BADBOX 2.0
- Type
- Botnet
- Capabilities
- Defense evasionSpoofing
- Delivery
- Fake update
- Platforms
- AndroidIOT
BADBOX 2.0 is an Android-device botnet used for large-scale advertising fraud and unauthorized residential proxy services. It compromises inexpensive consumer devices, particularly uncertified streaming television boxes and other connected devices running Android Open Source Project derivatives. The broader BADBOX family has also affected phones, tablets, media players, and digital picture frames. Some affected devices contain malware before delivery, making device purchase itself an infection vector; malicious applications have also contributed to distribution.
BADBOX monetizes compromised devices through fraudulent advertising activity and by routing third-party traffic through victims’ internet connections without their knowledge or consent. The family uses hidden video advertisements, impersonation of legitimate streaming applications, and residential proxy routing to make fraudulent traffic appear legitimate and evade anti-abuse filtering.
BADBOX 2.0 was identified in 2025 with more than one million infected connected television devices. A March 2025 disruption disconnected more than 500,000 devices from their control servers, while Google removed 24 malware-spreading applications from Google Play. Google subsequently alleged that the operation had compromised more than 10 million uncertified Android-based devices. The operators later rebuilt the operation, with subsequent activity tracked as BADBOX 3.0.
Associated threat actors
6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Kaspersky researchers tied the JarService infections to a familiar foe: the MoYu Group, which was also behind the notorious BadBox botnet.
Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and attributed the operation to the MoYu group, a threat actor previously associated with the BadBox malware botnet.
BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse
BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse
BADBOX 2.0 Botnet Infects 1 Million Android Devices for Ad Fraud and Proxy Abuse
"Google filed a 'John Doe' lawsuit ... against ... the 'BadBox 2.0 Enterprise,' which Google described as a botnet of over ten million unsanctioned Android streaming devices engaged in advertising fraud."
Techniques & procedures
36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
T1583.008 — Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet (Resource Development)
GTIG estimates the size of the NetNut network to be at least 2 million devices, distributed across the world.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
Silently downloads and installs specific apps without user permission.
Threat actors exploited a vulnerability in a system designed to handle software updates, enabling them to deliver malware to vehicle head units
The attackers compromised the update distribution channel to deliver stealthy malicious Android applications that served as droppers, loaders, clickers, and reverse-proxy loaders.
Le malware est distribué via TWCore ( com.tw.core ), une application système légitime responsable des mises à jour du firmware. TWCore reçoit des instructions via un broker MQTT hébergé sur cardoor[.]cn , qui lui ordonne de télécharger et d’installer des APK malveillants.
rikolliset voivat vuokrata pääsyn bottiverkkoon ja käyttää sitä esimerkiksi mainospetoksiin tai tietojenkalasteluun...
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
BadBox 2.0 mahdollistaa lisämoduulien etäkäynnistyksen...
web — opens a link in a hidden browser view and runs JavaScript inside it
The attackers compromised the update distribution channel to deliver stealthy malicious Android applications that served as droppers, loaders, clickers, and reverse-proxy loaders.
Persistence
5 techniques
Persistence
BadBox ist in der Lage, unbemerkt Accounts für E-Mail- und Messenger-Dienste zu erstellen, über die anschließend Fake-News verbreitet werden können.
BADBOX often comes baked into the firmware, so people are unboxing new devices that are already compromised before they even join a network.
...haittaohjelman takaovi sijaitsee laiteohjelmistossa, jota ei voi kirjoittaa uudelleen ilman valmistajan erillisiä toimenpiteitä.
Haittaohjelman asentamista varten laitteisiin on upotettu takaovi jo tuotantoketjussa, eikä sitä voi poistaa.
T1554 — Compromise Host Software Binary (Persistence)
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
We conducted an investigation, discovering a new version of the BADBOX backdoor, preloaded on the device. This backdoor is a multi-level loader embedded in a malicious native library, librescache.so, which was loaded by the system framework. As a result, a copy of the Trojan infiltrated every process running on the device.
Haittaohjelman asentamista varten laitteisiin on upotettu takaovi jo tuotantoketjussa, eikä sitä voi poistaa.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
Toisin kuin monissa muissa haittaohjelmissa, BadBox 2.0 toimii laitteen juuritason oikeuksilla, mikä tekee sen poistamisesta käytännössä mahdotonta ilman erikoistoimenpiteitä.
“decrypted data… using RC4… payload… loaded via DexClassLoader… C2 server addresses… Base64… gzip… AES-128… Another backdoor… single-byte XOR and executes it…”
We conducted an investigation, discovering a new version of the BADBOX backdoor, preloaded on the device. This backdoor is a multi-level loader embedded in a malicious native library, librescache.so, which was loaded by the system framework. As a result, a copy of the Trojan infiltrated every process running on the device.
BADBOX often comes baked into the firmware, so people are unboxing new devices that are already compromised before they even join a network.
...haittaohjelman takaovi sijaitsee laiteohjelmistossa, jota ei voi kirjoittaa uudelleen ilman valmistajan erillisiä toimenpiteitä.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
FBI indicators include: "Requiring Google Play Protect settings to be disabled."
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
“Triada… allowed the Trojan to exfiltrate credentials from messaging apps and social media platforms… payload… designed to steal victims’ account credentials… Telegram and Instagram… code for WhatsApp…”
BADBOX exploits devices for activities such as residential proxying... account abuse, and ad fraud.
BSI says the malware can steal two-factor authentication codes
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Stage two is a loader. It sends basic information about the infected device to a remote server... Stage three checks in with a remote server every 90 minutes, sending along the device’s screen resolution, model, connected Wi-Fi network name and MAC address
This flag allows TWCore to install apps that weren’t originally present on the device.
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
Data Harvesting Module, collects sensitive user and device information, including: Installed apps, IP and MAC addresses, Geolocation data, Device ID, IMEI, Android version, and more
copy — sets the contents of the clipboard, optionally pulling in extra data from a link
This remote server will tell the BadBox malware what malicious services should be run on the device and will also receive data stolen from the network.
BADBOX exploits devices for activities such as residential proxying... account abuse, and ad fraud.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
Stage three checks in with a remote server every 90 minutes... then waits for commands from the attackers’ server. ... http — sends a request to a server and can save the response
Kaspersky researchers have observed only commands to download a reverse proxy module, suggesting that the main goal is to ensnare devices in a proxy botnet.
Stage 3 – Clicker / Reverse proxy loader : ... télécharge et exécute le module zhima (proxy inversé).
Only loadlib2 and http were seen in use, with loadlib2 pulling down zhima, the reverse proxy module... This confirms that the attackers’ ultimate goal is building a proxy botnet.
The malware supports nine commands, including ones that enable its operators to display ads, conduct ad fraud (via the clicker component), and download additional components.
used to steal data, install additional malware, or for the threat actors to remotely gain access to the network where the device is located
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
Création d’un botnet proxy résidentiel via le module zhima
Residential Proxy Services, turns infected devices into proxy exit nodes to facilitate the following attacks: · Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Bottiverkkoon liitettyjä laitteita voidaan käyttää rikolliseen toimintaan, esimerkiksi palvelunestohyökkäyksiin.
Observables
202 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
200 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.