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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 2 CVEs

SpyGlace

SpyGlace is a backdoor malware family used in cyber-espionage campaigns attributed in the provided reporting to APT-C-60, with sustained activity against Japanese organizations observed from June through August 2025. It was delivered through spear-phishing emails impersonating job applicants and targeting recruitment or HR staff. In the documented infection chain, victims received a malicious VHDX attachment containing an LNK file; opening the shortcut executed a legitimate Git component (gcmd.exe) to run a malicious script, display a decoy document, and install staged downloader components. Downloader1 (including WebClassUser.dat) established persistence via COM hijacking at HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{566296fe-e0e8-475f-ba9c-a31ad31620b1}\InProcServer32, beaconed to StatCounter using victim identifiers derived from the volume serial number and computer name, and retrieved victim-specific tasking from GitHub raw URLs such as raw.githubusercontent.com/carolab989/class2025/... . Downloader2 then fetched and executed SpyGlace and its loader, also using COM hijacking and XOR-decoded payload retrieval.

JPCERT/CC observed SpyGlace versions 3.1.12, 3.1.13, and 3.1.14. Reported changes versus earlier 3.1.6 samples included prockill and proclist being changed to no-ops, addition of a new uld command that calls a function in a loaded module and unloads it after two seconds, and a screenupload-related module path reference to %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Clouds\Clouds.db with export name mssc1. Version differences also included distinct mutexes and an autorun path change in 3.1.14 to %appdata%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\CPLs. SpyGlace uses string and API obfuscation based on single-byte XOR and SUB operations, and its Download command decrypts files with AES-128-CBC using key B0747C82C23359D1342B47A669796989 and IV 21A44712685A8BA42985783B67883999, writing output to %temp%\wcts66889.tmp.

For command-and-control, SpyGlace communications were reported to use Base64 and a modified RC4 scheme. Initial request headers included values such as md5("GOLDBAR"), md5(system information), and encoded host data including computer name, user name, CPU info, OS version, and SpyGlace version. The string "GOLDBAR" was noted as a recurring marker in prior related reporting. The malware and associated campaigns abused legitimate services including StatCounter for victim tracking and GitHub for per-host tasking and payload staging, and earlier related reporting also referenced Bitbucket. High-confidence indicators mentioned in the content include filenames such as sp.dat, WebClassUser.dat, SecureBootUEFI.dat, Service.dat, cn.dat, and the C2 example IP 103.187.26.176.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2024-7262Arbitrary DLL Load in Kingsoft WPS Office promecefpluginhost.exeExploited in the wild

Public reporting indicates the group exploited a remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows version of a productivity suite (CVE-2024-7262) to drop SpyGlace.

via foresiet blogforesiet.com
CVE-2024-7263Arbitrary DLL Load in Kingsoft WPS Office promecefpluginhost.exe

APT-C-60 ... orchestrating multi-stage campaigns to deploy the SpyGlace back-door... ultimately loading SpyGlace... executing sp.dat (SpyGlace) as the back-door.

via foresiet blogforesiet.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Darkhotel

"APT-C-60 Targets Japan: New SpyGlace Malware Uses VHDX LNK and GitHub Tasking for Persistent Espionage"

via security online infosecurityonline.info
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

「求職者を装い組織の採用担当に宛てた標的型攻撃メール…今回の攻撃では悪性のVHDXファイルが直接添付ファイルとして送られていました。」

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

「メールの受信者がVHDXファイル内に含まれているLNKファイルをクリックすることで…悪性のスクリプトが動作します。」

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

「VHDXファイル内に含まれているLNKファイルをクリック…」

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

「取得したファイルは…XORデコード後に実行」「SpyGlaceは…BASE64とRC4…改変されたRC4」「AES128-CBCにて復号」

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

「a002=[md5(systeminfo)]」「[ComputerName;UserName;CpuInfo;OS Version;SpyGlace Version]」

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

「cancel Remote shell」

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

「screenupload Upload screenshot」「screenauto Upload screenshot automatically」

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

「statcounter…に対して一定間隔で通信」「リクエストヘッダー…Referer: ONLINE=>…」「C2サーバーとの通信にBASE64とRC4を使用…リクエストヘッダーのフォーマット…」

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

「攻撃者はペイロードの配布にGitHubを使用…」「Downloader1はstatcounterという正規の統計サービスに対して一定間隔で通信」

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

「https://raw.githubusercontent.com/.../[VolumeSerialNumber + ComputerName].txt…その取得したファイルに記載されているURLを元に次のDownloader2のダウンロードおよび実行」

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

53 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
34 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
14 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching53

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping10

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.