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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 4 actors

Amadey

Amadey is a malware family first identified in 2018 that is widely described as a versatile loader/downloader and infostealer, and is also referred to as a bot associated with a botnet of the same name. Its primary observed functions include collecting system information and reconnaissance data, stealing victim data, and downloading or installing additional payloads. Reported capabilities include collecting the username from an infected host via GetUserNameA, sending victim data to command-and-control servers, using modules or plug-ins for credential theft from popular browsers and VNC systems, screenshot capture, and clipboard hijacking of cryptocurrency wallet addresses. Amadey has also been described as using DLL plug-ins to extend functionality, including screenshot and credential-harvesting modules.

Amadey is frequently used as a delivery mechanism in multi-stage malware operations and malware-as-a-service/pay-per-install ecosystems. Public reporting cited in the content states it has delivered or been associated with payloads including Lumma Stealer, RedLine, StealC, SmokeLoader, AsyncRAT, XWorm, DOILoader/IDAT Loader/HijackLoader, zgRAT, NetSupport, JaskaGO, Arechclient2, Remcos, and in referenced reporting LockBit 3.0. Cisco Talos reported in April 2025 on a MaaS operation using Amadey to deliver payloads via fake GitHub accounts and public repositories, and assessed the infrastructure was likely providing delivery services for multiple customers. Trend Micro also described Amadey as a pay-per-install service widely used to deliver infostealer payloads.

Observed distribution vectors in the content include phishing, cracked software and warez, malicious JavaScript and PowerShell chains, fake CAPTCHA or browser-error social engineering, malvertising, compromised websites, LNK-based delivery chains, and other malware downloaders. Specific reporting ties Amadey delivery to ClearFake campaigns, fake CAPTCHA/browser error lures targeting Windows users, cracked software infection chains, and GitHub-hosted Emmenhtal/PEAKLIGHT-style loaders. Kaspersky reported widespread phishing campaigns in 2024 that used browser-executed scripts mimicking CAPTCHA prompts and browser errors to trigger downloads of either Lumma Stealer or the Amadey Trojan, including exposure on adult sites, file-sharing services, betting platforms, anime resources, and traffic-monetized web apps.

The malware has been observed creating persistence. In one analyzed infection chain, an Amadey payload created a scheduled task to run every minute and modified the user shell folders registry path related to Startup persistence. The content also notes geofencing behavior: Amadey does not run tasks or install additional malware if the victim machine is based in Russia.

Targeting in the provided reporting is broad and opportunistic, but the content specifically mentions use against healthcare organizations, industrial control system environments via phishing-driven initial access, and overlap with campaigns targeting Ukrainian entities. Microsoft Threat Intelligence also referenced Amadey in reporting on Secret Blizzard activity against Ukraine. Known indicators directly mentioned in the content include a previously linked Amadey C2 IP/URL set: 5.42.65.114 was noted as previously associated with an Amadey C2 server; Talos reported Amadey downloaded from 185.215.113.16 as amnew.exe and contacted hxxp://185.215.113.43/Zu7JuNko/index.php; another analyzed sample included the PDB path D:\Mktmp\Amadey\Release\Amadey.pdb and SHA-256 18A38FA6F5B306243D99621556AF948A61DAED29619AB755E25010F9E254C6BD.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

2024-12-11 ⋅ Microsoft Threat Intelligence Frequent freeloader part II: Russian actor Secret Blizzard using tools of other groups to attack Ukraine Amadey Kazuar Wipbot FlyingYeti

InCrease

Fuery is a garble-obfuscated Go 1.20.1 implant dropped by the Amadey botnet (campaign fbf543) ... The same Amadey campaign also deploys a VOLK CryptoMiner.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
Kimsuky

the group had deployed publicly available malware including gh0st RAT, QUASARRAT, and AMADEY

via industrialcyberindustrialcyber.co
WIZARD SPIDER

References https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

A significant increase in the percentage of malicious scripts and phishing pages was driven by a recent series of widespread phishing attacks in August and September. The phishing lures were distributed through various channels, including phishing emails (e.g., fake vulnerability notifications claiming to be from GitHub), malicious links, and malvertising networks.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The phishing lures were distributed through various channels, including phishing emails (e.g., fake vulnerability notifications claiming to be from GitHub), malicious links, and malvertising networks.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks ... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Threat actors are increasingly using PowerShell to execute malware, including crypto miners, by embedding malicious code directly into command line arguments.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The instructions provided by the phishing scripts tricked users into executing malicious PowerShell commands to download additional spyware... Nowadays, threat actors are increasingly using PowerShell to execute malware, including crypto miners, by embedding malicious code directly into command line arguments.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

Talos discovered another unique file on the “Milidmdds” GitHub account during this research — a malicious Python script named “checkbalance.py”.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Clicking the “I’m not a robot” button copies the line powershell.exe -eC ... to the clipboard and displays so-called “verification steps”: Press Win + R; Press CTRL + V; Press Enter.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

These scripts are designed to trick users into following simple instructions on their computers, which ultimately trigger the download of next-stage malware – either the Lumma stealer or the Amadey Trojan.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

The instructions provided by the phishing scripts tricked users into executing malicious PowerShell commands to download additional spyware.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks ... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Persistence may be achieved by adding a program to a startup folder, which causes the referenced program to be executed upon log-in (T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks ... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

Persistence may be achieved by adding a program to a startup folder, which causes the referenced program to be executed upon log-in (T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The line from the clipboard contains a Base64-encoded PowerShell command... Inside this content is an obfuscated PowerShell script...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Talos identified Emmenhtal samples masquerading as MP4 files.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

Both Lumma and Amadey are designed to steal credentials from browsers and password managers.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Amadey’s primary functions are to collect system information and download secondary payloads on an infected host.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

Lumma... searches the victim’s device for files associated with various cryptocurrency wallets and steals them... Then, the attackers view browser extensions related to wallets and cryptocurrencies and steal data from them.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

These plugins come in the form of dynamic link libraries (DLLs) that can be selected based on desired functionality, such as screenshot capabilities or credential harvesting.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After execution, this payload contacts “hxxp://185[.]215[.]113[.]43/Zu7JuNko/index.php”, a known Amadey C2 address.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

These scripts are designed to trick users into following simple instructions on their computers, which ultimately trigger the download of next-stage malware – either the Lumma stealer or the Amadey Trojan.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

739 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
89 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
49 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
601 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app20 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app20 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
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IOC matching739

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Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.