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Malware6 associated actors

ADRecon

Tracked since Jan 23, 2026 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceCredential theft
Platforms
Windows

ADRecon is an open-source, PowerShell-based reconnaissance tool for collecting extensive information about Microsoft Active Directory environments. It enumerates domain accounts, access-control lists, DNS zones, and domain trust relationships, helping operators map directory infrastructure and security relationships. Its collection scope can include sensitive information such as BitLocker recovery keys, Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) passwords, and service principal name–related credential hashes, subject to the executing account's access rights.

ADRecon is a legitimate dual-use utility rather than an inherently malicious malware family. Attackers use it after gaining access to Windows enterprise networks, including by executing it on domain controllers to support further intrusion planning. Its use has been observed in operations involving UNC3944, VOID MANTICORE, Citrus, and BlackCat/ALPHV affiliates. Credential dumping, lateral movement, ransomware deployment, and destructive actions performed alongside ADRecon are separate activities and are not intrinsic capabilities of the tool.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Citrus

It uses fscan, ADRecon, and SharpHound to map the network, then moves around with SSH, RDP, and WinRM.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Toy Ghouls

Once they had the access they needed and had moved laterally, the attackers ran ADRecon on domain controllers.

via malware newsmalware.news
Citrus Ransomware

The attackers ran ADRecon on domain controllers and SharpHound on one of the workstations.

via securelistsecurelist.com
Scattered Spider

A lack of endpoint monitoring allowed the group to download tools such as Mimikatz, ADRecon, and various covert tunneling tools.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
BlackCat

The file was identified as ‘ADRecon’, an open-source PowerShell tool specifically designed to gather extensive information about Active Directory (AD) environments, including ACLs, DNS zones, BitLocker recovery keys, LAPS passwords, Domain accounts, and SPN credential hashes.

via sygniasygnia.co
Handala

VOID MANTICORE has utilized ADRecon to enumerate the active directory environment.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

« Outils publics : Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan »

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

« Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan, exécutés en mémoire via PowerShell »

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

the threat actor uploaded the ‘netscan.exe’ file to the same folder, used it to scan the domain, and deleted it after the scan activity was completed... the file no longer existed after execution – presumably it was deleted by the threat actor.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

« outils publics ... exécutés en mémoire via PowerShell »

Discovery

11 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

ADFind ... Cartographie de l’AD. / ADRecon ... Cartographie de l’AD.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence8

ADFind ... Cartographie de l’AD. / ADRecon ... Cartographie de l’AD.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Initial bulk-export of users, groups, and device information is closely followed by enumerating data and resources readily available to the user’s profile... AAD bulk downloads of user, groups, and devices.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence3

“Using Impacket, ADRecon, and ADVipscan, and the custom LDAP brute-forcing utility REALBREEZE to conduct internal reconnaissance.”

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence3

Module_EnumerateAdmins.ps1 : Collects domain admin, enterprise admin, and domain user information

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

Later, the threat actor utilized a user account to remotely deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon on a server in a third domain, followed by network scans and enumeration of the Admins group in the new domain.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

They appeal to attackers because they allow them to implement activity such as credential stealing, discovery, lateral movement and malware execution, and more, while blending in with harmless everyday IT activity.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actor leveraged the SoftPerfect tool to perform several manual reconnaissance activities, which included searching for passwords in Group Policy xml files, accessing remote folders via Windows Explorer...

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence8

“BREEZE COMET used publicly available reconnaissance utilities such as Impacket, ADRecon and ADVipscan... The threat actor deployed the custom LDAP brute-forcing utility REALBREEZE.”

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence4

Domain enumeration via obfuscated ADRecon.ps1, nltest, and net group; including net group "Domain Admins" /domain.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence9

"The attackers appear to use Sense of Security's open-source AdRecon tool on each of their victims' AD environments..."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“downloaded the Netcat utility alongside custom scripts to pull down subsequent post-exploitation frameworks from external open directories.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.