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6 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

LockBit

Also known asabcd_ransomwarelockbitLockBit 4.0lockbit_20lockbit_3.0lockbit_50lockbit_blacklockbit_ganglockbit_greenlockbit_grouplockbit3.0lockbitsupp

LockBit is a transnational organized crime ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since around January 2020. It has also been referred to as LockBit 2.0, LockBit 3.0, LockBit Black, LockBit Green, LockBitSupp, and related variants including LockBit 4.0 and 5.0 in the provided content. U.S. government reporting states that LockBit has conducted more than 2,000 attacks worldwide since January 2020; DOJ reporting says it attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries, including about 1,800 in the United States. Victims have included individuals, small businesses, multinational corporations, hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies. Reported ransom proceeds range from at least $144 million in bitcoin to approximately $500 million, with billions of dollars in additional victim losses. LockBit operates through affiliates. According to DOJ reporting, the operation was designed as a RaaS model in which the administrator typically received 20% of each ransom payment and affiliates received the remaining 80%. The group used a control panel for affiliates, maintained public leak infrastructure for extortion, and used the StealBit tool for data exfiltration. The content describes LockBit as using double extortion: affiliates unlawfully accessed vulnerable systems, stole data, encrypted victim data, and threatened to publish stolen information if victims did not pay. Reporting in the content also notes use of standard encryption routines, lateral movement with stolen credentials, and exploitation of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers by affiliates. Cisco Talos reporting cited in the content says LockBit used custom exfiltration tooling and that BlackBasta, LockBit, and Rhysida encrypted data and defaced victim systems to maximize impact. The content links LockBit to Russian-speaking cybercrime. Multiple references state that LockBit operators expressly prohibit affiliates from targeting Russian and other CIS organizations. Separate reporting in the content describes LockBit 2.0/3.0 as among ransomware groups based in Russia. U.S. government reward material describes the actors’ nationality and citizenship as various and unknown, while DOJ indictments identify alleged key members as Russian nationals or dual Russian nationals. Named LockBit-linked individuals in the content include alleged administrator Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, also known as LockBitSupp, LockBit, and putinkrab, whom DOJ alleges was the creator, developer, administrator, and public spokesperson from September 2019 through 2024; developer Rostislav Panev, a dual Russian and Israeli national; affiliates Ruslan Magomedovich Astamirov, who used the aliases BETTERPAY, offtitan, and Eastfarmer; Mikhail Vasiliev, who used the aliases Ghostrider, Free, Digitalocean90, Digitalocean99, Digitalwaters99, and Newwave110; and Mikhail Pavlovich Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, m1x, Boriselcin, Uhodiransomwar, Orange, Biba99, and TetyaSluha, who is described as an affiliate associated with LockBit and other ransomware groups. The content states that LockBit was at times the most active and destructive ransomware group in the world and describes it as the leading ransomware operation. It also notes that the group continued operating after the February 2024 international law enforcement disruption led by the U.K. National Crime Agency with DOJ, FBI, and partners, although that action significantly damaged its reputation and capabilities. Authorities seized websites and servers, developed decryption capabilities, and later charged multiple members. The content further states that seized infrastructure showed stolen victim data had been retained even after ransom payments and promises of deletion. Despite the disruption, LockBit restarted operations, stood up new leak sites, and used updated encryptors and ransom notes.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics59 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
TA0001
Initial Access
5 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×5
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×3
PowerShell
T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
T1569
System Services
T1569.002
Service Execution
TA0003
Persistence
5 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1136
Create Account
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1068×2
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.001×2
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1558
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1482×2
Domain Trust Discovery
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001×2
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002×4
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.004
SSH
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1074×4
Data Staged
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
T1560
Archive Collected Data
T1560.001
Archive via Utility
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041×4
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537×3
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×2
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
4 techniques
T1486×25
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490×2
Inhibit System Recovery
T1491
Defacement
T1491.001
Internal Defacement
T1657×4
Financial Theft
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2018-10562Command Injection in Dasan GPON Home Routers diag_FormIn the wildEvidence1

CVE-2018-10562 8.9 Dasan GPON Home Routers LockBit, RansomHouse, Crypto24 Link

CVE-2019-12780Unauthenticated Command Injection in Belkin Wemo Enabled Crock-Pot UPnP APIIn the wildEvidence1

Based on their 90-day average detection rates, CVE-2019-12780 leads the list... CVE-2019-12780 9.8 Belkin Wemo Smart Plug LockBit, RansomHouse No

CVE-2023-27350Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass and RCE in PaperCut MF/NGIn the wildEvidence1

Two vulnerabilities were fixed in the PaperCut Application Server that allows remote attackers to perform unauthenticated remote code execution and information disclosure: CVE-2023–27350 ... Unauthenticated remote code execution flaw impacting all PaperCut MF or NG versions 8.0 or later... PaperCut disclosed that these flaws were actively exploited in the wild... A PoC exploit for the RCE flaw was released... Microsoft ... attributed the recent PaperCut attacks to the Clop and LockBit ransomware operations.

CVE-2023-27351Authentication Bypass in PaperCut NG/MF SecurityRequestFilterIn the wildEvidence1

CVE-2023–27351 ... Unauthenticated information disclosure flaw impacting all PaperCut MF or NG versions 15.0 or later... PaperCut disclosed that these flaws were actively exploited in the wild... Microsoft ... attributed the recent PaperCut attacks to the Clop and LockBit ransomware operations.

CVE-2023-4966CitrixBleedIn the wildEvidence1

...LockBit ransomware group as they exploited a vulnerability known as ‘Citrix Bleed’ (CVE-2023-4966) during their attacks. LockBit leveraged this flaw to hijack authenticated sessions...

IOCS

Observables

100 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping42

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal6

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables100

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.