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Malware3 associated actors

AuKill

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovdPrivilege escalationPersistencePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

AuKill is a Windows defense-evasion utility used to disable antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) software before attackers deploy ransomware or backdoors. It employs a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) technique, abusing the legitimate Microsoft-signed kernel driver distributed with Sysinternals Process Explorer version 16.32 to interfere with protected security processes. AuKill has been used by ransomware affiliates in attacks involving Medusa Locker and LockBit, including incidents in early 2023, and has been sold on criminal marketplaces.

AuKill requires existing administrative privileges to operate. When not running as SYSTEM, it attempts to relaunch with elevated privileges by impersonating TrustedInstaller and duplicating its access token. It copies itself onto the compromised system, installs itself as a service, and loads the outdated Process Explorer driver. Multiple threads continuously monitor targeted processes and services, repeatedly terminating security processes and disabling services to prevent recovery. Some variants also unload security-product drivers and remove their service registrations. Observed targets include Sophos and Microsoft security components. AuKill shares substantial code and driver-interaction similarities with the open-source Backstab tool.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Medusa Group

“The AuKill malware employs a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to disable Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) processes.”

via jmp esp blogjmp-esp.org
LockBit

“The AuKill malware employs a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to disable Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) processes.”

via jmp esp blogjmp-esp.org
FIN7

FIN7 also developed AuKill (also known as AvNeutralizer), a custom EDR evasion utility designed to disable endpoint security solutions, which was later reported to have been offered for sale by the group on criminal marketplaces.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

For each service name in the list, AuKill checks if it exists, and if it does, disables it by calling ChangeServiceConfigW and passing SERVICE_DISABLED for dwStartType.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

For each driver name, AuKill tries to unload it via calling NtUnloadDriver and deleting the corresponding registry key in the hive System\CurrentControlSet\Services\[DRIVER_NAME].

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

For each service name in the list, AuKill checks if it exists, and if it does, disables it by calling ChangeServiceConfigW and passing SERVICE_DISABLED for dwStartType.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Finally, it copies itself to C:\Windows\system32, installs itself as a service, and starts the service.

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence7

By leveraging a vulnerable driver, attackers can execute malicious actions in kernel mode. For example, after gaining administrative access, an attacker can install a signed but flawed driver and send it crafted commands to exploit its weaknesses. | Attackers are increasingly abusing trusted Windows drivers to turn off antivirus (AV) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, using a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Then it duplicates the token of TrustedInstaller.exe using the DuplicateTokenW WINAPI function, and passes the token to CreateProcessWithTokenW to elevate itself to SYSTEM once the process restarts.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

Then it duplicates the token of TrustedInstaller.exe using the DuplicateTokenW WINAPI function, and passes the token to CreateProcessWithTokenW to elevate itself to SYSTEM once the process restarts.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

For each service name in the list, AuKill checks if it exists, and if it does, disables it by calling ChangeServiceConfigW and passing SERVICE_DISABLED for dwStartType.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Finally, it copies itself to C:\Windows\system32, installs itself as a service, and starts the service.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

If the sample does not run with SYSTEM privileges, it continues by attempting to elevate its rights by impersonating the security context of TrustedInstaller.exe.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“This tool has been found in the wild as a packed payload… analysis of the associated private packer… ‘PackXOR’… The aim of packing is to hinder the work of malware analysts and antivirus/EDR software, by concealing payloads and delaying their detection.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

AuKill drops a driver named PROCEXP.SYS (from the release version 16.32 of process Explorer) into the C:\Windows\System32\drivers path. The legitimate Process Explorer driver is named PROCEXP152.sys, and normally is found in the same location.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

For each driver name, AuKill tries to unload it via calling NtUnloadDriver and deleting the corresponding registry key in the hive System\CurrentControlSet\Services\[DRIVER_NAME].

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

FIN7 also developed AuKill (also known as AvNeutralizer), a custom EDR evasion utility designed to disable endpoint security solutions...

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Then it duplicates the token of TrustedInstaller.exe using the DuplicateTokenW WINAPI function, and passes the token to CreateProcessWithTokenW to elevate itself to SYSTEM once the process restarts.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

Then it duplicates the token of TrustedInstaller.exe using the DuplicateTokenW WINAPI function, and passes the token to CreateProcessWithTokenW to elevate itself to SYSTEM once the process restarts.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

For each service name in the list, AuKill checks if it exists, and if it does, disables it by calling ChangeServiceConfigW and passing SERVICE_DISABLED for dwStartType.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

For each driver name, AuKill tries to unload it via calling NtUnloadDriver and deleting the corresponding registry key in the hive System\CurrentControlSet\Services\[DRIVER_NAME].

T1553Subvert Trust ControlsEvidence1

脆弱な署名済みドライバを武器化し ... Process Explorer(ProcExp)ドライバ(Microsoft署名済み)を悪用

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence14

The most common outcome is the termination of AV or EDR processes. In other cases, attackers may silently degrade security tools by stripping permissions or modifying kernel structures so that monitoring systems no longer receive alerts.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

For each service name in the list, AuKill checks if it exists, and if it does, disables it by calling ChangeServiceConfigW and passing SERVICE_DISABLED for dwStartType.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

It iterates through all running processes. If a process name is included in the list, AuKill sends IO control code IOCTL_CLOSE_HANDLE to procexp.sys to close the process handle.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence3

The most common outcome is the termination of AV or EDR processes.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.