KONNI is a Windows remote access trojan associated with North Korean cyber operations and commonly linked to APT37, also tracked in some reporting as Earth Imp. It has been used in espionage-oriented campaigns and has evolved toward stealthier delivery and execution methods.
Observed KONNI activity includes delivery through phishing-themed lures and malicious Windows shortcut files, including oversized .lnk samples padded with whitespace and junk content to conceal malicious command-line behavior from users and hinder detection. KONNI has also used PowerShell to download and execute payloads, and has leveraged certutil to retrieve and decode Base64-encoded content.
On compromised systems, KONNI supports a range of surveillance and post-compromise functions. Documented capabilities include collecting the current username, gathering the victim host’s IP address, enumerating running processes with tasklist, capturing screenshots, deleting files, and stealing browser profile data containing credential material from Firefox, Chrome, and Opera. Stolen data has been encoded with a custom Base64 key prior to exfiltration.
For persistence, KONNI has modified Windows Registry settings and has also established autostart by placing a shortcut in the Startup folder, including masqueraded shortcut names intended to appear legitimate. For privilege escalation and execution proxying, KONNI has used rundll32 to launch its loader. These behaviors, combined with credential theft and host reconnaissance, make KONNI a multifunction espionage implant focused on long-term access and information collection from Windows victims.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
During our analysis, we discovered that some North Korean threat actors, such as Earth Manticore (APT37) and Earth Imp (Konni), tended to use extremely large .lnk files with large amounts of whitespace and other junk content to further evade detection.
12 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Since the beginning of 2022 CYFIRMA and 3rd party researchers alike have been observing a few of the same domains below repeatedly used in Konni Campaigns by suspected APT37 from North Korea.
During our analysis, we discovered that some North Korean threat actors, such as Earth Manticore (APT37) and Earth Imp (Konni), tended to use extremely large .lnk files with large amounts of whitespace and other junk content to further evade detection.
During our analysis, we discovered that some North Korean threat actors, such as Earth Manticore (APT37) and Earth Imp (Konni), tended to use extremely large .lnk files with large amounts of whitespace and other junk content to further evade detection.
In this campaign, the hackers use malware known as Konni, a remote access trojan (RAT) capable of establishing persistence and performing privilege escalation on the host.
The phishing campaign started since at least October 19, 2021, deploying Konni malware, a remote administration tool (RAT) associated with the cyber activity from North Korean hackers known as APT37.
The phishing campaign started since at least October 19, 2021, deploying Konni malware, a remote administration tool (RAT) associated with the cyber activity from North Korean hackers known as APT37.
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell to execute payloads, run commands, download additional malware, perform lateral movement, evade defenses, and execute scripts in memory. | Examples include: 'APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands'; 'APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation'; 'TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.'
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values. Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.
KONNI has bypassed UAC by performing token impersonation... Qilin can bypass standard user access controls by using stolen tokens to launch processes at an elevated security context.
Malware development tricks: parent PID spoofing. Simple C++ example. Cobalt Strike Konni
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.
Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that 'bypass UAC,' 'perform UAC bypass,' or use specific Windows components such as fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, sdclt.exe, CMSTPLUA COM interface, SilentCleanup, and registry hijacks to gain elevated privileges.
actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.
KONNI has bypassed UAC by performing token impersonation... Qilin can bypass standard user access controls by using stolen tokens to launch processes at an elevated security context.
Malware development tricks: parent PID spoofing. Simple C++ example. Cobalt Strike Konni
APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.
certutil has been used to decode binaries hidden inside certificate files as Base64 information.
Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations.
The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, BIOS, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, and WMI to gather host information. | Multiple entries explicitly state use of the Windows systeminfo command, e.g., 'BlackEnergy has used Systeminfo to gather the OS version...' and 'OilRig has run hostname and systeminfo on a victim.'
Examples include: "Babuk can enumerate disk volumes," "Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives," and "XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed."
Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'
The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.
we observed a repeatedly used set of domains hosted at the same Bulgarian IP range 185.176.43.0/24
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
183 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
140 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Konni is mentioned in connection with North Korean threat actor activity using oversized malicious .lnk files to evade detection while exploiting the shortcut vulnerability.
A long-running RAT/backdoor family repeatedly linked in the content to North Korean activity, including diplomatic targeting and phishing-based delivery.
A PowerShell backdoor associated with Konni activity, described here as AI-assisted in its code generation while retaining established delivery and execution tradecraft.
Konni is referenced in the context of a multi-stage attack involving malicious LNK files used to implant a Python-based backdoor.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.