Ryuk

Ryuk ransomware operators extorted victim companies by demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin in exchange for decryption keys.

Prosecutors previously accused Vardanyan and his co-conspirators ... of illegally accessing computer networks to deploy Ryuk ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations between March 2019 and September 2020.

Authorities accused him of identifying exploitable vulnerabilities in potential victims' networks. "The data obtained by the hacker was used by his accomplices to plan and carry out cyberattacks," police said.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Prosecutors previously accused Vardanyan and his co-conspirators ... of illegally accessing computer networks to deploy Ryuk ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations between March 2019 and September 2020.

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Examples include 'adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence', 'creates a shortcut in the Startup folder', and 'RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.'

Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as achieving persistence by adding values under Run/RunOnce/Policies\Explorer\Run Registry keys or by placing shortcuts/files in the Windows Startup folder.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Prosecutors previously accused Vardanyan and his co-conspirators ... of illegally accessing computer networks to deploy Ryuk ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations between March 2019 and September 2020.

Examples include 'adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence', 'creates a shortcut in the Startup folder', and 'RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.'

Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as achieving persistence by adding values under Run/RunOnce/Policies\Explorer\Run Registry keys or by placing shortcuts/files in the Windows Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

Prosecutors previously accused Vardanyan and his co-conspirators ... of illegally accessing computer networks to deploy Ryuk ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations between March 2019 and September 2020.

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.

Multiple entries describe enumerating local, logical, or physical drives and disk/volume information, e.g., 'can enumerate local drives,' 'GetLogicalDrives,' 'fsutil fsinfo drives,' 'list drives,' and 'discover logical drive information including the drive type, free space, and volume information.'

title: Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE ... Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE ... tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002

selection_accounts_root: CommandLine|contains: ' accounts ' ... selection_accounts_flags: CommandLine|contains: ' /do' # short for domain ... tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002

Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.

In one documented case, it was placed on a domain controller during a Ryuk ransomware attack, handing operators remote control over the most critical server.

Vardanyan and his co-conspirators illegally accessed computer networks of victim companies and deployed ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations.

What made EMOTET so dangerous is that the malware was offered for hire to other cybercriminals to install other types of malware, such as banking Trojans or ransomwares, onto a victim’s computer.

Trickbot is a cybercriminal group that has conducted ransomware campaigns across essential services including healthcare and banking. | The EU designated Vitaly Nikolayevich Kovalev, also known as “Stern,” administrator of the Trickbot ransomware operations who has received more than $300 million in ransom payments.

Techniques → T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact), T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery)

As part of the scheme, ransom payments were extorted from victim companies in exchange for decryption keys to regain access to their data. A ransom note was placed on the computer systems demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.