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TeamPCP, tracked by Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group as UNC6780, is a financially motivated cybercriminal group that emerged in late 2025 and conducted large-scale software supply-chain compromises during 2026. It targeted open-source software ecosystems, developer tooling, CI/CD infrastructure, cloud environments, and AI-development systems to steal credentials, API keys, source code, and proprietary AI-related data. Known aliases include PCPcat, ShellForce, DeadCatx3, PersyPCP, and UNC6780; available infrastructure and branding evidence also links elements of its online presence to CipherForce, although not every activity attributed to that wider identity set is conclusively attributable to TeamPCP. The group compromised or was associated with compromises affecting Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Telnyx, TanStack, Mistral AI, and other software projects. Its operations commonly used compromised maintainer, package-publishing, and CI/CD credentials to distribute trojanized package releases and to harvest additional secrets from downstream developer systems. TeamPCP distributed CanisterWorm and released Mini Shai-Hulud, self-propagating supply-chain malware frameworks that steal package-publishing credentials and enable further malicious package publication. TeamPCP adopted Shai-Hulud branding for later 2026 activity, but it has not been definitively attributed to the original 2025 Shai-Hulud campaigns. TeamPCP used stolen credentials for follow-on cloud and development-environment intrusions, including access to build pipelines, repositories, and cloud accounts. It targeted AI coding assistants, LLM-based security scanners, AI-service credentials, and CI/CD systems; activity associated with its DUSTMAKER tooling included prompt injection against AI-enabled development and security workflows. The group also used autonomous AI-agent workflows for vulnerability scanning, credential harvesting, troubleshooting, and operational automation. It reportedly worked with ShinyHunters and other Hacker Com-associated actors to monetize stolen credentials and data, including through extortion. Australian authorities arrested two alleged key TeamPCP members in August 2026.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
26 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
21 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
The chain that reached the widest set of victims ran through Trivy into LiteLLM... The ecosystem flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-33634 and was added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 26 March 2026.
During February, the group expanded its exploitation to include CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-55182. In December 2025, TeamPCP's PCPcat operation targeted React2Shell-vulnerable applications and exposed Docker APIs with ransomware.
The tracking identifier is CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6 per The Hacker News; advisory GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx per Snyk).
During February, masscan[.]cloud again resolved to 44.252.85.168 and 67.217.57.240. During this period, the group expanded its exploitation to include CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-55182, targeting a broad range of internet-facing technologies including AWS, Anyscale’s Ray, Docker, Kubernetes, Linux, Meta React, Microsoft Azure, Redis, and Vercel Next.js.
The four CVEs associated with this campaign are CVE-2026-33634, CVE-2026-48027, CVE-2026-45321, and CVE-2025-55182.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
612 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A supply-chain-focused criminal group that compromises software publishers and CI/CD infrastructure, steals credentials, distributes malicious package updates and self-propagating worms, conducts data theft and extortion, and uses stolen access to enable follow-on attacks. The group published an open-source Mini Shai-Hulud variant and reportedly partnered with other extortion and ransomware groups.
An upstart cybercrime group reported to have compromised global code supply chains with malicious software and stolen credentials, which were subsequently used in extortion activity.
Supply-chain-focused cybercrime group that compromised global code supply chains with malicious software and collected credentials. It briefly partnered with ShinyHunters and SLSH members, but the partnership deteriorated amid disputes over monetization and extortion proceeds.
Associated with a LiteLLM supply-chain infostealer campaign that targeted GCP credential artifacts, including Application Default Credentials files.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.