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Mallory
Malware6 associated actors4 associated CVEs

ANDROMEDA

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns4Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK57Techniques
IOCs248Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissanceExfiltration
Delivery
MalspamExploit kitDrive byUSB
Platforms
Windows
Also known asGamarue

Andromeda, also known as Gamarue and Wauchos, is a modular, HTTP-based botnet malware family targeting Windows. First observed in 2011, it provides a persistent foothold for collecting host information and downloading and executing additional malware. Its command-driven architecture supports plug-in installation, self-updating, component removal, and uninstallation. It has delivered threats including Chthonic, CoalaBot, and Neutrino Bot, and was used by the Carbanak cybercriminal group.

Andromeda uses process hollowing to execute its payload inside other processes and employs packing, encrypted payloads, dynamically resolved APIs, and anti-debugging and anti-virtualization checks to obstruct analysis. Some versions divert execution into dummy routines or prolonged sleep loops when analysis environments are detected. Persistence mechanisms include registry autoruns and, in some versions, cooperating injected processes with watchdog threads that restore deleted malware files or modified persistence settings. Its command-and-control communications use HTTP POST requests with RC4 encryption and CRC32 validation; message formatting and encoding vary across versions.

Distribution mechanisms include exploit kits hosted on compromised websites, malicious email campaigns, and infected USB drives. Some Gamarue variants exhibit worm-like propagation and use deceptive Windows shortcuts to facilitate execution. Andromeda has also been delivered as a secondary payload by other downloaders. An international law-enforcement operation disrupted its infrastructure in 2017, accompanied by the arrest of a suspected administrator in Belarus.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2016-3366via certego blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2016-3366)Microsoft has just released a patch for their email client in their last Security Bulletin (CVE-2016-3366 in the security bulletin MS16-107) fixing the vulnerability.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-0158via trendmicro documentsMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionThe Andromeda botnet is a well-known botnet that surfaced around 2011 ... The main purpose of spreading Andromeda is to cast a wide net and gain control of endpoints ... On certain instances, GamaPoS is installed.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-1761via trendmicro documentsMicrosoft Word RTF Memory Corruption VulnerabilityThe Andromeda botnet is a well-known botnet that surfaced around 2011 ... The main purpose of spreading Andromeda is to cast a wide net and gain control of endpoints ... On certain instances, GamaPoS is installed.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2010-3333via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability"...spear-phishing emails with malicious RTF files exploiting CVE-2010-3333 or CVE-2012-0158..." | "...use of the Andromeda Trojan as an initial payload in their attacks to download and execute other tools in their toolset."View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Carbanak

Début 2013, avant que le code malveillant Carbanak (alias Anunak, Sekur) ne soit développé, le groupe cybercriminel aurait souscrit à des Malware-as-a-Service, tels qu’Andromeda (alias Gamarue) et Pony.

via cert ssicert.ssi.gouv.fr
CL0P

...later campaigns occasionally used Pony or Andromeda as intermediate loaders to distribute various instances of Dridex.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
APT36

"...use of the Andromeda Trojan as an initial payload in their attacks to download and execute other tools in their toolset."

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
UNC4210

"...a legacy ANDROMEDA sample was automatically installed and began to beacon out."

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
Turla

C0026 ... selective distribution of KOPILUWAK and QUIETCANARY malware to previous ANDROMEDA malware victims in Ukraine through re-registered ANDROMEDA C2 domains.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
CodeFork

...CodeFork leveraging the popular downloader Andromeda (aka Gamarue) to distribute a miner module to their existing botnets.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

57 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

I found it spread as a tasks in a Betabot and in an Andromeda spread via RIG fed by at least one HilltopAds malvertising.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Multiple actors (e.g., APT1, APT28, APT32, APT38, APT42, FIN7, Lazarus Group, etc.) are described as registering/acquiring/purchasing domains, including look-alike domains, for operations.

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

“One of its C2 domains… had expired, was found to be newly re-registered… This novel technique of claiming expired domains used by widely distributed… malware…”

T1584.005BotnetEvidence1

The XBL is Spamhaus’s block list which lists IP addresses that host bots and malware-infected computers.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence7

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has been spread via infected USB keys.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence7

I met one of those bot (v2.5 ... ) as a second stage of an Andromeda pushed in Nuclear Pack

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

In recent months, the authors have mainly focused on spreading Andromeda via exploit kits (Neutrino, Nuclear, Angler,..) located on compromised websites or advertisement services.

T1566PhishingEvidence8

They have all been used to deliver much of the spam, phishing lures and malware that was received globally.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence9

When sending messages containing an exploit, cybercriminals attached a specially crafted RTF document, designed to exploit the CVE-2014-1761 vulnerability in Microsoft Office products. The file has a .DOC extension to make it look less suspicious.

Execution

10 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Eventually, waiting for a command in an infinite loop, it sniffs port 8000. A received command will then be run in the command window.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Eventually, waiting for a command in an infinite loop, it sniffs port 8000. A received command will then be run in the command window.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

We’ve seen a packer very similar to Zbot (based on its source code), obfuscated Visual Basic and .NET binaries

T1106Native APIEvidence1

This malware uses very uncommon API functions in low-level form (Nt/Rtl), which is probably used to avoid standard API monitors/tracers, sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

...les aurait distribués par point d’eau via le kit d’exploitation Neutrino.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"...illegal software downloads... as a means of distribution."

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

the attached document instructs the end user to download and enable its content. This allows the macro malware to execute, thus completing the initial infection of Andromeda.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

Additionally, the two processes communicate with each other through an instance of creating a pipe connection.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

This part of code is executed when the environment variable ‘svch’ has not been found. The bot tries to connect to the pipe name, which is ‘kill’ xor’ed by the VolumeSerialNumber.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

As part of its evolution, version 2.07 implements a custom exception handler using a call to SetUnhandledExceptionFilter. Similarly, version 2.08 calls RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler and adds the custom handler as the first handler into the vectored exception handler chain (VEH).

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

First, it modifies the registry entry HKLM\system\currentcontrolset\services\sharedaccess\parameters\firewallpolicy\standardprofile\authorizedapplications\list to the value of %s:*:Generic Host Process, which points to the path of the current process.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

A suspended process of the file to be injected is created... Before it calls ResumeThread to resume the process, it changes the entry point of the injected file to point to its code.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence12

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can establish persistence by dropping a sample of itself to `C:\ProgramData\Local Settings\Temp\mskmde.com` and adding a Registry run key to execute every time a user logs on.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Gamarue, Dinihou and now also Spora use Windows shortcuts (.LNK files) instead. Spora adds the hidden attribute to files and folders on the desktop, in the root of removable drives and the system drive. Spora then puts Windows shortcuts with the same name and icon as the hidden files and folders as a visible replacement.

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence11

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can inject into the `wuauclt.exe` process to perform C2 actions.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

It then calls QueueUserAPC, which creates an asynchronous procedure call object. This object points to the code which decrypts some encrypted strings using RC4 decryption.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Eventually, in all versions, the loader injects the payload into a remote process using a process hollowing technique and runs it in memory.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

A suspended process of the file to be injected is created... Before it calls ResumeThread to resume the process, it changes the entry point of the injected file to point to its code.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence12

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can establish persistence by dropping a sample of itself to `C:\ProgramData\Local Settings\Temp\mskmde.com` and adding a Registry run key to execute every time a user logs on.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Gamarue, Dinihou and now also Spora use Windows shortcuts (.LNK files) instead. Spora adds the hidden attribute to files and folders on the desktop, in the root of removable drives and the system drive. Spora then puts Windows shortcuts with the same name and icon as the hidden files and folders as a visible replacement.

Stealth

18 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Version 2.10 also keeps an array of API hash values. The hash algorithm is a custom function and, in order to complicate static analysis further, the author incorporates opaque predicates.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

When the message is prepared for the required information, in all versions except the most recent one, the string is encrypted in two steps. The first step uses a 20-byte hard-coded RC4 key and the second step uses base64 encoding. Version 2.10 encrypts the message only using the RC4 algorithm.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

If the bot does detect the presence of either a debugger or a virtual machine, it decrypts the dummy code. This code copies itself under %alluserprofiles% as svchost.exe with hidden system file attributes.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has been installed to `C:\Temp\TrustedInstaller.exe` to mimic a legitimate Windows installer service.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1036.006Space after FilenameEvidence1

ANDROMEDA has been delivered through a LNK file disguised as a folder.

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence3

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has been delivered through a LNK file disguised as a folder.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence11

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can inject into the `wuauclt.exe` process to perform C2 actions.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

It then calls QueueUserAPC, which creates an asynchronous procedure call object. This object points to the code which decrypts some encrypted strings using RC4 decryption.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Eventually, in all versions, the loader injects the payload into a remote process using a process hollowing technique and runs it in memory.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

They call the DeleteFile API to remove the :Zone.Identifier flag from the newly created ms*.exe file

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

It uses this path to create a copy of the original file before deleting it, and saves it in %alluserprofile% with a random filename... The original file in the old path is deleted.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

the file time is set to the file time obtained from the original msiexec.exe file. The well known functions - GetFileTime and SetFileTime are used.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

The majority of Gamarue activity we see involves rundll32.exe executing with unusual command lines that include long filenames with repeating characters and random function names.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

In these variants, the loader enumerates the processes running on the machine and compares them against a list of unwanted processes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Iterating through process names and computing their CRC32 hash values... Trying to load the libraries guard32.dll and sbiedll.dll... Querying for a value... to search for the presence of any virtual machine.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

This code copies itself under %alluserprofiles% as svchost.exe with hidden system file attributes.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

As part of its evolution, version 2.07 implements a custom exception handler using a call to SetUnhandledExceptionFilter. Similarly, version 2.08 calls RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler and adds the custom handler as the first handler into the vectored exception handler chain (VEH).

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

The malware acquires the timestamp counter (by calling rdtsc) twice and calculates the difference between the two. If the difference is less than 512ms, it proceeds to resolve imports and decrypt the payload.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

First, it modifies the registry entry HKLM\system\currentcontrolset\services\sharedaccess\parameters\firewallpolicy\standardprofile\authorizedapplications\list to the value of %s:*:Generic Host Process, which points to the path of the current process.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

Formbook ... can retrieve authorization and login credentials from a web data form before the information reaches a secure server, bypassing HTTPS encryption. ... Formgrabbers intercept HTTP(S) data and use inline hooking ... to capture a user's information before the user submits it

Discovery

8 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Querying for a value in the system\currentcontrolset\services\disk\enum registry to search for the presence of any virtual machine.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

the malware includes ... rg Administrator rights Set 1 if malware process runs under an administrator account.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware tries to connect various legal servers on port 80 with a crafted socket and obtain the infected machine’s IP address from the sockaddr structure via the getsockname API function.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The main aim of Andromeda's payload is to steal the infected system's information, talk to the command-and-control (C&C) server, and download and install additional malware onto the system.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

In these variants, the loader enumerates the processes running on the machine and compares them against a list of unwanted processes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Iterating through process names and computing their CRC32 hash values... Trying to load the libraries guard32.dll and sbiedll.dll... Querying for a value... to search for the presence of any virtual machine.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Language exclusions Another interesting feature is the detection of keyboard layout settings. If Andromeda detects the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian or Kazakh keyboard, it sets a special flag that disables the infection

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

The malware acquires the timestamp counter (by calling rdtsc) twice and calculates the difference between the two. If the difference is less than 512ms, it proceeds to resolve imports and decrypt the payload.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence7

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has been spread via infected USB keys.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

the machines infected by Avalanche are still out there spreading the infection to new machines.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Il télécharge d'autres logiciels malveillants à partir de ses serveurs de contrôle, souvent dans le but de voler des informations sur les systèmes infectés.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

Formbook ... can retrieve authorization and login credentials from a web data form before the information reaches a secure server, bypassing HTTPS encryption. ... Formgrabbers intercept HTTP(S) data and use inline hooking ... to capture a user's information before the user submits it

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

All communication is RC4 encrypted ... Andromeda contains a hard-coded RC4 key, which is used for C&C server communication, for the downloaded plugin decryption and also for decrypting hard-coded C&C URLs

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

As shown in Table 2, each version has two message formats, both sent as HTTP POST requests: Action Request and Task Report.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has the ability to make GET requests to download files from C2.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

The hooked GetAddrInfoW API performs a DNS query for the input host name from Google DNS server 8.8.4.4... The DNS record received is then used for querying the C&C domain name.

T1092Communication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

“USB spreading malware continues to be a useful vector to gain initial access… a USB infected… was inserted… When the system's user double clicked a malicious link file (LNK) disguised as a folder within the USB drive…”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence18

[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can download additional payloads from C2.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

These bots can now be controlled via a control panel to perform different commands such as downloading and executing files, performing remote shell

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence1

“yelprope.cloudns[.]cl is a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain…”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

This string is encrypted using RC4 with a hard-coded key of length 0x20 and is further encrypted using base64... Later it is decrypted using RC4 with the VolumeSerialNumber as the key.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

248 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching248Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping57Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.