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South Korea🇰🇷 KR7 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Darkhotel

Also known asapt_c_06APT-C-60Dark HotelDarkhotelDUBNIUMEgobotFallout TeamNemimPALADINPurple PygmySHADOW CRANETapaouxTEMPLARTieOnJoeZigzag Hail

DarkHotel is a threat actor also tracked as Tapaoux and associated in the provided content with aliases including Dubnium, Zigzag Hail, Shadow Crane, Purple Pygmy, Paladin, Nemim, Fallout Team, Templar, Tieonjoe, EgoBot, APT-C-06, and APT-C-60. The content describes it as a sophisticated, likely South Korea-linked nation-state actor; Microsoft maps Dark Hotel/Tapaoux to Zigzag Hail, and Kaspersky reported indications the group may have originated from South Korea. Kaspersky stated the group had been active since at least 2007. The actor is described as targeting high-profile executives, government agencies, NGOs, defense-related entities, and luxury hotel guests in Asia, with primary targeting in North Korea, Japan, and India, as well as the U.S. defense industrial base and important executives worldwide. A notable campaign involved compromising luxury hotel networks in Asia to deliver fake Adobe updates to selected guests, with malware staged on hotel servers before a target arrived and removed after departure. The content also states the group used a two-pronged approach consisting of broad peer-to-peer infections and more selective spearphishing and hotel-based operations. Observed tradecraft in the provided content includes spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments; malware disguised as a Secure Shell (SSH) tool; persistence via Windows Run Registry keys; dropping an mspaint.lnk shortcut that launches a shell script to download and execute a file; collection of running processes; collection of hostname, OS version, service pack version, processor architecture, IP address, and network adapter information; use of forged or stolen code-signing certificates to sign malware, backdoors, and downloaders; obfuscation using RC4, XOR, and RSA; just-in-time string decryption to evade sandbox detection; and process and memory injection behavior including WriteProcessMemory and Process32NextW noted in sandbox analysis. Kaspersky also reported use of zero-day exploits in spearphishing, a kernel-mode keystroke logger, and signed malware made to appear legitimate. The content further states that the NSA Territorial Dispute research mapped Sig25 to Dark Hotel/Tapaoux and suggests the NSA may have tracked DarkHotel tools in 2011, before broader public discovery.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇰🇵 North Korea
  • 🇯🇵 Japan
  • 🇮🇳 India
  • 🇺🇸 United States

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • KR
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

43 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics59 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1189×2
Drive-by Compromise
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1200
Hardware Additions
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001×12
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×3
PowerShell
T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1129
Shared Modules
T1203×4
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204×3
User Execution
T1204.002×6
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
T1546.015
Component Object Model Hijacking
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×4
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
T1546.015
Component Object Model Hijacking
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×4
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
7 techniques
T1027×6
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.013×2
Encrypted/Encoded File
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.008
Masquerade File Type
T1055
Process Injection
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218×2
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.014
MMC
T1497×3
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.006
Run Virtual Instance
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002×2
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0007
Discovery
8 techniques
T1016×6
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1046
Network Service Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082×7
System Information Discovery
T1083×4
File and Directory Discovery
T1124
System Time Discovery
T1497×3
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1102
Web Service
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2015-8651Integer Overflow RCE in Adobe Flash Player and Adobe AIRIn the wildEvidence2

Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2018-8174Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence1

May 2018: a new wave of targeted attacks abusing CVE-2018-8174 (this exploit has been associated with the DarkHotel APT group, as described on Securelist), with diplomatic, defense, manufacturing, military and government targets in Asia and Eastern Europe;

CVE-2020-0968Internet Explorer Scripting Engine Memory Corruption RCEIn the wildEvidence1

At the end of June 2020, the operators stepped up their game by using a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2020-0968, which had been patched in April 2020. Instead of delivering an archive with a LNK file, the C&C server was delivering an RTF file that, once opened, downloaded an HTML file exploiting the aforementioned vulnerability.

CVE-2024-7262Arbitrary DLL Load in Kingsoft WPS Office promecefpluginhost.exeIn the wildEvidence1

Public reporting indicates the group exploited a remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows version of a productivity suite (CVE-2024-7262) to drop SpyGlace.

IOCS

Observables

101 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping43

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal7

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables101

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.