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Threat actorRussiaLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

LAUNDRY BEAR

Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days8 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
CVEs2Associated
Malware11Families
ATT&CK115Techniques
IOCs220Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
USUA
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessDefense evasionReconnaissanceBrute force
Also known asLaundry BearLaundryBearta488uac_0190Void Blizzardvoid_blizzard_(laundry_bear)

Laundry Bear is a Russian state-backed cyberespionage actor also tracked as Void Blizzard, TA488, UAC-0190, UNK_PitStop, and CL-STA-1114. Active since at least 2024, it conducts intelligence-collection operations against Western governments and organizations in NATO countries and Ukraine. Its targets include military organizations, defense suppliers, diplomatic bodies, energy and nuclear organizations, scientific and educational institutions, civil society organizations, and digital service providers. The actor has been identified as a private contractor working for Russian intelligence. Laundry Bear focuses on acquiring sustained access to email, cloud-hosted files, and other sensitive information. Its techniques include password spraying, session-cookie theft, and living-off-the-land activity. Beginning at least in July 2025, TA488 exploited CVE-2025-66376, a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite, against Ukrainian government entities and U.S. government, scientific, nuclear, and defense organizations. Crafted HTML emails triggered JavaScript execution when opened or previewed in vulnerable webmail, without requiring a link click or attachment execution. The campaign deployed the ZimReaper JavaScript implant within authenticated browser sessions. ZimReaper stole authentication material and browser-autofilled passwords, enumerated organizational address directories, and exported up to 90 days of mailbox contents. It created application-specific passwords to maintain mail-protocol access without two-factor authentication, and used DNS and HTTP-based exfiltration. Laundry Bear also sent further exploit-bearing messages from compromised accounts. Its defense-evasion techniques include payload obfuscation, browser-session execution, and infrastructure masquerading as legitimate telemetry services. The actor has also exploited Outlook Web Access through crafted messages that deploy the browser-resident OWAReaper implant. This activity involves mailbox reconnaissance, credential and OAuth-token theft, and persistent access through mailbox permission changes. Across its operations, Laundry Bear emphasizes repeatable access to communications and bulk information collection rather than disruptive or financially motivated activity.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Education & Research
  • Financial Services
  • Software & Services
  • Energy
  • Telecommunication Services
  • Consumer Services
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Public Safety
  • Capital Goods
  • Media & Entertainment

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
  • Ukraine
  • Netherlands
  • United Kingdom
  • Australia
  • Finland
  • New Zealand
  • Russia

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

115 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

15 of 15 tactics141 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance6 techniques
T1589×4Gather Victim Identity Information
T1589.001×3Credentials
T1589.002×3Email Addresses
T1590Gather Victim Network Information
T1593×3Search Open Websites/Domains
T1595×3Active Scanning
T1596Search Open Technical Databases
T1596.005×3Scan Databases
T1597×3Search Closed Sources
T1597.002×3Purchase Technical Data
TA0042Resource Development6 techniques
T1583×5Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001×4Domains
T1583.003×6Virtual Private Server
T1583.006Web Services
T1584Compromise Infrastructure
T1586Compromise Accounts
T1586.002Email Accounts
T1587Develop Capabilities
T1587.001×3Malware
T1587.004×3Exploits
T1588Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002×3Tool
T1588.007×3Artificial Intelligence
T1608×3Stage Capabilities
TA0001Initial Access6 techniques
T1078×15Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1189×4Drive-by Compromise
T1190×14Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1199×3Trusted Relationship
T1566×46Phishing
T1566.001×8Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×18Spearphishing Link
T1566.003×4Spearphishing via Service
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1059×7Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.006Python
T1059.007×24JavaScript
T1203×28Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence8 techniques
T1078×15Valid Accounts
T1098×10Account Manipulation
T1098.002Additional Email Delegate Permissions
T1133External Remote Services
T1136Create Account
T1176×2Software Extensions
T1505Server Software Component
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1556×7Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006×3Multi-Factor Authentication
TA0004Privilege Escalation4 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×15Valid Accounts
T1098×10Account Manipulation
T1098.002Additional Email Delegate Permissions
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005Stealth9 techniques
T1027×4Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.010×3Command Obfuscation
T1027.013×4Encrypted/Encoded File
T1027.017×4SVG Smuggling
T1036×2Masquerading
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.008Clear Mailbox Data
T1078×15Valid Accounts
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1564×2Hide Artifacts
T1564.003Hidden Window
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
T1684Social Engineering
T1684.001×2Impersonation
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1556×7Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006×3Multi-Factor Authentication
TA0006Credential Access12 techniques
T1003OS Credential Dumping
T1056×2Input Capture
T1110Brute Force
T1110.003×6Password Spraying
T1212×3Exploitation for Credential Access
T1528×5Steal Application Access Token
T1539×26Steal Web Session Cookie
T1552Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001×3Credentials In Files
T1555×10Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003×2Credentials from Web Browsers
T1556×7Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006×3Multi-Factor Authentication
T1557×6Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1621×3Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
T1649×9Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007Discovery6 techniques
T1069Permission Groups Discovery
T1082×2System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1087×6Account Discovery
T1087.003Email Account
T1087.004×2Cloud Account
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1526×3Cloud Service Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement2 techniques
T1534Internal Spearphishing
T1550Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550.001Application Access Token
T1550.004×3Web Session Cookie
TA0009Collection13 techniques
T1005×5Data from Local System
T1056×2Input Capture
T1074Data Staged
T1074.002×3Remote Data Staging
T1113Screen Capture
T1114×22Email Collection
T1114.002×7Remote Email Collection
T1119×4Automated Collection
T1123Audio Capture
T1125Video Capture
T1185×12Browser Session Hijacking
T1213×15Data from Information Repositories
T1530Data from Cloud Storage
T1557×6Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1560×5Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control8 techniques
T1001Data Obfuscation
T1071×8Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×6Web Protocols
T1071.004×9DNS
T1090×2Proxy
T1090.002×2External Proxy
T1090.003×2Multi-hop Proxy
T1102Web Service
T1102.002×2Bidirectional Communication
T1105×6Ingress Tool Transfer
T1132Data Encoding
T1568×2Dynamic Resolution
T1573Encrypted Channel
T1573.001Symmetric Cryptography
TA0010Exfiltration3 techniques
T1041×16Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×12Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1048.002×3Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
T1048.003×5Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
T1567×4Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040Impact1 technique
T1565Data Manipulation
Malware

Associated malware families

11 malware families Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.

FamilyContextEvidenceLast seen
ZimReaperProofpoint tracks this malware family as ZimReaper. ZimReaper then uses Zimbra APIs to conduct reconnaissance against the device and gather two-factor authentication codes.17Oct 9, 2026OWAReaperOWAReaper est un implant JavaScript résident en mémoire navigateur, évolution du ZimReaper ciblant précédemment Zimbra.15Sep 4, 2026UlejSupported by a custom-developed capability named “Ulej,” the actors leverage a view-based exploit that triggers automatically when a user views a malicious email within a vulnerable version of the webmail service.6Aug 14, 2026FlowerbedFlowerbed est le framework de collecte côté serveur, un projet Python conteneurisé via Docker comprenant : Catcher : serveur DNS/HTTP recevant les données exfiltrées ; Certbot : génération automatique de certificats Let’s Encrypt ; Nginx : reverse proxy HTTPS ; Gardener : health check du service Catcher.5Jul 26, 2026PLUGGYAPEкод основного програмного засобу розроблено з використанням мови програмування Python та класифіковано як бекдор PLUGGYAPE. Починаючи з грудня 2025 року виявлено удосконалену (та обфусковану) версію PLUGGYAPE (PLUGGYAPE.V2), в якій застосовано протокол MQTT, а також додано низку перевірок для протидії аналізу, зокрема запуску у віртуальному середовищі.5May 31, 2026

6 additional families tracked in Mallory.

Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 2 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2025-6637636 evidence · Nov 19, 2026Exploited in the wildStored XSS in Zimbra Collaboration Classic UI via CSS @importL’attività ha sfruttato una vulnerabilità del servizio webmail, CVE- 2025-66376 | La campagna è finalizzata all’acquisizione di e-mail e di altre informazioni sensibili.View vulnerability →
CVE-2026-4289714 evidence · Sep 4, 2026Exploited in the wildStored XSS in Microsoft Exchange Server Outlook Web AccessCVE-2026-42897 is described as a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) stored XSS vulnerability in on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server Outlook Web Access (OWA). Malicious email HTML is rendered into the authenticated DOM without adequately neutralizing JavaScript event handlers; opening the email in OWA triggers the attack.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

220 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does LAUNDRY BEAR target?
LAUNDRY BEAR targets Government & Administration, Military, Education & Research, Financial Services, Software & Services, Energy, Telecommunication Services, Consumer Services, and 4 more in United States, Ukraine, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, New Zealand, and Russia.
What malware does LAUNDRY BEAR use?
LAUNDRY BEAR is associated with ZimReaper, OWAReaper, Ulej, Flowerbed, PLUGGYAPE, and 6 more.
What other names is LAUNDRY BEAR known by?
LAUNDRY BEAR is also known as Void Blizzard.
Where is LAUNDRY BEAR from?
Mallory's sources associate LAUNDRY BEAR with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping115MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware11Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs2CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables220Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.