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Malware11 associated actors6 associated CVEs

ZLoader

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 14 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns6Associated
Actors11Associated
ATT&CK112Techniques
IOCs1,293Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLureMalvertisingExploit kitDrive by
Platforms
Windows

ZLoader is a Zeus-derived banking trojan for Microsoft Windows that also operates as a multipurpose malware loader and malware-as-a-service platform. Originally focused on financial theft, it expanded into delivering additional malware and tools, including Cobalt Strike and ransomware such as Ryuk and DarkSide. ZLoader infections have affected businesses, hospitals, schools, and home users worldwide. TA547 has distributed it through job-application-themed email campaigns, and Conti operators have used its distribution network for initial access.

ZLoader steals browser passwords and cookies, captures browser keystrokes, collects screenshots and process information, and searches for documents to upload to its command-and-control infrastructure. It supports man-in-the-browser interception using browser-injected components, a local proxy, and a fraudulent certificate. Additional commands allow operators to download and execute programs, block access to selected URLs, and remove the implant. Remote-control functionality can be provided through a downloaded VNC tool.

Distribution methods include phishing and spam attachments, malicious Office macros, script-based downloaders, malvertising, drive-by compromise, exploit kits, and delivery by other malware, including Smoke Loader and QakBot. Campaigns have also exploited CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office. ZLoader establishes persistence through user-level startup configuration and injects components into legitimate Windows processes. Its evasion mechanisms include code and string obfuscation, virtual-environment checks, packing, encrypted communications, and components that disable security software. An embedded domain generation algorithm provides fallback command-and-control destinations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

6 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2013-3900via bleeping computerExploited in the wildWindows WinVerifyTrust Signature Validation VulnerabilityThe threat actors behind the 3CX incident "exploited a 10-year-old Windows vulnerability (CVE-2013-3900) to make it appear that the malicious DLLs used to drop additional payloads were legitimately signed." The same vulnerability was also used to infect Windows computers with Zloader. | The same vulnerability has been used to infect Windows computers with Zloader banking malware capable of stealing user credentials and private information.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via trendmicro comExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorTrend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI). ... CVE-2017-11882 is a 17-year old memory corruption issue in Microsoft Office ... The flaw resides within Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE) ... A proof-of-concept exploit was released publicly, but this has been fixed by Microsoft’s November Patch Tuesday.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-1579via acronisExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in PAN-OS GlobalProtectIn others, the CVE-2019-1579 vulnerability in Palo Alto’s GlobalProtect portal and GlobalProtect Gateway interface products and Microsoft Exchange server exposure were used. As a result of exploitation, an unauthenticated attacker could execute malicious code remotely (RCE).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-1599via vmware security blogExploited in the wildWindows Authenticode Spoofing via Embedded HTA ContentFinally, the threat actor leverages CVE-2013-3900 and CVE-2020-1599 to execute a malicious script appended to a signed Windows dll that injects the main Zloader dll into an msiexec.exe process. | BatLoader vs ZLoader While researching the pre-existing information on BatLoader published on the public internet, there seemed to be some confusion as to whether BatLoader and Zloader, a banking trojan, are one and the same.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-0151via eset welivesecurity blogWinVerifyTrust Signature Validation VulnerabilityZloader started life as a banking trojan, but lately evolved to become a distributor of several malware families, including various ransomware families.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-15982via ntt security japanExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Remote Code ExecutionSpelevo Exploit Kitは2つの脆弱性(CVE-2018-8174とCVE-2018-15982)を悪用することが報告されていますが、PseudoGateによる攻撃ではCVE-2018-15982のみが観測されています。CVE-2018-15982はAdobe Flash PlayerのRCEの脆弱性です。View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

11 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Conti

Other malware distribution networks (e.g., ZLoader)

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
TA547

A prior effort included a ZLoader banking malware campaign disguised as job applicant emails.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
WIZARD SPIDER

The threat actors authored and operated the TrickBot malware from late 2016 until March 2022 and have also distributed malware such as BazarLoader, Anchor, Zloader, and Buer Loader.

via secureworks blogsecureworks.com
TA511

SilentNight est un cheval de Troie vendu sur des forums russophones souterrains depuis fin 2019. Il est une variante du code malveillante Zloader.

via cert ssicert.ssi.gouv.fr
Water Minyades

Batloader has been observed to drop several malware payloads, such as Ursnif, Vidar, Bumbleloader, RedLine Stealer, ZLoader, Cobalt Strike, and SmokeLoader.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
FIN7

As announced today, Microsoft took action against the ZLoader trojan... Derived from the Zeus banking trojan first discovered in 2007, ZLoader is a malware family notable for its ability to evolve and change from campaign to campaign... ZLoader has previously been linked to ransomware infections such as Ryuk, DarkSide, and BlackMatter.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com

+5 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

112 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

14 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence3

Kroll has observed threat actors abusing Google Ads to deploy malware masquerading as legitimate downloads... VIDAR malware... is using Google Ads to advertise spoofed domains and redirect users to fraudulent sites or malware downloads.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

In more recent campaigns, ZLoader has shifted away from using email as a means of delivery and instead used malicious ads on search engines such as Google to trick users into visiting malicious sites.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server Several servers were used to host Zloader infrastructure.

T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

The second malvertiser ('malsmoke') ... was able to abuse the Traffic Stars ad network and place their malicious ad on xhamster[.]com

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The majority of the emails contained links to a malicious file hosted on Google Drive... the use of a legitimate web platform for hosting the malicious content may provide another way for the attacker to evade various protections

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server Some legitimate websites were compromised to host parts of Zloader infrastructure.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware Zloader is malware targeting users of the Windows operating system.

T1587.002Code Signing CertificatesEvidence1

T1587.002 Develop Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates Some of Zloader's distribution methods use signed malicious binaries.

T1587.003Digital CertificatesEvidence1

T1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates Zloader used digital certificates in HTTPS traffic.

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware Various malware samples are used to distribute Zloader or are distributed by Zloader itself.

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool Various legitimate tools and libraries are used to support Zloader tasks.

T1588.006VulnerabilitiesEvidence1

T1588.006 Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities CVE-2013-3900 is exploited in one of Zloader's distribution methods.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

Danabot operators upload other malware to their infrastructure for further spreading.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

The threat actors utilize search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning to lure users to download the malware from compromised websites.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence8

Zloader can be downloaded through drive-by compromise via Malsmoke, RIG Exploit Kit, and Spelevo

T1566PhishingEvidence20

Zloader can arrive via phishing emails with attached XLS downloader files

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence16

The Cobalt hacking group also weaponized this security flaw in one of their campaigns in late November, sending out a similarly constructed RTF file. In their previous spear-phishing campaigns, the DLL is a component of the penetration testing tool Cobalt Strike.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence7

These emails contained URLs linking to a landing page that presents a CAPTCHA challenge before linking to the download of a Microsoft Word Document.

Execution

12 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Zloader uses WMI to gather various system information.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence7

T1059 -Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence7

BatLoader is an initial access malware that heavily uses batch and PowerShell scripts to gain a foothold on a victim machine and deliver other malware.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence11

while the EXE will be done alone with the help of “WScript.Shell”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence15

Within the ComboBox objects’ initialization code in the UserForm objects and various other mechanisms, a download URL and a password are assembled and used within a call to the VBA function CallByName. | The document will automatically execute the macro code on closing the document | These MHTML files contain a Word document with VBA macros. The VBA macro code downloads and decrypts a password-protected XLS file

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

the attachments used for dropping the malware were mostly Word documents with malicious Javascript.

T1106Native APIEvidence4

Zloader hooks native API from user32.dll and ntdll.dll to redirect execution to Zloader DLL

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Trend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence8

User can execute the XLS Zloader downloader file manually

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link Zloader is commonly distributed through malicious links.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence15

The PowerShell inline script kicks off the infection when executed during software installation, downloading the first BatLoader script, update.bat using the cmdlet Invoke-WebRequest.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

including many non-malicious .dll files that are legitimate pieces of whatever software is being impersonated at the time. A malicious .bat file is hidden in those .dll files.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

Zloader modules (at least Downloaders and Backdoors) use a registry to store various data necessary for their work.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

the rest of the “tg” function then creates an object via CreateObject("excel.application")

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

T1547- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

Downloader module is copied into %APPDATA% and added to the autorun key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with random value name.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence14

Zloader injects its loader or core component to msiexec.exe

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Zloader injects its modules into several processes.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence2

Along with that it will use Syscall associated with NtGetContextThread, NtSetContextThread and NtResumeThread. Doing this it is hijacking the Thread.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The libssl.dll is loaded by hollowing mshtml.dll.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

the rest of the “tg” function then creates an object via CreateObject("excel.application")

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

T1547- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

Downloader module is copied into %APPDATA% and added to the autorun key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with random value name.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence3

The downloaded script flash.bat executed a VBS script designed to bypass the user application control and elevate threat actor’s privileges.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence3

T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control Several methods are used to bypass UAC mechanisms during Zloader's deployment.

Stealth

25 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence15

Zloader tries to confuse the analyst by obfuscating these in a form of various, dedicated functions

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence3

One of the more creative ways to disguise threat activity comes in the form of packing software – a technique that applies a packing algorithm on malware to produce a file that is harder to detect, analyze, and prevent.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence5

Figure 2: Mapping API with hashes... It is making use of the above mentioned Function in Figure 2 to resolve the API.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

The nature of malware communications with its C&C server(s) has advanced over time, from using plain non-encrypted channels to using custom and standard symmetric ... and asymmetric ... encryption algorithms and protocols (SSL/TLS) to hinder network inspection of such malicious traffic.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence9

Zloader MSI files were disguised as installers for remote working applications such as Zoom, TeamViewer, and Discord.

T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence1

T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature Some of the Zloader installers have been signed using invalid certificates to make them seem more legitimate.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Some of the Zloader installers mimic names of legitimate applications.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence14

Zloader injects its loader or core component to msiexec.exe

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Zloader injects its modules into several processes.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence2

Along with that it will use Syscall associated with NtGetContextThread, NtSetContextThread and NtResumeThread. Doing this it is hijacking the Thread.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The libssl.dll is loaded by hollowing mshtml.dll.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath '%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming' ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'msiexec.exe'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Some components of Zloader or its distribution method are removed after successful installation.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

Zloader performs XOR to decode obfuscated strings and information

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

utilize validly-signed files to hide malicious scripts through vulnerabilities like CVE-2020-1599, CVE-2013-3900, and CVE-2012-0151.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence5

The appended script content is executed using the windows binary mshta.exe .

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

This DLL is meant to be executed by ‘mshta.exe’ which will then decrypt and detonate files.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

The second and the last task of the Main function is to start msiexec.exe and perform the PE injection of the code into it.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence5

The script used regsvr32.exe to launch the DLL and run a command to time out for 200 seconds.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence7

the DLL will be loaded using the rundll32 windows utility.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

Zloader downloader scripts check if it is running in a virtual environment and will not execute properly if it is

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

$Condition001 = ($UserDomain -ne $UserPCname) ... $Condition003 = ($IP_count -ge $MaxIPToSendRequest)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

including many non-malicious .dll files that are legitimate pieces of whatever software is being impersonated at the time. A malicious .bat file is hidden in those .dll files.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

It fills these allocated buffers with helper functions which are used for further self modifications or unpacking procedures of the payload. The last allocated buffer is then finally filled with the unpacked malware payload.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

After that it performs some basic anti-debugging checks like IsDebuggerPresent(), PEB checks which can be easily bypassed.

Defense Impairment

7 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

Zloader modules (at least Downloaders and Backdoors) use a registry to store various data necessary for their work.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

malware is often signed with valid Authenticode certificates... The SolarMarker actor always signs his first stage payload

T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence1

T1553.004 Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate Zloader installs browser certificates are installed to support AitB attack.

T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Defense Evasion

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence9

Zloader also included a component that disabled popular security and antivirus software, thereby preventing victims from detecting the ZLoader infection.

Credential Access

10 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Zloader captures keystrokes on browsers

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail. | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Web injection allows the attacker to alter content of the websites displayed to the victim, while form grabbing captures credentials from the browser windows.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence9

Zloader steals cookies from Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

A new addition to the bot is the capability of stealing outlook credentials. | Execution of this command triggers stealing passwords saved in the attacked browsers. Currently only Chrome is supported. | The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

The malware steals saved Chrome credentials... select `origin_url`, `username_value`, `password_value` FROM logins

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence2

In order to be able to perform those actions, the malware has to deploy a Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) attack, (which is a variant of Man-In-The-Middle).

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence4

Originally, the primary goal of Zloader was financial theft, stealing account login IDs, passwords and other information to take money from people’s accounts.

Discovery

13 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

T1012 - Query Registry

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

Silent Night also collects network information by running and saving the output of the following commands: ipconfig /all

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Zloader uses the victim's username to generate a botID to identify a system in a botnet.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

List of active processes: | The injecting function starts by taking a snapshot of all running processes, using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, and then walks through it.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

T1082 System Information Discovery Zloader gathers various system information and sends it to its C&C.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

Zloader steals cookies by discovering files from specific directories like \Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

T1124 System Time Discovery Zloader gathers Information about the system’s time zone and sends it to the C&C.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence3

net view /all net view /all /domain

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence4

"C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" computersystem get domain

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

Zloader downloader scripts check if it is running in a virtual environment and will not execute properly if it is

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

$Condition001 = ($UserDomain -ne $UserPCname) ... $Condition003 = ($IP_count -ge $MaxIPToSendRequest)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery Zloader uses a WMI command to discover installed security software.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

After that it performs some basic anti-debugging checks like IsDebuggerPresent(), PEB checks which can be easily bypassed.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence2

The bot collects the process list, and allows you to launch SOCKS5/HVNC services via its backconnect server.

Collection

10 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

it’s able to download and execute arbitrary files, steal files, inject arbitrary code to visited HTML pages and so on.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Zloader captures keystrokes on browsers

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail. | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Web injection allows the attacker to alter content of the websites displayed to the victim, while form grabbing captures credentials from the browser windows.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging Zloader saves its collected data to file prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

2) a series of screenshots in JPEG format (each screenshot has a fixed size 500 x 500 pixels) | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence5

Zloader has to install its own (fake) certificate, and has to run a local proxy before deploying a Man-In-TheBrowser (MITB) attack

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence2

In order to be able to perform those actions, the malware has to deploy a Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) attack, (which is a variant of Man-In-The-Middle).

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

バージョン1.0.8.0では、コマンドを受信した際に%TEMP%配下に一部の文書ファイルがコピーされ、別のスレッドによってC2サーバへ送信するという動作でした

T1560.003Archive via Custom MethodEvidence1

T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method Zloader uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt data before sending them to the C&C.

Command and Control

16 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence2

C2 is encrypted via RC4 and XORing algorithm where each character of the string is XORed with the preceding character which was already XORed

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

If none of the hardcoded servers responds, a Zloader bot can use its DGA as a fallback mechanism.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence14

The following commands are accepted: user_execute ... user_cookies_get ... user_url_block ... bot_uninstall ... user_password_get ... user_files_get

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

there is a GET request sent to the C2 (hxxps://tanikku.com/kku.php) which provides a status report on the successful infection.

T1071.004DNSEvidence2

“…Zloader variant linked to Black Basta ransomware, employing Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling for stealthy command and control…”

T1090ProxyEvidence3

Zloader components injected into browsers are responsible for redirecting traffic via proxy

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Threads are spawned that execute functions to install a fake certificate and run a local proxy

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence1

We also discovered infection chains that deliver multiple payloads to a single victim as part of a multi-stage infection process.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence24

Interestingly, this Smoke Loader instance also downloads Raccoon Stealer and ZLoader.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

Anybody with previous experience working with encoded content will easily see that base64 encoding is used.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

Zloader downloads and executes VNC tool to control victim machine

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence3

Zloader contains a domain generation algorithm (DGA) embedded within the malware that creates additional domains as a fallback or backup communication channel for the botnet.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence9

README.md ... Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) of Malware reimplemented in Python.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

However, the network encryption is now using 1,024-bit RSA with RC4 and the Zeus “visual encryption” algorithms.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

All communication between bots and their C&C servers is performed over HTTP/HTTPS, and regardless of which is used the data is encrypted using RC4.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Data collected by Zloader, such as stolen cookies, screenshot, and process list, are exfiltrated to C&C server

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Deploying ransomware through which cyber actors remove victim access to data (usually via encryption), potentially causing significant disruption to operations.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

T1489 Service Stop Some of the Zloader distribution methods disable the Windows Defender service.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Some of the Zloader distribution methods disable Windows recovery function through bcdedit.exe .

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence3

shutdown /s /f /t 01

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1,293 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1,293Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors11Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities6CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping112Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.