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Malware4 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Anubis

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this week#89of 30,234 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days16 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK75Techniques
IOCs109Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasionPrivilege escalationReconnaissance
Delivery
Fake updateLure
Platforms
WindowsLinux

Anubis is a ransomware family and affiliate-driven ransomware-as-a-service operation developed by the cybercriminal group tracked as Hawkmoth. It emerged in late 2024 as a rebranding of Sphinx, retaining a largely unchanged payload. It is distinct from the Android banking trojan also named Anubis. Anubis operations combine file encryption, data theft, and threats to publish stolen information, with an optional destructive mode that empties file contents and leaves zero-length files.

Anubis has Windows and Linux encryptors. Analyzed payloads use an Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme implementation in Go. The ransomware checks administrative privileges, supports elevated execution, discovers files and processes, stops services, terminates processes, and attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies to inhibit recovery. It excludes selected system directories from encryption and creates ransom notes demanding negotiation and threatening data disclosure.

Affiliate intrusion methods vary. Anubis affiliates have exploited CVE-2025-5777, known as CitrixBleed 2, in Citrix NetScaler appliances to obtain access through exposed session material. Subsequent activity has included credential harvesting, remote-administration software, lateral movement, and cloud-based exfiltration. Some attacks have deployed the Lindnor backdoor and multiple security-disabling tools that abuse signed vulnerable drivers. Attackers have also configured remote access to persist in Windows Safe Mode with Networking. These supporting capabilities belong to the intrusion toolchain rather than necessarily to the ransomware executable.

Anubis targets organizations internationally across healthcare, engineering, construction, manufacturing, finance, technology, government, and transportation. Associated attacks can disrupt production and logistics through compromises of enterprise IT systems.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-5777via secpod blogExploited in the wildCitrixBleed 2Anubis ransomware affiliates are exploiting CVE-2025-5777, widely referred to as CitrixBleed 2, to gain access to enterprise environments through vulnerable Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway appliances.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-26399via resecurity otherUnauthenticated AjaxProxy Deserialization RCE in SolarWinds Web Help Desk“Resecurity is sharing a case study with an analysis of Anubis Ransomware affecting one of the major port authorities in the EU.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Hawkmoth

Anubis est un Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) opéré par le groupe Hawkmoth

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Anubis

Although the ransomware encryption payload was successfully blocked, the incident highlights Anubis operators' growing capabilities and their focus on disabling security defenses before launching ransomware attacks.

via gurucul threat researchcommunity.gurucul.com
Storm-2570

Analysts from Microsoft identified a consistent pattern after access was gained, even when attacks ended with Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis or BERT ransomware.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
FIN7

In its most recent campaigns, FIN7 has been observed deploying the Python-based Anubis backdoor, which provides full system control via in-memory execution and communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure using Base64-encoded data.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

75 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Sitnikov was allegedly charged for posting the source code of the Anubis banking trojan on Freedom F0x, a Telegram channel where Sitnikov often posted data leaks and malware source code

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Arctic Wolf observed intrusions involving valid VPN credentials and CitrixBleed 2 exploitation against NetScaler ADC and Gateway systems.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Abus d’infrastructure VPN : thème récurrent à travers les intrusions documentées

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

“This mechanism and similar techniques are the main implementation for the drive-by downloads typically associated with malvertising campaigns.”

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Exploitation de CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) : une vulnérabilité ciblant l’infrastructure VPN Citrix, utilisée comme vecteur d’accès initial

T1566PhishingEvidence3

The group utilizes a range of social engineering tactics, including previously undisclosed Microsoft Teams-based campaigns, alongside traditional phishing methods.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Email attachments continue to be the most common delivery mechanism. These typically contain macros or embedded scripts that execute malware under the guise of legitimate business communication.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

It will try and trick users into installing it with the fake system update seen in Figure 3.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

After decoding base64, it uses service to decrypt data that encrypted with rc4 scheme... Here is output of my script to get c2 and key from an Anubis sample.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence2

Anubis unpacks the encrypted data file and then drops the decrypted version. Later on malware proceeds loading decrypted dex into the application. After loading with DexClassLoader, malware removes the decrypted dex file.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

If the malicious code runs, then the app will try to trick the users into downloading and installing its payload APK with a fake system update.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The most common point of distribution seems to be from the Google Play Store.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

From there, attackers moved through RDP and SMB, used PsExec service creation...

Persistence

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Arctic Wolf observed intrusions involving valid VPN credentials and CitrixBleed 2 exploitation against NetScaler ADC and Gateway systems.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Abus d’infrastructure VPN : thème récurrent à travers les intrusions documentées

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

i malware per Android seguono tutti lo stesso copione: inducono l’utente ad installare un servizio di accessibilità con il quale possono leggere cosa è presente e cosa viene digitato nello schermo... Questo malware non fa eccezione

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once executed, the XLL payload initiates a series of code injection techniques... as one of the security vendors started flagging rundll32-based executions generically, the group was forced to experiment with process injection and alternative staging mechanisms.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Arctic Wolf observed intrusions involving valid VPN credentials and CitrixBleed 2 exploitation against NetScaler ADC and Gateway systems.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

i malware per Android seguono tutti lo stesso copione: inducono l’utente ad installare un servizio di accessibilità con il quale possono leggere cosa è presente e cosa viene digitato nello schermo... Questo malware non fa eccezione

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

Anubis has requested accessibility service privileges while masquerading as "Google Play Protect"

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

At a first look, it seemed clear that the APK was heavily obfuscated... It seems to mostly rely on generating a variety of random functions to hide the real functionalities of the sample... Most of the strings in the code are generated by using functions implementing a XOR decryption of byte arrays.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence2

The source code also appears to have been merged into one main file with most of the function names being obfuscated, as opposed to the previously separated but clear functionality.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Agent Smith can impersonate any popular application on an infected device, and the core malware disguises itself as a legitimate Google application.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once executed, the XLL payload initiates a series of code injection techniques... as one of the security vendors started flagging rundll32-based executions generically, the group was forced to experiment with process injection and alternative staging mechanisms.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

After loading with DexClassLoader, malware removes the decrypted dex file.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Arctic Wolf observed intrusions involving valid VPN credentials and CitrixBleed 2 exploitation against NetScaler ADC and Gateway systems.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

I found rc4 key with the help of stackTrace... With bArr2, we can decrypt the encrypted file from images folder of the APK.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Living-off-the-land : usage de binaires légitimes présents sur les systèmes victimes pour éviter la détection

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Based on the signature identifier ‘Trojan:Win64/IcedID.EI!MTB’ and loader’s execution using rundll32.exe with function scab /k accompanied by arguments such as besogon728 or pechene634 or haval462, it can be inferred that the Anubis botnet is in fact IcedID malware.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The malware developer is assuming that the sandbox for scanning malware is an emulator with no motion sensors, and as such will not create that type of data. If that is the case, the developer can determine if the app is running in a sandbox environment by simply checking for sensor data.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Reflection is an important concept in Java which lets you to call methods/classes without knowing about them in compile time... cObj = Class.forName("dalvik.system.dexClassLoader");

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

From there, attackers moved through RDP and SMB, used PsExec service creation, deployed RMM tools, looked for credentials, weakened security visibility...

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence6

“The Overlay attack is a well-known technique implemented on modern Android banking trojans... This usually takes the form of an imitation app or a WebView launched ‘on-top’ of a legitimate application (such as a banking app).”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Malicious functionality in these trojanized contact-tracing applications includes: ... Keylogging ...

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

After the infection, a webinject is deployed by Dreambot on the victim browsers and when that victims logs into the online banking service, credentials are intercepted to be later reused by the carder.

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

Intercepting, redirecting, sending and deleting SMS messages, to bypass SMS-based 2-factor authentication

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Harvest entered credentials or credit/debit card details and send them to the C&C server

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

These malware families are specifically designed to steal credentials related to banking platforms, financial services, and cryptocurrency exchanges.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

This has been the dominant method in recent years... mimics the bank’s login page and reels in the victim’s credentials.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

ipconfig for system network configuration discovery (T1016).

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

arp -a for both remote system discovery (T1018)... nltest /dclist for the remote discovery of the domain controllers (T1018). ping for network connectivity tests to remote systems (T1018).

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

the usage of the Task Manager to identify running software was extremely common... we observed actors identifying known security tooling based on the process icon

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1082 System Information Discovery

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

dir for file and directory discovery (T1083) over SMB (T1021.002).

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The malware developer is assuming that the sandbox for scanning malware is an emulator with no motion sensors, and as such will not create that type of data. If that is the case, the developer can determine if the app is running in a sandbox environment by simply checking for sensor data.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

From there, attackers moved through RDP and SMB, used PsExec service creation, deployed RMM tools, looked for credentials, weakened security visibility, and used cloud-transfer tooling before the final ransomware stage.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Anubis ransomware intrusions investigated since the start of 2026 used a mix of valid VPN credentials, exploitation of CitrixBleed 2, RDP movement...

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

dir for file and directory discovery (T1083) over SMB (T1021.002).

Collection

11 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage. BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history. CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence6

“The Overlay attack is a well-known technique implemented on modern Android banking trojans... This usually takes the form of an imitation app or a WebView launched ‘on-top’ of a legitimate application (such as a banking app).”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Malicious functionality in these trojanized contact-tracing applications includes: ... Keylogging ...

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

After the infection, a webinject is deployed by Dreambot on the victim browsers and when that victims logs into the online banking service, credentials are intercepted to be later reused by the carder.

T1074Data StagedEvidence2

It claimed to have 671GB of data including HR records, engineering/technical documentation and production data.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

Malicious functionality in these trojanized contact-tracing applications includes: ... Voice, Screen, and Camera recording and exfiltration

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

Another quite common technique was the inspection of Outlook... On one singular instance, we observed the actor expressing interests in Outlook’s rules.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

another trove of data was found within the clipboard synchronization feature. By copy/pasting between victim and attacker machines, operators exposed some additional TTPs and information surrounding their operations.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Malicious functionality in these trojanized contact-tracing applications includes: ... Voice, Screen, and Camera recording and exfiltration

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

Malicious functionality in these trojanized contact-tracing applications includes: ... Voice, Screen, and Camera recording and exfiltration

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

In a directory called “/numers/” there were also examples of address book dumps from phone contacts.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Then, it registers with the C&C server and checks for commands with an HTTP POST request.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"...command-and-control communication..."

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Tunnels and cloud transfer New or unexplained cloudflared , authenticated proxy, SSH SOCKS tunnel... activity on servers.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

this malware uses social media to obtain its C2: it downloads the webpage of a photo-less Instagram account. It then extracts the biography field of this account and decodes it using Base64.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

Sitnikov was allegedly charged for posting the source code of the Anubis banking trojan on Freedom F0x

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

IcedID itself is composed of multiple modules, one of which is a poorly documented VNC backdoor... acting as a cross-platform remote desktop solution... These backdoors are typically activated during the final initial-access stages to initiate hands-on-keyboard activity.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK ID Description T1571 Non-Standard Port

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

including ScreenConnect, Zoho Assist, MeshAgent, Remotely, UltraVNC, Total Software Deployment, cloudflared, SSH-based tunneling...

T1665Hide InfrastructureEvidence1

One of the ways the app developers hide the malicious server is by encoding it in Telegram and Twitter webpage requests. The bank malware dropper will request Telegram or Twitter after it trusts the running device. By parsing the response’s HTML content, it gets the C&C server ( aserogeege.space ).

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

SpyNote RAT can copy files from the device to the C2 server. ViceLeaker can copy arbitrary files from the device to the C2 server, can exfiltrate browsing history, can exfiltrate the SD card structure, and can exfiltrate pictures as the user takes them.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

Хакеры утверждают, что зашифровали инфраструктуру компании и похитили около 1 Тбайт корпоративных данных, которые теперь угрожают опубликовать.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

The group said it has now leaked this trove on its ransomware blog.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

used cloud-transfer tooling before the final ransomware stage... rclone, s5cmd, and S3 Browser.

Impact

6 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence2

Supporte un mode wiper optionnel vidant le contenu des fichiers

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence13

Le payload iservice.exe a été bloqué avant exécution . En cas de succès, il : Ajoute l’extension .anubis Dépose les notes de rançon restore files.txt et restore files.html

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

Final ransomware symptoms .anubis file extensions, ransom notes named RESTORE FILES.html or RESTORE FILES.txt , deleted shadow copies, broken restore points...

T1561Disk WipeEvidence2

В 2025 году операторы Anubis добавили в свой арсенал вайпер, который уничтожает файлы жертв и лишает их возможности восстановить данные даже в случае устранения последствий от атаки шифровальщика.

T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence1

The cybercrime gang caught the attention of the cybersecurity industry for a ‘wiper mode’ feature that enables it to permanently delete victims’ files and prevent their recovery.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence2

Coca-Cola has been given a week to pay up, or the stolen data will be leaked

Indicators of compromise

Observables

109 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

130 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
dragos blogNews · Nov 16, 2026Industrial Ransomware Analysis for Q3 2026 - DragosClaimed responsibility for the Fairlife ransomware incident, alleging server encryption and theft of up to 1 TB of data. The incident suspended production at four U.S. facilities for roughly 11 days; Coca-Cola confirmed data theft.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Nov 15, 2026Anubis Ransomware : le backdoor Lindnor et un arsenal BYOVD déployés contre une organisation US | CyberVeilleRansomware deployed during an October 2026 attack against an unnamed US organization. Its iservice.exe payload was blocked before execution. It would append .anubis, create restore files.txt and restore files.html ransom notes, and optionally empty file contents using a wiper mode. Data theft was claimed but not confirmed.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 9, 2026Anubis Ransomware Hackers Deploy New Lindnor Backdoor and 13 Security-Killing Tools in U.S. Attack | Cryptika CybersecurityRansomware offered through a ransomware-as-a-service operation developed by Hawkmoth. It appeared as a rebrand of Sphinx, with largely unchanged payload code. It encrypts files, threatens publication of stolen data, and supports an optional wiper mode that empties file contents. In the October 2026 U.S. intrusion, defenders blocked its payload before encryption began.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 9, 2026Anubis Ransomware Hackers Deploy New Lindnor Backdoor and 13 Security-Killing Tools in U.S. AttackRansomware developed by Hawkmoth and distributed through a ransomware-as-a-service operation described as appearing in December 2024 as a rebrand of Sphinx. It encrypts files, appends .anubis, and leaves notes threatening publication of stolen data. An optional wiper mode empties file contents. In the October 2026 attack against a U.S. organization, the encryptor was blocked before encryption began.Read more ↗
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IOC matching109Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping75Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.