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Mallory
Malware6 associated actors

BADBOX 2.0

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this week#81of 30,716 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days24 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK36Techniques
IOCs202Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Defense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
Fake update
Platforms
AndroidIOT
Also known asBADBOX

BADBOX 2.0 is an Android-device botnet used for large-scale advertising fraud and unauthorized residential proxy services. It compromises inexpensive consumer devices, particularly uncertified streaming television boxes and other connected devices running Android Open Source Project derivatives. The broader BADBOX family has also affected phones, tablets, media players, and digital picture frames. Some affected devices contain malware before delivery, making device purchase itself an infection vector; malicious applications have also contributed to distribution.

BADBOX monetizes compromised devices through fraudulent advertising activity and by routing third-party traffic through victims’ internet connections without their knowledge or consent. The family uses hidden video advertisements, impersonation of legitimate streaming applications, and residential proxy routing to make fraudulent traffic appear legitimate and evade anti-abuse filtering.

BADBOX 2.0 was identified in 2025 with more than one million infected connected television devices. A March 2025 disruption disconnected more than 500,000 devices from their control servers, while Google removed 24 malware-spreading applications from Google Play. Google subsequently alleged that the operation had compromised more than 10 million uncertified Android-based devices. The operators later rebuilt the operation, with subsequent activity tracked as BADBOX 3.0.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MoYu Group

Kaspersky researchers tied the JarService infections to a familiar foe: the MoYu Group, which was also behind the notorious BadBox botnet.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MoYu

Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and attributed the operation to the MoYu group, a threat actor previously associated with the BadBox malware botnet.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
LongTV

BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
Lemon Group

BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
SalesTracker Group

BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
BadBox 2.0 Enterprise

"Google filed a 'John Doe' lawsuit ... against ... the 'BadBox 2.0 Enterprise,' which Google described as a botnet of over ten million unsanctioned Android streaming devices engaged in advertising fraud."

via krebs on securitykrebsonsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

T1583.008 — Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet (Resource Development)

T1584.005BotnetEvidence2

GTIG estimates the size of the NetNut network to be at least 2 million devices, distributed across the world.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence5

Silently downloads and installs specific apps without user permission.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Threat actors exploited a vulnerability in a system designed to handle software updates, enabling them to deliver malware to vehicle head units

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence27

The attackers compromised the update distribution channel to deliver stealthy malicious Android applications that served as droppers, loaders, clickers, and reverse-proxy loaders.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

Le malware est distribué via TWCore ( com.tw.core ), une application système légitime responsable des mises à jour du firmware. TWCore reçoit des instructions via un broker MQTT hébergé sur cardoor[.]cn , qui lui ordonne de télécharger et d’installer des APK malveillants.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

rikolliset voivat vuokrata pääsyn bottiverkkoon ja käyttää sitä esimerkiksi mainospetoksiin tai tietojenkalasteluun...

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

BadBox 2.0 mahdollistaa lisämoduulien etäkäynnistyksen...

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

web — opens a link in a hidden browser view and runs JavaScript inside it

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

The attackers compromised the update distribution channel to deliver stealthy malicious Android applications that served as droppers, loaders, clickers, and reverse-proxy loaders.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1136Create AccountEvidence2

BadBox ist in der Lage, unbemerkt Accounts für E-Mail- und Messenger-Dienste zu erstellen, über die anschließend Fake-News verbreitet werden können.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

BADBOX often comes baked into the firmware, so people are unboxing new devices that are already compromised before they even join a network.

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

...haittaohjelman takaovi sijaitsee laiteohjelmistossa, jota ei voi kirjoittaa uudelleen ilman valmistajan erillisiä toimenpiteitä.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Haittaohjelman asentamista varten laitteisiin on upotettu takaovi jo tuotantoketjussa, eikä sitä voi poistaa.

T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryEvidence1

T1554 — Compromise Host Software Binary (Persistence)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

We conducted an investigation, discovering a new version of the BADBOX backdoor, preloaded on the device. This backdoor is a multi-level loader embedded in a malicious native library, librescache.so, which was loaded by the system framework. As a result, a copy of the Trojan infiltrated every process running on the device.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Haittaohjelman asentamista varten laitteisiin on upotettu takaovi jo tuotantoketjussa, eikä sitä voi poistaa.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Toisin kuin monissa muissa haittaohjelmissa, BadBox 2.0 toimii laitteen juuritason oikeuksilla, mikä tekee sen poistamisesta käytännössä mahdotonta ilman erikoistoimenpiteitä.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“decrypted data… using RC4… payload… loaded via DexClassLoader… C2 server addresses… Base64… gzip… AES-128… Another backdoor… single-byte XOR and executes it…”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

We conducted an investigation, discovering a new version of the BADBOX backdoor, preloaded on the device. This backdoor is a multi-level loader embedded in a malicious native library, librescache.so, which was loaded by the system framework. As a result, a copy of the Trojan infiltrated every process running on the device.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

BADBOX often comes baked into the firmware, so people are unboxing new devices that are already compromised before they even join a network.

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

...haittaohjelman takaovi sijaitsee laiteohjelmistossa, jota ei voi kirjoittaa uudelleen ilman valmistajan erillisiä toimenpiteitä.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

FBI indicators include: "Requiring Google Play Protect settings to be disabled."

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

“Triada… allowed the Trojan to exfiltrate credentials from messaging apps and social media platforms… payload… designed to steal victims’ account credentials… Telegram and Instagram… code for WhatsApp…”

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

BADBOX exploits devices for activities such as residential proxying... account abuse, and ad fraud.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

BSI says the malware can steal two-factor authentication codes

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Stage two is a loader. It sends basic information about the infected device to a remote server... Stage three checks in with a remote server every 90 minutes, sending along the device’s screen resolution, model, connected Wi-Fi network name and MAC address

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

This flag allows TWCore to install apps that weren’t originally present on the device.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Data Harvesting Module, collects sensitive user and device information, including: Installed apps, IP and MAC addresses, Geolocation data, Device ID, IMEI, Android version, and more

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

copy — sets the contents of the clipboard, optionally pulling in extra data from a link

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

This remote server will tell the BadBox malware what malicious services should be run on the device and will also receive data stolen from the network.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

BADBOX exploits devices for activities such as residential proxying... account abuse, and ad fraud.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence11

Stage three checks in with a remote server every 90 minutes... then waits for commands from the attackers’ server. ... http — sends a request to a server and can save the response

T1090ProxyEvidence9

Kaspersky researchers have observed only commands to download a reverse proxy module, suggesting that the main goal is to ensnare devices in a proxy botnet.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

Stage 3 – Clicker / Reverse proxy loader : ... télécharge et exécute le module zhima (proxy inversé).

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence11

Only loadlib2 and http were seen in use, with loadlib2 pulling down zhima, the reverse proxy module... This confirms that the attackers’ ultimate goal is building a proxy botnet.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

The malware supports nine commands, including ones that enable its operators to display ads, conduct ad fraud (via the clicker component), and download additional components.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

used to steal data, install additional malware, or for the threat actors to remotely gain access to the network where the device is located

Impact

3 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2

Création d’un botnet proxy résidentiel via le module zhima

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3

Residential Proxy Services, turns infected devices into proxy exit nodes to facilitate the following attacks: · Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Bottiverkkoon liitettyjä laitteita voidaan käyttää rikolliseen toimintaan, esimerkiksi palvelunestohyökkäyksiin.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

202 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

200 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
bleeping computerNews · Nov 21, 2026BADBOX 3.0 botnet returns with record-breaking 40 billion daily ad requestsInfects Android-based phones, tablets, and streaming TV boxes to conduct advertising fraud and residential proxying. BADBOX 3.0 generated approximately 40 billion fraudulent daily advertising bid requests at its peak. It plays video advertisements in hidden windows, impersonates legitimate streaming applications, and enrolls devices in residential proxy networks without owners' consent. The operation also uses fraudulent server-side ad insertion requests. Infected devices download modules from public code repositories, with payloads mirrored across hosting platforms to resist disruption. Earlier takedowns interrupted BADBOX 2.0, but operators rebuilt the botnet.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 19, 2026BADBOX 3.0 Malware Infects Android TV Boxes to Generate 40 Billion Fraudulent Ad Requests DailyEarlier malware and the family designation linking the BADBOX campaigns. Infrastructure associated with the PXYEDGE residential proxy network included a relay shared with BADBOX and a proxy previously observed as a BADBOX task server.Read more ↗heiseNews · Nov 19, 2026BSI ändert Lagebewertung auf „angespannt bis kritisch“ | heise onlineMalware reported on approximately 30,000 infected systems in Germany. Affected devices arrive preinfected, with the malware residing in unpatchable components of TV boxes, media players, digital picture frames, mobile phones, smartphones, and tablets. Infected devices are incorporated into botnets for DDoS attacks or proxy activities.Read more ↗eset welivesecurity blogNews · Nov 19, 2026My IoT devices are no longer supported - is my smart home safe?Botnet involving no-name Android TV boxes and other devices, cited as an example of smart-device security risks. The article notes that the FBI warned about its use of these devices in June 2025.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching202Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping36Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.