LockBit
LockBit is a transnational organized crime ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since around January 2020. It has also been referred to as LockBit 2.0, LockBit 3.0, LockBit Black, LockBit Green, LockBitSupp, and related variants including LockBit 4.0 and 5.0 in the provided content. U.S. government reporting states that LockBit has conducted more than 2,000 attacks worldwide since January 2020; DOJ reporting says it attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries, including about 1,800 in the United States. Victims have included individuals, small businesses, multinational corporations, hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies. Reported ransom proceeds range from at least $144 million in bitcoin to approximately $500 million, with billions of dollars in additional victim losses. LockBit operates through affiliates. According to DOJ reporting, the operation was designed as a RaaS model in which the administrator typically received 20% of each ransom payment and affiliates received the remaining 80%. The group used a control panel for affiliates, maintained public leak infrastructure for extortion, and used the StealBit tool for data exfiltration. The content describes LockBit as using double extortion: affiliates unlawfully accessed vulnerable systems, stole data, encrypted victim data, and threatened to publish stolen information if victims did not pay. Reporting in the content also notes use of standard encryption routines, lateral movement with stolen credentials, and exploitation of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers by affiliates. Cisco Talos reporting cited in the content says LockBit used custom exfiltration tooling and that BlackBasta, LockBit, and Rhysida encrypted data and defaced victim systems to maximize impact. The content links LockBit to Russian-speaking cybercrime. Multiple references state that LockBit operators expressly prohibit affiliates from targeting Russian and other CIS organizations. Separate reporting in the content describes LockBit 2.0/3.0 as among ransomware groups based in Russia. U.S. government reward material describes the actors’ nationality and citizenship as various and unknown, while DOJ indictments identify alleged key members as Russian nationals or dual Russian nationals. Named LockBit-linked individuals in the content include alleged administrator Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, also known as LockBitSupp, LockBit, and putinkrab, whom DOJ alleges was the creator, developer, administrator, and public spokesperson from September 2019 through 2024; developer Rostislav Panev, a dual Russian and Israeli national; affiliates Ruslan Magomedovich Astamirov, who used the aliases BETTERPAY, offtitan, and Eastfarmer; Mikhail Vasiliev, who used the aliases Ghostrider, Free, Digitalocean90, Digitalocean99, Digitalwaters99, and Newwave110; and Mikhail Pavlovich Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, m1x, Boriselcin, Uhodiransomwar, Orange, Biba99, and TetyaSluha, who is described as an affiliate associated with LockBit and other ransomware groups. The content states that LockBit was at times the most active and destructive ransomware group in the world and describes it as the leading ransomware operation. It also notes that the group continued operating after the February 2024 international law enforcement disruption led by the U.K. National Crime Agency with DOJ, FBI, and partners, although that action significantly damaged its reputation and capabilities. Authorities seized websites and servers, developed decryption capabilities, and later charged multiple members. The content further states that seized infrastructure showed stolen victim data had been retained even after ransom payments and promises of deletion. Despite the disruption, LockBit restarted operations, stood up new leak sites, and used updated encryptors and ransom notes.
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Tradecraft
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2018-10562 8.9 Dasan GPON Home Routers LockBit, RansomHouse, Crypto24 Link
Based on their 90-day average detection rates, CVE-2019-12780 leads the list... CVE-2019-12780 9.8 Belkin Wemo Smart Plug LockBit, RansomHouse No
Two vulnerabilities were fixed in the PaperCut Application Server that allows remote attackers to perform unauthenticated remote code execution and information disclosure: CVE-2023–27350 ... Unauthenticated remote code execution flaw impacting all PaperCut MF or NG versions 8.0 or later... PaperCut disclosed that these flaws were actively exploited in the wild... A PoC exploit for the RCE flaw was released... Microsoft ... attributed the recent PaperCut attacks to the Clop and LockBit ransomware operations.
CVE-2023–27351 ... Unauthenticated information disclosure flaw impacting all PaperCut MF or NG versions 15.0 or later... PaperCut disclosed that these flaws were actively exploited in the wild... Microsoft ... attributed the recent PaperCut attacks to the Clop and LockBit ransomware operations.
...LockBit ransomware group as they exploited a vulnerability known as ‘Citrix Bleed’ (CVE-2023-4966) during their attacks. LockBit leveraged this flaw to hijack authenticated sessions...
Observables
100 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cited as a major ransomware group disrupted by law enforcement; used as an example of the decline of large centralized ransomware brands and the shift toward smaller fragmented factions.
Referenced as a ransomware operation previously linked to misuse of the GoToResolve remote administration tool.
Notorious ransomware operators cited as forbidding attacks on Russian and other CIS targets.
Referenced as a headline ransomware group whose takedown is portrayed as less strategically important than the broader growth of the ransomware ecosystem.
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Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.