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Malware2 associated actors

AcidRain

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
LinuxNetwork deviceIOT

AcidRain is a destructive Linux wiper targeting satellite modems, routers, and similar embedded network devices. Identified by SentinelLabs in March 2022, its analyzed implementation is a 32-bit MIPS ELF executable. With root privileges, it recursively overwrites and deletes filesystem contents and attacks flash memory, SD/MMC storage, and block devices. It iterates through possible storage-device identifiers rather than relying exclusively on device-specific configurations, uses direct writes and flash-memory IOCTL erase operations, commits destructive writes to storage, and reboots the system, leaving affected devices inoperable.

AcidRain was used in the February 24, 2022 attack against Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Attackers compromised the network’s trusted management infrastructure and used legitimate management commands to execute the destructive payload on customer modems. The operation disrupted thousands of subscribers in Ukraine and tens of thousands elsewhere in Europe, including satellite connectivity supporting remote monitoring and control of approximately 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany; the turbines themselves were not physically disabled. The KA-SAT operation has been publicly attributed to Russia, including its military intelligence agency, the GRU. AcidRain’s primary purpose is destructive sabotage of communications infrastructure.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GRU

AcidRain was designed to remotely erase vulnerable modems and routers, including terminals used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for command and control at exactly the moment that control matters most.

via lieber westpointlieber.westpoint.edu
Sandworm

Researchers from cybersecurity vendor SentinelOne uncovered a wiper malware called AcidRain designed for MIPS firmware used by the SATCOM modems that was potentially used in the KA-SAT attack.

via bushidotoken blogblog.bushidotoken.net
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The adversaries were reportedly able to gain access via exploiting a 'misconfigured VPN' and moved laterally to the management segment of the KA-SAT network.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence3

"The threat actor used the KA-SAT management mechanism in a supply-chain attack to push a wiper designed for modems and routers," SentinelOne hypothesized.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

To destroy data on compromised devices, the wiper overwrites file contents with up to 0x40000 bytes of data or uses MEMGETINFO, MEMUNLOCK, MEMERASE, and MEMWRITEOOB input/output control (IOCTL) system calls.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

A deeper look at the 'ut_app_execute_operation' function revealed that it is implementing a functionality that enables the ACS to install (upload and run) arbitrary binaries on the modem... This functionality seems to match both the Viasat statement as well as the approach to deploy the 'AcidRain' wiper described by SentinelOne.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Modification of routing traffic rules

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."

Stealth

3 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Destroys infected equipment (Wipes flash memory, sd, memory card, and block devices)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

If during enumeration it found a regular file (DT_REG) or symbolic link (DT_LNK) it will overwrite it... If it is another directory, it will traverse all the files on that folder path, wipe it, then delete that directory using rmdir() function.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Modification of routing traffic rules

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The main malicious functions of these malicious payloads can be resumed in: System discovery and footprinting

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) identifies specific files and directories in the Linux operating system associated with storage devices.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

the user manual suggests retrieving firmware updates via FTP from a Telnet or SSH shell on the serial converter itself... The iRZ RUH2 3G is similarly Linux-based and has the ability to push firmware updates via its web interface, though SSH shell access is possible too... FuxNet malware over either SSH or a proprietary sensor management protocol

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

when hundreds of thousands of these devices are compromised and work in aggregation via Command and Control they can cause significant damage

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Obfuscated multiple C2 callback failover (TOR, VPS, Geolocation)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Ability to download and install additional payloads

Impact

9 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence22

[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) performs an in-depth wipe of the target filesystem and various attached storage devices through either a data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase it.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

The references include multiple wiper campaigns and destructive malware operations such as NotPetya, SwiftSlicer, AcidRain, AcidPour, and DynoWiper associated with Sandworm/APT44.

T1495Firmware CorruptionEvidence1

A destructive pattern, that corrupted the flash memory rendering the SATCOM modems inoperable, can be observed on the left...

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence2

IoT wipers often rewrite important parts of the firmware of an IoT device, rendering that device useless, so they are also known as 'brickers'.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence9

[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)

T1561Disk WipeEvidence2

From there, the attackers executed commands to flash the memory of the modems, rendering them unusable.

T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence11

[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) iterates over device file identifiers on the target, opens the device file, and either overwrites the file or calls various IOCTLS commands to erase it.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)

T1561.002Disk Structure WipeEvidence1

The two Acid wipers have an identical way of wiping code, using the same logic and loops internally.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.