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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

MISTPEN

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs48Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePersistenceExfiltrationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

MISTPEN is a lightweight, modular Windows downloader associated with North Korean cyberespionage operations, including Lazarus Group’s Operation Dream Job and activity tracked as UNC2970. Publicly documented in 2024, it retrieves additional payloads and reflectively loads DLL modules directly into memory, reducing disk artifacts. It uses the Microsoft Graph API to exchange AES-encrypted files through attacker-controlled OneDrive storage for command-and-control and payload delivery. Other observed deployments have used compromised WordPress infrastructure.

MISTPEN is delivered through targeted recruitment-themed social engineering, including fake job descriptions and technical skills assessments. Infection chains have used trojanized PDF viewers and malicious DLLs sideloaded by legitimate PDF-viewing or VNC applications. Decoy job documents are displayed while the downloader executes covertly. Early UNC2970 activity used a modified SumatraPDF application and the BURNBOOK launcher; this did not involve an inherent SumatraPDF vulnerability.

Its modular functionality includes host profiling, process enumeration, screenshot collection and transmission, and persistence across reboots. MISTPEN also retrieves privilege-escalation components and follow-on malware, including ForestTiger, RollMid, and LPEClient. Its role is principally payload retrieval and orchestration rather than implementing every capability of those subsequent components. Observed targeting includes U.S. critical infrastructure, energy, aerospace, defense, aviation, and nuclear-related organizations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-68820via cyberveilleExploited in the wildLocal Privilege Escalation in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSockCVE-2026-68820 est un use-after-free dans afd.sys (Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock), exploitable via une race condition entre deux chemins de code non synchronisés opérant sur le même état de socket. L’exploitation produit un primitif de lecture/écriture arbitraire dans le noyau , permettant la réécriture du token de processus pour obtenir SYSTEM . | MISTPEN est un downloader modulaire in-memory utilisant l’ API Microsoft Graph (OneDrive) comme canal C2 chiffré AES, rendant le trafic indiscernable du trafic entreprise légitime.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-49113via gurucul threat researchAuthenticated Remote Code Execution in Roundcube WebmailAttackers deployed MISTPEN, Troy RAT, ForestTiger, and FudModule, including the exploitation of the CVE-2026-68820 zero-day in Windows AFD.sys for local privilege escalation and SYSTEM-level access.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

MISTPEN est un downloader modulaire in-memory utilisant l’ API Microsoft Graph (OneDrive) comme canal C2 chiffré AES, rendant le trafic indiscernable du trafic entreprise légitime.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence2

The downloader communicates with threat actor-controlled infrastructure using Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

The campaign used malicious PDF-related lures and trojanized software to gain initial execution before deploying additional malware modules.

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The PDF file has been encrypted and can only be opened with the included trojanized version of SumatraPDF to ultimately deliver MISTPEN backdoor via BURNBOOK launcher. Mandiant observed UNC2970 modify the open source code of an older SumatraPDF version as part of this campaign.

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

MISTPEN, an in-memory downloader that communicates via attacker-controlled files on OneDrive using the Microsoft Graph API.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Operation Dream Job campaign targeting the defense, aerospace, and aviation sectors through spear-phishing, job-offer lures, impersonation websites, SEO poisoning, and trojanized PDF viewers.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

The second is by distributing trojanized remote access tools such as VNC or PuTTY to convince the targets to connect to a specific server for a skills assessment.

T1566PhishingEvidence7

Check Point researchers found the group using fake employment opportunities aimed heavily at defense, aerospace, aviation, drone, robotics, and military technology organizations.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence7

Chaîne 1 : Archive ZIP protégée par mot de passe contenant un viewer PDF légitime (MuPDF) et une DLL malveillante libmupdf.dll chargée par side-loading, déployant le downloader MISTPEN en mémoire.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Les attaquants usurpent l’identité de recruteurs sur LinkedIn et via des applications de messagerie directe, proposant de fausses offres d’emploi auprès d’entreprises reconnues.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence5

Attacks begin with fraudulent job offers, supposedly from well-known companies, sent through direct messages or platforms like LinkedIn and mainly targeting the defense and aerospace sectors in Europe and India.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

In the first, the victim is convinced to download an encrypted ZIP archive containing three files... When the victim launches the executable, the malicious DLL libmupdf.dll is loaded via DLL sideloading.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

When the victim launches the executable, the malicious DLL libmupdf.dll is loaded via DLL sideloading.

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

MISTPEN, an in-memory downloader that communicates via attacker-controlled files on OneDrive using the Microsoft Graph API.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

in-memory DLL injection

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence9

L’exploitation produit un primitif de lecture/écriture arbitraire dans le noyau , permettant la réécriture du token de processus pour obtenir SYSTEM .

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

archive chiffrée contenant un viewer PDF légitime signé numériquement, une DLL malveillante et un payload chiffré... le payload est déchiffré

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

Les attaquants usurpent l’identité de recruteurs... proposant de fausses offres d’emploi auprès d’entreprises reconnues... viewer PDF légitime signé numériquement... sites usurpant l’identité d’Enveil.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

in-memory DLL injection

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

During one infection chain, the MISTPEN in-memory downloader performed reconnaissance, established persistence, and loaded an exploit module targeting the Windows networking driver.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

When the victim launches the executable, the malicious DLL libmupdf.dll is loaded via DLL sideloading.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

downloads and executes in memory a lightweight downloader dubbed MISTPEN

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

PvPlugin : énumération des processus

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

GetInfoPlugin : profil hôte

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

During one infection chain, the MISTPEN in-memory downloader performed reconnaissance, established persistence, and loaded an exploit module targeting the Windows networking driver.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

OneScreenCapture : capture d’écran multi-moniteurs

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The job description is delivered to the victim in a password-protected ZIP archive containing an encrypted PDF file and a modified version of an open-source PDF viewer application.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

The downloaders work with hacker controlled infrastructure via Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

CookiePlus encodes the RSA-encrypted data using Base64. It is set as the cookie value in the HTTP header and passed to the C2.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence4

MISTPEN, a lightweight downloader that communicates through Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

MISTPEN est un downloader modulaire in-memory utilisant l’ API Microsoft Graph (OneDrive) comme canal C2 chiffré AES, rendant le trafic indiscernable du trafic entreprise légitime.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

Modules déployés à la demande :

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

LPE loader : fingerprinting, négociation de clé ML-KEM (Kyber) + transport GOST-CBC , déploiement de FudModule via DestroyEnv()

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Command results are returned through the send channel in a compact JSON envelope

Indicators of compromise

Observables

48 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

28 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyberveilleNews · Nov 15, 2026Lazarus exploite CVE-2026-68820 dans afd.sys avec FudModule 3.1 via Operation Dream Job | CyberVeilleModular, memory-resident downloader delivered through DLL side-loading alongside a legitimate MuPDF viewer. Uses Microsoft Graph and OneDrive for AES-encrypted command-and-control. Its modules collect host information, enumerate processes, capture screenshots, and deploy FudModule through a privilege-escalation loader that checks the operating-system build and security profile before serving the exploit.Read more ↗securelist ruNews · Oct 21, 2026Разбор "Операции FlashHole" - сложной кампании группы Lazarus | SecurelistLazarus malware cited for modularity and to contrast newer Dream Job tooling with the older families updated for FlashHole. Specific functionality is not described.Read more ↗securelistNews · Oct 21, 2026Dissecting Operation FlashHole, a complex attack by Lazarus | SecurelistMalware used in the newer Dream Job toolchain and cited as another example of modularization. It is contrasted with the updated older tools deployed in FlashHole.Read more ↗cysecurity newsNews · Aug 14, 2026Lazarus Abuses Zero-Day Exploit to Install a New Backdoor - CySecurity News - Latest Information Security and Hacking IncidentsA lightweight in-memory downloader used in the intrusion chain to communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure via Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive and retrieve additional espionage and persistence modules.Read more ↗
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IOC matching48Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.