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Malware5 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Nefilim

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days23 mentions · peak 11 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK53Techniques
IOCs232Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationExtortion
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
Windows

Nefilim is a ransomware family and ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in 2020. Its operators and affiliates conduct double-extortion attacks, encrypting victim networks and stealing information to threaten public disclosure if ransom demands are not met. Administrators maintain public leak sites branded Corporate Leaks to publish stolen data. Attacks have caused millions of dollars in losses through ransom payments and damage to victim systems.

The operation provides affiliates with ransomware access through an online management panel. Attackers customize ransomware executables for individual victims, using victim-specific decryption keys and ransom notes. In a documented affiliate arrangement, administrators received 20 percent of collected ransom proceeds while the affiliate retained 80 percent. Attackers research compromised organizations using public business databases to assess revenue, size, and contact information before pursuing extortion.

Nefilim favors high-revenue businesses, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Documented targeting guidance initially prioritized companies with annual revenue exceeding $100 million and subsequently encouraged targeting those exceeding $200 million. Victims span multiple industries, including logistics and oil and gas transportation. Attacks have also affected organizations across Europe and elsewhere.

Associated individuals include affiliate Artem Stryzhak and alleged administrator Volodymyr Tymoshchuk. Stryzhak participated in Nefilim attacks from approximately June through at least October 2021 and separately worked with Hive ransomware. He received a 70-month U.S. prison sentence in 2026 for ransomware-related computer-fraud and extortion conspiracies.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-19781via trendmicro documentsExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal in Citrix ADC and GatewayTo better describe this new wave of ransomware, we present an in-depth case study of the Nefilim ransomware family. Nefilim has been known to target mainly multi-billion dollar companies...View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0213via trendmicro documentsExploited in the wildWindows COM Aggregate Marshaler Local Privilege EscalationTo better describe this new wave of ransomware, we present an in-depth case study of the Nefilim ransomware family. Nefilim has been known to target mainly multi-billion dollar companies...View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-11634via qualys blogExploited in the wildIncorrect Access Control in Citrix Workspace App for WindowsNefilim targets vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-11634 and CVE-2019-19781 in Citrix gateway devices, identified in December 2019 and patched in January 2020. | One of the more popular ransomware families over the last few months to switch to this extortion tactic was Nefilim. Nefilim ransomware emerged in March 2020 when Nemty operators quit the ransomware as a service model to concentrate their energy on more targeted attacks with more focused resources.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Nefilim

Starting in June 2021, he became a Nefilim affiliate and was given access to the Nefilim ransomware. In exchange, Stryzhak would pay the Nefilim group 20 percent of the ransom received from attacks.

via decipher scdecipher.sc
Volodymyr Tymoshchuk

The court found the unnamed Ukrainian man to be the lead developer of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim ransomware families.

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
Oleksandr Ieremenko

Les attaques ont utilisé trois familles de ransomware : LockerGoga, MegaCortex, Nefilim.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Water Roc

To better describe this new wave of ransomware, we present an in-depth case study of the Nefilim ransomware family. Nefilim has been known to target mainly multi-billion dollar companies...

via trendmicro documentsdocuments.trendmicro.com
Nefilim ransomware gang

Home appliances giant Whirlpool suffered a ransomware attack by the Nefilim ransomware gang who stole data before encrypting devices.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

53 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595.002Vulnerability ScanningEvidence1

Attackers actively scan for internet-facing hosts that are vulnerable to recently disclosed exploits.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence8

Nefilim can gain initial access through exposed RDPs.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

...эксплойтов, вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов...

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence5

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

Nefilim is capable of lateral movement via tools such as PsExec or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

We observed how cybercriminals abused a PowerShell command to drop a Cobalt Strike beacon in one of these attacks from 2020.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

Ransomware uses anti-debugging method by calling the IsDebuggerPresent function... It also makes use of API GetTickCount / QueryPerformanceCounter... Nefilim delete itself from the target systems after infection with the help of ShellExecute API

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений, обманных загрузок... фальшивых обновлений, перепакованных и заражённых инсталляторов.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence8

Nefilim can gain initial access through exposed RDPs.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities to elevate privileges to perform administrative actions or actions requiring elevated privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It implements a minor anti-analysis trick consisting of a string obfuscation algorithm. The strings ... are encrypted by the RC4 stream cipher with a hardcoded key “fuckav” and encoded in Base64.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

Nefilim delete itself from the target systems after infection with the help of ShellExecute API "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c timeout /t 3 /nobreak && del "C:\Users\admin\Download{ransomware_filename}.exe" /s /f /q

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Adversaries may use obfuscated files or information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

➤ Использует чужие подписанные сертификаты для exe-файлов.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

The tool was used to identify and disable antimalware solutions.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence3

Cybercriminals employ the features of Mimikatz for credential dumping to extract usernames, passwords, and other credentials that might be used to escalate privilege in other phases of the attack.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

Attackers dump and use credentials to gain access to additional parts of the internal network after gaining initial access. It is also subsequently used for lateral movement.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Nefilim ransomware is distributed through exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) setups by brute-forcing them and using other known vulnerabilities for initial access.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Nefilim has been observed to use a batch file for terminating certain processes and services.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

AdFind can be used to discover computers, users, or groups with AD as a reconnaissance tool...

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

cybercriminals have weaponized this function for ransomware campaigns to discover and terminate arbitrary processes and services, including those that are antimalware-related.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

As Process Hacker can be used to gain an overview of processes currently being used...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The hackers work to move around the network before deploying their ransomware to find out where juicier data may be stored.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means way to identify of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for collection and to identify potential systems of interest for lateral movement.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence2

AdFind can query AD for computers, identify domain users and domain groups, extract subnet information from AD, and collect information about organizational units on domain trusts.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Nefilim TTP Map ... Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery (T1518.001)

Lateral Movement

5 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence4

Nefilim is capable of lateral movement via tools such as PsExec or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

The primary method of delivery is currently vulnerable RDP services. Once the attackers have compromised the environment via RDP...

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence3

PsExec can also be used for propagation and remote execution of ransomware.

T1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialEvidence1

Attackers can use Mimikatz to dump hashes, tickets, or plain text passwords.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

Start copy kill.bat \destinationip\c$\windows\temp ... copy \sourceip\c$\windows\temp C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\kill.bat

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Nefilim... has been witnessed to attack logistics companies... We found out that this data theft begins weeks or even months before the ransomware is deployed

T1074Data StagedEvidence3

it has been observed to copy data from servers or shared directories to a local directory

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

it has been observed to copy data from servers or shared directories to a local directory and to archive these using 7-Zip.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Nefilim Cobalt Strike Domains and IP Addresses C&C Date Created IP Address Country Protocol Confidence Level

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Fast flux refers to a domain-based technique that is characterized by rapidly changing the DNS records (e.g., IP addresses) associated with a single domain [T1568.001].

Exfiltration

8 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during collection.

T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data in fixed-size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

Le groupe est accusé d’avoir « volé des données » avant ou pendant les intrusions ransomware ; la section TTPs détectés liste explicitement T1041.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence2

The threat actors started targeting high-profile victims and manually operating inside the victim’s network, exfiltrating confidential data and threatening to leak it to intimidate the victim.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

...an unnamed cybercriminal group that hacked corporate networks, stole data and encrypted systems to extort victims.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. | Investigation into a Nefilim Attack Shows Signs of Lateral Movement, Possible Data Exfiltration.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

It then uses MEGAsync to exfiltrate this data.

T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence2

Вымогатели, распространяющие Nefilim-Nephilim , угрожают опубликовать украденные данные... в марте 2020 они создали сайт для публикаций украденных данных.

Impact

5 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence20

Le suspect est présenté comme le principal développeur des rançongiciels Lockergoga, Megacortex et Nefilim; Stadler Rail a été sommée de payer une rançon en bitcoin.

T1489Service StopEvidence3

TTPs et IOCs détectés # TTP # T1486 — Data Encrypted for Impact (Impact) T1489 — Service Stop (Impact)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

Nefilim TTP Map ... Inhibit system Recovery (T1490)

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

The process kill lists were designed to amplify the effects of known ransomware strains.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence6

A new ransomware named Nefilim has been discovered, threatening to release its victims’ data to the public if they fail to pay the ransom.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

232 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

90 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching232Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping53Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.