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Mallory
Threat actor

MoYu Group

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware3Families
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs72Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Financial
Targets
CN
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitationInitial accessSpoofing
Also known asMoYu Group

MoYu Group is a threat actor linked with high confidence to the BADBOX botnet ecosystem, including BADBOX 2.0, and is associated with covert monetization of compromised Android-based consumer and embedded devices. The group has been tied to operations affecting Android smartphones, tablets, streaming devices, TV boxes, and Android-based automotive head units. Its activity is consistent with financially motivated abuse of infected devices for ad fraud and residential or reverse-proxy services. MoYu Group has been associated with a multi-stage Android malware campaign targeting aftermarket car infotainment head units running DoFun software, assessed as the first documented malware infection chain specifically tailored to that device class. In that operation, the actors abused a legitimate system update component to silently install malicious Android applications without user interaction. The malware chain included dropper, loader, clicker, downloader, and reverse-proxy functionality. Observed behavior showed the operators primarily deploying a reverse-proxy module, indicating an objective of enrolling devices into a proxy botnet while retaining the ability to deliver additional payloads. Across reporting, MoYu Group is linked to BADBOX operations that have used both supply-chain-style preinstallation on low-cost Android devices and post-sale compromise through legitimate update paths. The group’s tooling supports remote command execution through application-level tasking, device profiling, periodic beaconing, dynamic configuration updates, hidden web content loading, HTTP-based task execution, and arbitrary module loading. Documented capabilities include ad display, fraudulent ad clicking, device information collection, payload staging, and conversion of infected devices into traffic-relay nodes for proxy infrastructure. Attribution to MoYu Group is supported by overlaps in infrastructure, malware naming conventions, shared components, and links to other BADBOX-associated Android malware. The actor has also been named alongside other BADBOX-related entities including SalesTracker Group, Lemon Group, and LongTV. MoYu Group should be understood as part of a broader Chinese-linked criminal ecosystem focused on monetizing large populations of compromised Android and IoT-like devices rather than as a traditional espionage actor.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Automobiles & Components

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • China

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

32 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

11 of 15 tactics40 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195×13Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.002×2Compromise Software Supply Chain
TA0002Execution5 techniques
T1059×5Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.007×7JavaScript
T1072Software Deployment Tools
T1106Native API
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1055Process Injection
TA0005Stealth6 techniques
T1027×4Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.007Dynamic API Resolution
T1055Process Injection
T1140×5Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1620×2Reflective Code Loading
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1553Subvert Trust Controls
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1016×2System Network Configuration Discovery
T1082×11System Information Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1518×2Software Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1072Software Deployment Tools
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1115×5Clipboard Data
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011Command and Control6 techniques
T1071×9Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2Web Protocols
T1090×10Proxy
T1090.001Internal Proxy
T1090.002External Proxy
T1090.003×3Multi-hop Proxy
T1102×2Web Service
T1105×15Ingress Tool Transfer
T1568Dynamic Resolution
T1571Non-Standard Port
TA0040Impact1 technique
T1496×2Resource Hijacking
Indicators of compromise

Observables

72 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does MoYu Group target?
MoYu Group targets Automobiles & Components in China.
What malware does MoYu Group use?
MoYu Group is associated with JarService, BADBOX 2.0, and zhima.
Where is MoYu Group from?
Mallory's sources associate MoYu Group with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
security weekNews · Aug 25, 2026First Malware Built Specifically for Car Head Units Fuels Botnet - SecurityWeekLinked to development and operation of the BadBox botnet and assessed as likely responsible for malware targeting Android-based car head units via a compromised software update channel, apparently to enroll devices into a proxy botnet and support fraud-related activity.Read more ↗the record mediaNews · Aug 24, 2026Hackers infecting Android car systems to build proxy botnet | The Record from Recorded Future NewsOperating an Android malware campaign infecting DoFun Android-based car head units via abuse of the TWCore system application to install JarService, with the apparent goal of expanding a botnet and using infected devices as reverse proxies, ad-fraud nodes, and downloader footholds.Read more ↗help net securityNews · Aug 24, 2026Android car head units infected with proxy botnet malware through built-in software updaters - Help Net SecurityAttributed operator behind Android malware delivered via built-in updaters on Android-based car head units, using the infections for ad fraud and to build a proxy botnet.Read more ↗xakepNews · Aug 24, 2026Хакеры заражают головные устройства авто малварью для создания прокси-ботнета - ХакерAttributed with high confidence to a campaign targeting Android-based automotive head units via a legitimate software update mechanism, delivering JarService and the zhima reverse-proxy module to monetize infected devices and expand a proxy botnet.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping32MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware3Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables72Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.