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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors1 associated CVE

LockerGoga

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs153Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionLateral movement
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

LockerGoga is Windows ransomware used in financially motivated attacks against corporate networks worldwide. It encrypts victim files, including core operating-system files, and demands Bitcoin payment in exchange for decryption. Its encryption scheme incorporates RSA-OAEP with MGF1. LockerGoga can also change account passwords and log off active users, denying legitimate access and compounding the disruption caused by encryption.

Deployment within compromised networks is operator-driven: attackers have manually copied the ransomware between systems over SMB rather than relying on autonomous self-propagation. Its implementation uses parent and child processes coordinated through shared memory to perform encryption. LockerGoga has been linked to FIN6 activity and attacks affecting industrial organizations, including Norsk Hydro and chemical companies Hexion and Momentive. U.S. authorities have accused Volodymyr Tymoshchuk of administering LockerGoga and MegaCortex ransomware operations. A Swiss court also identified a common lead developer for LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim. Bitdefender released a free LockerGoga decryptor in 2022 in cooperation with law enforcement, enabling recovery for affected historical victims.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-3396via web archiveServer-side template injection and RCE in Atlassian Confluence Widget ConnectorWhile Atlassian only had one trending vulnerability against Confluence, it was targeted by several families including Gandcrab, Lockergoga, and Megacortex.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN6

Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Volodymyr Tymoshchuk

The court found the unnamed Ukrainian man to be the lead developer of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim ransomware families. Bitdefender released a free LockerGoga decryptor in 2022.

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
Oleksandr Ieremenko

Les attaques ont utilisé trois familles de ransomware : LockerGoga, MegaCortex, Nefilim.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
WIZARD SPIDER

L’ANSSI a observé depuis maintenant plusieurs mois des campagnes d’attaques dans lesquelles des rançongiciels nommés « LockerGoga » et « Ryuk » sont déposés sur les systèmes d’information des victimes.

via cert ssicert.ssi.gouv.fr
VENOM SPIDER

"From mid-2018... FIN6 or affiliated parties were distributing the Ryuk and LockerGoga ransomware"

via cert ssi scadacert.ssi.gouv.fr
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

In the case of NorskHydro, the adversary achieved access to systems through business email compromise (BEC) and leveraged dwell time before launching the destructive LockerGoga ransomware attack.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence5

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Some of these criminals were dealing with the penetration effort, using multiple mechanisms to compromise IT networks, including brute force attacks, SQL injections, stolen credentials and phishing emails with malicious attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The result of targeted phishing attacks, these infections were more common in Q1.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

When interacting with the sample, Talos observed commands being executed to encrypt each individual file

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

This tool allows the attackers to deploy "beacons" on a compromised device to "create shells, execute PowerShell scripts, perform privilege escalation, or spawn a new session to create a listener on the victim system."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Le fichier « kill.bat » ... contient une liste de commandes permettant entre autres de stopper et désactiver des services, de terminer des processus, de désinstaller des logiciels de sécurité

Persistence

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

T1112 --> Modify Registry --> Defense Evasion

T1136.001Local AccountEvidence2

標準ユーザーを除く全ての管理者アカウントのユーザーのパスワードを強制的に「HuHuHUHoHo283283@dJD」という共通の文字列に設定します

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

PsExec等のツールやシステムサービスによる配布

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Cisco’s Talos group observed that some LockerGoga variants forcibly log victims off their devices. They are then unable to log back onto the device... in some cases the network interface on each system was disabled and the local user account passwords were changed.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

攻撃者が遠隔から配布する場合はLockerGogaをPsExec等のツールや権限昇格に関わる脆弱性の利用など何らかの手口を利用して管理者権限で実行させる必要があります。

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

LockerGogaは自身のプロセスに以下の複数の特権を付与することで、様々な不正活動に必要な権限を得ます。

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

PsExec等のツールやシステムサービスによる配布

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

LockerGogaのEXEファイルには以下の通り「ALISA LTD」の有効なデジタル署名が付与されています

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence12

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has been observed deleting its original launcher after execution.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

LockerGogaは自身のプロセスに以下の複数の特権を付与することで、様々な不正活動に必要な権限を得ます。

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

まず%temp%の一時領域にCMDのmoveコマンドを利用して自身のEXEファイルを移動させます

Defense Impairment

5 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

T1112 --> Modify Registry --> Defense Evasion

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence5

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has been signed with stolen certificates in order to make it look more legitimate.(Citation: Wired Lockergoga 2019)

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Cisco’s Talos group observed that some LockerGoga variants forcibly log victims off their devices. They are then unable to log back onto the device... in some cases the network interface on each system was disabled and the local user account passwords were changed.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence8

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) installation has been immediately preceded by a "task kill" command in order to disable anti-virus.(Citation: Wired Lockergoga 2019)

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

Talos has also observed versions of the LockerGoga ransomware that attempt to clear the Windows Event Logs

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as 7-Zip, PowerShell scripts, wmic, nslookup, adfind.exe, mstds.exe, Mimikatz, Ntsdutil.exe, and massscan.exe.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Some of these criminals were dealing with the penetration effort, using multiple mechanisms to compromise IT networks, including brute force attacks, SQL injections, stolen credentials and phishing emails with malicious attachments.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Cisco’s Talos group observed that some LockerGoga variants forcibly log victims off their devices. They are then unable to log back onto the device... in some cases the network interface on each system was disabled and the local user account passwords were changed.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... nslookup...

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... massscan.exe.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Une étude approfondie de la cible et de son infrastructure est donc fortement probable.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... adfind.exe...

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence3

どちらかといえば、PsExec等のツールやシステムサービスによる配布、脆弱性の利用等、なんらかの手段でユーザーの操作を介さずに管理者権限で実行させる感染手法を前提にして開発されているように見受けられます。

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

effectue différents rebonds via le protocole RDP (Remote Desktop) dans l’infrastructure ciblée

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence3

utilise PSEXEC pour copier et exécuter le rançongiciel afin de chiffrer les machines cibles

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence6

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has been observed moving around the victim network via SMB, indicating the actors behind this ransomware are manually copying files form computer to computer instead of self-propagating.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as 7-Zip...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Une deuxième adresse IP, qui télécharge une charge utile METERPRETER ou EMPIRE a été identifiée

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Stadler Rail : intrusion en 2020, exfiltration de données, chiffrement des systèmes

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

...an unnamed cybercriminal group that hacked corporate networks, stole data and encrypted systems to extort victims.

Impact

9 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

他のファイルと並行し、「ブートローダー」というシステムファイルに対しても暗号を行います。

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence27

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Wired Lockergoga 2019)

T1489Service StopEvidence5

TTPs et IOCs détectés # TTP # T1486 — Data Encrypted for Impact (Impact) T1489 — Service Stop (Impact)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

Windows標準ツールである「cipher.exe」を利用して、全てのドライブの空き領域を消去します。これには、フォレンジックによるファイルの復元を困難にさせる目的があると考えられます。

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence2

LockerGogaはOS標準ツールである「netsh.exe」を利用して、端末に存在する全てのネットワークインターフェイスを無効にします。

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence7

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has been observed shutting down infected systems.(Citation: Wired Lockergoga 2019)

T1531Account Access RemovalEvidence5

[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) has been observed changing account passwords and logging off current users.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

Les charges retenues par le Ministère public incluent : ... Détérioration grave de données

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

rançon de 6 millions de dollars en bitcoins exigée

Indicators of compromise

Observables

153 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

85 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching153Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.