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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 9 actorsExploits 3 CVEs

RansomHub

RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in February 2024 and rapidly became one of the most active ransomware brands after the disruption of LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat. Multiple sources in the content state that it absorbed displaced affiliates from those groups, and some reporting assesses it as a rebrand or evolution of Knight, with its encryptor built from repurposed Knight source code. The operation advertised favorable affiliate terms, including direct payment handling by affiliates and a 90% revenue share, and supported Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi encryptors. Reporting in the content also notes that RansomHub later appeared to go offline or become dormant in 2025.

RansomHub is associated with double-extortion activity and broad enterprise targeting. The content states that affiliates exfiltrate data and deploy encryption tools, often using legitimate administrative utilities, and that the group has targeted organizations in Europe and North America across healthcare, finance, government services, critical infrastructure, manufacturing, legal, automotive, technology, and other sectors. One source cited in the content links RansomHub to more than 200 attacks since February 2024 and notes targeting of U.S. government organizations. Healthcare reporting specifically says its affiliate model enabled some of the most damaging attacks on that sector in 2025.

Observed behavior in the content includes internal network discovery and pre-encryption preparation. RansomHub can enumerate all accessible machines from an infected system. Incident reporting describes affiliates conducting internal network scanning, harvesting credentials, accessing backup passwords, destroying backups, and deploying ransomware across Windows systems and virtual management servers. The content also notes targeting of VMware ESXi and broader virtualization infrastructure. In one Talos-reported case, operators maintained access for over a month before execution and used a compromised Administrator account to execute ransomware, dump credentials, and run scans with a commercial network scanning tool. A previously unseen persistence technique was also reported in which operators modified Windows Firewall settings to enable remote access shortly before ransomware execution.

The malware and its ecosystem are also linked in the content to anti-defense tooling. ESET identified EDRKillShifter as a custom EDR killer developed and maintained by RansomHub and introduced to affiliates in May 2024. The tool used vulnerable drivers in BYOVD-style attacks and was later seen beyond strictly RansomHub cases. Sophos also observed HeartCrypt-packed AV-killer payloads in RansomHub-related incidents, including a VMProtect-packed AV killer targeting ESET, HitmanPro, Kaspersky, Sophos, and Symantec products. Talos further reported use of a Veeam password stealer and KMS Auto in RansomHub intrusions.

Several threat actor relationships are mentioned in the content. Scattered Spider / Octo Tempest / UNC3944 was reported to have added RansomHub to its ransomware payloads in 2024, and multiple articles state that Scattered Spider partnered with Russian ransomware gangs including RansomHub. Mandiant reporting also describes UNC2165, a financially motivated cluster with overlap to Evil Corp, destroying backups and deploying RansomHub in a 2025 investigation. Separate reporting notes alleged ties between RansomHub and Evil Corp, though the precise nature of that relationship is not established in the provided content.

High-confidence infrastructure and sample indicators directly mentioned in the content include EDRKillShifter samples with SHA-1 hashes BF84712C5314DF2AA851B8D4356EA51A9AD50257 and 77DAF77D9D2A08CC22981C004689B870F74544B5, and infrastructure linked by ESET to a RansomHub-affiliated cluster: 45.32.206[.]169 hosting EDRKillShifter and WKTools, and SystemBC C2 server 45.32.210[.]151.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

3 CVES
CVE-2023-46604Apache ActiveMQ OpenWire Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

An attacker is exploiting a nearly 2-year-old vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ to compromise Linux servers and install malicious software on them... The servers were all vulnerable to CVE-2023-46604, a maximum-severity remote code execution bug in Apache ActiveMQ message broker... After deploying DripDropper... the attacker downloaded... the patch for CVE-2023-46604... and replaced them with the patched versions.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
CVE-2024-37085VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass

Ransomware groups—including BlackCat/ALPHV, Black Basta, RansomHub, and Dark Angels—are increasingly targeting VMware ESXi...

via huntio blogblog.alphahunt.io
CVE-2024-55591FortiOS/FortiProxy Management Interface Authentication BypassExploited in the wild

Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2024-55591, a zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability disclosed in January 2025, had the highest count of ransomware groups attached to it as the year closed, with six named ransomware families (DragonForce, Hunters International, NightSpire, Qilin, RansomHub, and SuperBlack)...

via industrialcyberindustrialcyber.co
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

9 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Indrik Spider

New to the top three market share boards were RansomHub and Fog ransomware. RansomHub has been gaining share throughout 2024, despite its alleged ties to Evil Corp.

via coveware blogcoveware.com
Scattered Spider

Since the start of 2023, Scattered Spider has also partnered with several Russian ransomware gangs, including BlackCat/AlphV, Qilin, and RansomHub.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Andariel

RansomHub, a new RaaS gang that emerged around the time of Operation Cronos... It is also worth mentioning that RansomHub’s encryptor is not written from scratch, but based on repurposed code from Knight.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
CosmicBeetle

RansomHub, a new RaaS gang that emerged around the time of Operation Cronos... It is also worth mentioning that RansomHub’s encryptor is not written from scratch, but based on repurposed code from Knight.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
RansomHub

Prominent RaaS operations observed in early 2025 included RansomHub (tracked by Unit 42 as Spoiled Scorpius, the most prolific on leak sites Jan-Mar 2025)...

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
SocGholish

"RansomHub is a RaaS operation that was first observed in February 2024."

via optiv blogoptiv.com
RansomHub ransomware

“…CISA flagged RansomHub ransomware, linked to more than 200 attacks since February.”

via verizon businessverizon.com
ShadowSyndicate

"RansomHub is revisited with new insights on this ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform... RansomHub is known for employing double extortion attacks, encrypting data using 'Curve25519' encryption."

via darktrace blogdarktrace.com
DragonForce

“There are mixed reports of the relationship between Ransomhub and DragonForce…”

via blackpoint cyberblackpointcyber.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1
TacticStealth

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

In a RansomHub engagement, affiliates leveraged a compromised Administrator account to execute the ransomware, dump credentials, and run scans using a commercial network scanning tool.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“RansomHub affiliates… deploy encryption tools, often utilizing legitimate administrative utilities to facilitate their malicious activities.”

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

GTIG observed confirmed or suspected data theft in approximately 77% of ransomware intrusions — a steep jump from 57% the year before. Attackers now frequently steal sensitive files before deploying encryption, threatening to post the stolen data publicly on leak sites even if victims manage to restore their systems from backup.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

Scattered Spider threat actors typically engage in data theft for extortion using multiple social engineering techniques...

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

resulting in the exfiltration of a significant volume of confidential data... the group ultimately released the stolen data, purportedly amounting to 200 GB, onto the dark web.

Impact

5 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence14
TacticImpact

Bologna FC 1909 S.p.a. has officially confirmed a targeted ransomware attack on its internal security systems

T1489Service StopEvidence1
TacticImpact

Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2
TacticImpact

Operators have moved beyond dual-threat encryption-and-theft operations toward systematically denying organizations the ability to recover, targeting identity services, virtualization management planes, and backup infrastructure.

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1
TacticImpact
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

Despite extending the deadline for a ransom payment, the group ultimately released the stolen data

Other

3 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads. In multiple cases, this tool was detected during an ongoing ransomware attack.

T1562.009Safe Mode BootEvidence1
T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

Scattered Spider is the designation given to a threat actor that's known for its sophisticated social engineering schemes to breach targets and establish persistence for follow-on exploitation and data theft.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution9

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities3

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.