RansomHub

The framework acts as a JavaScript-based dropper, deploying various malware families as part of drive-by downloads, including ransomware, banking trojans, spyware, and more...

Others are hit as a stepping stone toward bigger, better-defended targets further down the chain, such as hospitals that depend on them for records, equipment, or connected systems.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

In a RansomHub engagement, affiliates leveraged a compromised Administrator account to execute the ransomware, dump credentials, and run scans using a commercial network scanning tool.

ransomhub_spray: Password spraying followed by RDP access and RansomHub deployment.

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

Once active, SocGholish connects to its C2 infrastructure and deploys a variety of second-stage payloads. We have observed it delivering loaders like Gholoader and MintsLoader.

GTIG observed confirmed or suspected data theft in approximately 77% of ransomware intrusions — a steep jump from 57% the year before. Attackers now frequently steal sensitive files before deploying encryption, threatening to post the stolen data publicly on leak sites even if victims manage to restore their systems from backup.

After the club refused to pay the ransom, the attackers published stolen data on the dark web, reportedly including information relating to players and sponsors.

resulting in the exfiltration of a significant volume of confidential data... the group ultimately released the stolen data, purportedly amounting to 200 GB, onto the dark web.

CISA has confirmed the group is using DragonForce ransomware to encrypt victims’ ESXi environments, alongside past use of ALPHV/BlackCat and RansomHub.

Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.

Operators have moved beyond dual-threat encryption-and-theft operations toward systematically denying organizations the ability to recover, targeting identity services, virtualization management planes, and backup infrastructure.

Despite extending the deadline for a ransom payment, the group ultimately released the stolen data

We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads. In multiple cases, this tool was detected during an ongoing ransomware attack.

We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads... the extracted payload... is the AVKiller again, packed this time with VMProtect and specifically targeting Eset, HitManPro, Kaspersky, Sophos, and Symantec products.