AcidRain
- Type
- Wiper
- Capabilities
- Defense evasion
- Platforms
- LinuxNetwork deviceIOT
AcidRain is a destructive Linux wiper targeting satellite modems, routers, and similar embedded network devices. Identified by SentinelLabs in March 2022, its analyzed implementation is a 32-bit MIPS ELF executable. With root privileges, it recursively overwrites and deletes filesystem contents and attacks flash memory, SD/MMC storage, and block devices. It iterates through possible storage-device identifiers rather than relying exclusively on device-specific configurations, uses direct writes and flash-memory IOCTL erase operations, commits destructive writes to storage, and reboots the system, leaving affected devices inoperable.
AcidRain was used in the February 24, 2022 attack against Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Attackers compromised the network’s trusted management infrastructure and used legitimate management commands to execute the destructive payload on customer modems. The operation disrupted thousands of subscribers in Ukraine and tens of thousands elsewhere in Europe, including satellite connectivity supporting remote monitoring and control of approximately 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany; the turbines themselves were not physically disabled. The KA-SAT operation has been publicly attributed to Russia, including its military intelligence agency, the GRU. AcidRain’s primary purpose is destructive sabotage of communications infrastructure.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
AcidRain was designed to remotely erase vulnerable modems and routers, including terminals used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for command and control at exactly the moment that control matters most.
Researchers from cybersecurity vendor SentinelOne uncovered a wiper malware called AcidRain designed for MIPS firmware used by the SATCOM modems that was potentially used in the KA-SAT attack.
Techniques & procedures
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."
The adversaries were reportedly able to gain access via exploiting a 'misconfigured VPN' and moved laterally to the management segment of the KA-SAT network.
"The threat actor used the KA-SAT management mechanism in a supply-chain attack to push a wiper designed for modems and routers," SentinelOne hypothesized.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
To destroy data on compromised devices, the wiper overwrites file contents with up to 0x40000 bytes of data or uses MEMGETINFO, MEMUNLOCK, MEMERASE, and MEMWRITEOOB input/output control (IOCTL) system calls.
A deeper look at the 'ut_app_execute_operation' function revealed that it is implementing a functionality that enables the ACS to install (upload and run) arbitrary binaries on the modem... This functionality seems to match both the Viasat statement as well as the approach to deploy the 'AcidRain' wiper described by SentinelOne.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."
Modification of routing traffic rules
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Destroys infected equipment (Wipes flash memory, sd, memory card, and block devices)
If during enumeration it found a regular file (DT_REG) or symbolic link (DT_LNK) it will overwrite it... If it is another directory, it will traverse all the files on that folder path, wipe it, then delete that directory using rmdir() function.
As noted in our report: "the attacker moved laterally through this trusted management network to a specific network segment used to manage and operate the network, and then used this network access to execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously."
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Modification of routing traffic rules
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The main malicious functions of these malicious payloads can be resumed in: System discovery and footprinting
[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) identifies specific files and directories in the Linux operating system associated with storage devices.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
the user manual suggests retrieving firmware updates via FTP from a Telnet or SSH shell on the serial converter itself... The iRZ RUH2 3G is similarly Linux-based and has the ability to push firmware updates via its web interface, though SSH shell access is possible too... FuxNet malware over either SSH or a proprietary sensor management protocol
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
when hundreds of thousands of these devices are compromised and work in aggregation via Command and Control they can cause significant damage
Obfuscated multiple C2 callback failover (TOR, VPS, Geolocation)
Ability to download and install additional payloads
Impact
9 techniques
Impact
[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) performs an in-depth wipe of the target filesystem and various attached storage devices through either a data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase it.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)
The references include multiple wiper campaigns and destructive malware operations such as NotPetya, SwiftSlicer, AcidRain, AcidPour, and DynoWiper associated with Sandworm/APT44.
A destructive pattern, that corrupted the flash memory rendering the SATCOM modems inoperable, can be observed on the left...
Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.
IoT wipers often rewrite important parts of the firmware of an IoT device, rendering that device useless, so they are also known as 'brickers'.
[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)
From there, the attackers executed commands to flash the memory of the modems, rendering them unusable.
[AcidRain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1125) iterates over device file identifiers on the target, opens the device file, and either overwrites the file or calls various IOCTLS commands to erase it.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022)
The two Acid wipers have an identical way of wiping code, using the same logic and loops internally.
Observables
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.