshell associated with UNC5221 that targets compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It embeds malicious functionality into a legitimate CGI component, providing persistent remote access for arbitrary command execution and file writing. Its command-execution action returns command output encrypted with RC4 and encoded with Base64, while its file-writing action decodes supplied content and appends it to an attacker-specified file. Malicious functionality is activated through a specific HTTP request parameter value.

BUSHWALK was deployed in targeted operations that bypassed Ivanti's January 2024 mitigations, with the mitigation bypass tracked as CVE-2024-21893. Its deployment formed part of post-exploitation activity against internet-facing VPN infrastructure. BUSHWALK was also observed during the intrusion into MITRE's Networked Experimentation, Research, and Virtualization Environment, where a variant contained modified command-handling logic and an additional data-export routine.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-46805via cisa advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureCyber threat actors are actively exploiting multiple previously identified vulnerabilities—CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, and CVE-2024-21893—affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21893via cisa advisoriesExploited in the wildUnauthenticated SAML SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTAIvanti disclosed three additional vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-21893 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x), and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA...View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21887via cisa advisoriesExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureVolexity reported on two vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE): CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
UNC5221

The group has been observed using other distinct malware including CHAINLINE backdoor, FRAMESTING webshell, WIREFIRE webshell, LIGHTWIRE webshell, BUSHWALK webshell.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
UNC5325

In our previous blog post, we described a mitigation bypass that was used to drop a newly identified BUSHWALK webshell.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

“cyber threat actors are exploiting… vulnerabilities… affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways… used in a chain of exploits to enable… bypass authentication… execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.” / “Volexity… observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE)”

Execution

2 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

“Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).”

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence5

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) is a web shell that has the ability to execute arbitrary commands or write files.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)

T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryEvidence3

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can embed into the legitimate `querymanifest.cgi` file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can encrypt the resulting data generated from C2 commands with RC4.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can Base64 decode and RC4 decrypt malicious payloads sent through a web request’s command parameter.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

Collection

1 technique
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

the adversary used the Ivanti help website as a staging area for data exfiltration

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

BEEFLUSH ... communicated with several internal IP addresses making POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can write malicious payloads sent through a web request’s command parameter.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[BUSHWALK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1118) can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The adversary exfiltrated data from the NERVE using command-and-control infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.