ZLoader
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- PhishingMalspamLureMalvertisingExploit kitDrive by
- Platforms
- Windows
ZLoader is a Zeus-derived banking trojan for Microsoft Windows that also operates as a multipurpose malware loader and malware-as-a-service platform. Originally focused on financial theft, it expanded into delivering additional malware and tools, including Cobalt Strike and ransomware such as Ryuk and DarkSide. ZLoader infections have affected businesses, hospitals, schools, and home users worldwide. TA547 has distributed it through job-application-themed email campaigns, and Conti operators have used its distribution network for initial access.
ZLoader steals browser passwords and cookies, captures browser keystrokes, collects screenshots and process information, and searches for documents to upload to its command-and-control infrastructure. It supports man-in-the-browser interception using browser-injected components, a local proxy, and a fraudulent certificate. Additional commands allow operators to download and execute programs, block access to selected URLs, and remove the implant. Remote-control functionality can be provided through a downloaded VNC tool.
Distribution methods include phishing and spam attachments, malicious Office macros, script-based downloaders, malvertising, drive-by compromise, exploit kits, and delivery by other malware, including Smoke Loader and QakBot. Campaigns have also exploited CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office. ZLoader establishes persistence through user-level startup configuration and injects components into legitimate Windows processes. Its evasion mechanisms include code and string obfuscation, virtual-environment checks, packing, encrypted communications, and components that disable security software. An embedded domain generation algorithm provides fallback command-and-control destinations.
Associated vulnerabilities
6 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
11 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
A prior effort included a ZLoader banking malware campaign disguised as job applicant emails.
The threat actors authored and operated the TrickBot malware from late 2016 until March 2022 and have also distributed malware such as BazarLoader, Anchor, Zloader, and Buer Loader.
SilentNight est un cheval de Troie vendu sur des forums russophones souterrains depuis fin 2019. Il est une variante du code malveillante Zloader.
Batloader has been observed to drop several malware payloads, such as Ursnif, Vidar, Bumbleloader, RedLine Stealer, ZLoader, Cobalt Strike, and SmokeLoader.
As announced today, Microsoft took action against the ZLoader trojan... Derived from the Zeus banking trojan first discovered in 2007, ZLoader is a malware family notable for its ability to evolve and change from campaign to campaign... ZLoader has previously been linked to ransomware infections such as Ryuk, DarkSide, and BlackMatter.
+5 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
112 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
14 techniques
Resource Development
Kroll has observed threat actors abusing Google Ads to deploy malware masquerading as legitimate downloads... VIDAR malware... is using Google Ads to advertise spoofed domains and redirect users to fraudulent sites or malware downloads.
In more recent campaigns, ZLoader has shifted away from using email as a means of delivery and instead used malicious ads on search engines such as Google to trick users into visiting malicious sites.
T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server Several servers were used to host Zloader infrastructure.
The second malvertiser ('malsmoke') ... was able to abuse the Traffic Stars ad network and place their malicious ad on xhamster[.]com
The majority of the emails contained links to a malicious file hosted on Google Drive... the use of a legitimate web platform for hosting the malicious content may provide another way for the attacker to evade various protections
T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server Some legitimate websites were compromised to host parts of Zloader infrastructure.
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware Zloader is malware targeting users of the Windows operating system.
T1587.002 Develop Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates Some of Zloader's distribution methods use signed malicious binaries.
T1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates Zloader used digital certificates in HTTPS traffic.
T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware Various malware samples are used to distribute Zloader or are distributed by Zloader itself.
T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool Various legitimate tools and libraries are used to support Zloader tasks.
T1588.006 Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities CVE-2013-3900 is exploited in one of Zloader's distribution methods.
Danabot operators upload other malware to their infrastructure for further spreading.
The threat actors utilize search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning to lure users to download the malware from compromised websites.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Zloader can be downloaded through drive-by compromise via Malsmoke, RIG Exploit Kit, and Spelevo
Zloader can arrive via phishing emails with attached XLS downloader files
The Cobalt hacking group also weaponized this security flaw in one of their campaigns in late November, sending out a similarly constructed RTF file. In their previous spear-phishing campaigns, the DLL is a component of the penetration testing tool Cobalt Strike.
These emails contained URLs linking to a landing page that presents a CAPTCHA challenge before linking to the download of a Microsoft Word Document.
Execution
12 techniques
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Zloader uses WMI to gather various system information.
T1059 -Command and Scripting Interpreter
BatLoader is an initial access malware that heavily uses batch and PowerShell scripts to gain a foothold on a victim machine and deliver other malware.
while the EXE will be done alone with the help of “WScript.Shell”
Within the ComboBox objects’ initialization code in the UserForm objects and various other mechanisms, a download URL and a password are assembled and used within a call to the VBA function CallByName. | The document will automatically execute the macro code on closing the document | These MHTML files contain a Word document with VBA macros. The VBA macro code downloads and decrypts a password-protected XLS file
the attachments used for dropping the malware were mostly Word documents with malicious Javascript.
Zloader hooks native API from user32.dll and ntdll.dll to redirect execution to Zloader DLL
Trend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI).
User can execute the XLS Zloader downloader file manually
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link Zloader is commonly distributed through malicious links.
The PowerShell inline script kicks off the infection when executed during software installation, downloading the first BatLoader script, update.bat using the cmdlet Invoke-WebRequest.
including many non-malicious .dll files that are legitimate pieces of whatever software is being impersonated at the time. A malicious .bat file is hidden in those .dll files.
Persistence
6 techniques
Persistence
Zloader modules (at least Downloaders and Backdoors) use a registry to store various data necessary for their work.
the rest of the “tg” function then creates an object via CreateObject("excel.application")
T1547- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Downloader module is copied into %APPDATA% and added to the autorun key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with random value name.
The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).
偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。
Privilege Escalation
9 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Zloader injects its loader or core component to msiexec.exe
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Zloader injects its modules into several processes.
Along with that it will use Syscall associated with NtGetContextThread, NtSetContextThread and NtResumeThread. Doing this it is hijacking the Thread.
The libssl.dll is loaded by hollowing mshtml.dll.
the rest of the “tg” function then creates an object via CreateObject("excel.application")
T1547- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Downloader module is copied into %APPDATA% and added to the autorun key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with random value name.
The downloaded script flash.bat executed a VBS script designed to bypass the user application control and elevate threat actor’s privileges.
T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control Several methods are used to bypass UAC mechanisms during Zloader's deployment.
Stealth
25 techniques
Stealth
Zloader tries to confuse the analyst by obfuscating these in a form of various, dedicated functions
One of the more creative ways to disguise threat activity comes in the form of packing software – a technique that applies a packing algorithm on malware to produce a file that is harder to detect, analyze, and prevent.
Figure 2: Mapping API with hashes... It is making use of the above mentioned Function in Figure 2 to resolve the API.
The nature of malware communications with its C&C server(s) has advanced over time, from using plain non-encrypted channels to using custom and standard symmetric ... and asymmetric ... encryption algorithms and protocols (SSL/TLS) to hinder network inspection of such malicious traffic.
Zloader MSI files were disguised as installers for remote working applications such as Zoom, TeamViewer, and Discord.
T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature Some of the Zloader installers have been signed using invalid certificates to make them seem more legitimate.
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Some of the Zloader installers mimic names of legitimate applications.
Zloader injects its loader or core component to msiexec.exe
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Zloader injects its modules into several processes.
Along with that it will use Syscall associated with NtGetContextThread, NtSetContextThread and NtResumeThread. Doing this it is hijacking the Thread.
The libssl.dll is loaded by hollowing mshtml.dll.
Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath '%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming' ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'msiexec.exe'
T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Some components of Zloader or its distribution method are removed after successful installation.
Zloader performs XOR to decode obfuscated strings and information
utilize validly-signed files to hide malicious scripts through vulnerabilities like CVE-2020-1599, CVE-2013-3900, and CVE-2012-0151.
The appended script content is executed using the windows binary mshta.exe .
This DLL is meant to be executed by ‘mshta.exe’ which will then decrypt and detonate files.
The second and the last task of the Main function is to start msiexec.exe and perform the PE injection of the code into it.
The script used regsvr32.exe to launch the DLL and run a command to time out for 200 seconds.
the DLL will be loaded using the rundll32 windows utility.
Zloader downloader scripts check if it is running in a virtual environment and will not execute properly if it is
$Condition001 = ($UserDomain -ne $UserPCname) ... $Condition003 = ($IP_count -ge $MaxIPToSendRequest)
including many non-malicious .dll files that are legitimate pieces of whatever software is being impersonated at the time. A malicious .bat file is hidden in those .dll files.
It fills these allocated buffers with helper functions which are used for further self modifications or unpacking procedures of the payload. The last allocated buffer is then finally filled with the unpacked malware payload.
After that it performs some basic anti-debugging checks like IsDebuggerPresent(), PEB checks which can be easily bypassed.
Defense Impairment
7 techniques
Defense Impairment
Zloader modules (at least Downloaders and Backdoors) use a registry to store various data necessary for their work.
malware is often signed with valid Authenticode certificates... The SolarMarker actor always signs his first stage payload
T1553.004 Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate Zloader installs browser certificates are installed to support AitB attack.
Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Defense Evasion
The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).
偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。
Zloader also included a component that disabled popular security and antivirus software, thereby preventing victims from detecting the ZLoader infection.
Credential Access
10 techniques
Credential Access
Zloader captures keystrokes on browsers
The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail. | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.
Web injection allows the attacker to alter content of the websites displayed to the victim, while form grabbing captures credentials from the browser windows.
Zloader steals cookies from Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer
A new addition to the bot is the capability of stealing outlook credentials. | Execution of this command triggers stealing passwords saved in the attacked browsers. Currently only Chrome is supported. | The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail.
The malware steals saved Chrome credentials... select `origin_url`, `username_value`, `password_value` FROM logins
The bot allows for stealing contents of the opened pages (webgrabber), as well as for modifying it (webinject).
偽の入力画面などを表示させることで、ユーザの入力情報を窃取するものです。
In order to be able to perform those actions, the malware has to deploy a Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) attack, (which is a variant of Man-In-The-Middle).
Originally, the primary goal of Zloader was financial theft, stealing account login IDs, passwords and other information to take money from people’s accounts.
Discovery
13 techniques
Discovery
T1012 - Query Registry
Silent Night also collects network information by running and saving the output of the following commands: ipconfig /all
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Zloader uses the victim's username to generate a botID to identify a system in a botnet.
List of active processes: | The injecting function starts by taking a snapshot of all running processes, using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, and then walks through it.
T1082 System Information Discovery Zloader gathers various system information and sends it to its C&C.
Zloader steals cookies by discovering files from specific directories like \Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
T1124 System Time Discovery Zloader gathers Information about the system’s time zone and sends it to the C&C.
net view /all net view /all /domain
"C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" computersystem get domain
Zloader downloader scripts check if it is running in a virtual environment and will not execute properly if it is
$Condition001 = ($UserDomain -ne $UserPCname) ... $Condition003 = ($IP_count -ge $MaxIPToSendRequest)
T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery Zloader uses a WMI command to discover installed security software.
After that it performs some basic anti-debugging checks like IsDebuggerPresent(), PEB checks which can be easily bypassed.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
The bot collects the process list, and allows you to launch SOCKS5/HVNC services via its backconnect server.
Collection
10 techniques
Collection
it’s able to download and execute arbitrary files, steal files, inject arbitrary code to visited HTML pages and so on.
Zloader captures keystrokes on browsers
The reports are geared towards banking theft. The reports could be of HTTP/S traffic, key logs, screenshots, cookies, passwords and mail. | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.
Web injection allows the attacker to alter content of the websites displayed to the victim, while form grabbing captures credentials from the browser windows.
T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging Zloader saves its collected data to file prior to exfiltration.
2) a series of screenshots in JPEG format (each screenshot has a fixed size 500 x 500 pixels) | The hook of the function user32.TranslateMessage redirects into a function responsible for keylogging and making screenshots.
Zloader has to install its own (fake) certificate, and has to run a local proxy before deploying a Man-In-TheBrowser (MITB) attack
In order to be able to perform those actions, the malware has to deploy a Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) attack, (which is a variant of Man-In-The-Middle).
バージョン1.0.8.0では、コマンドを受信した際に%TEMP%配下に一部の文書ファイルがコピーされ、別のスレッドによってC2サーバへ送信するという動作でした
T1560.003 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method Zloader uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt data before sending them to the C&C.
Command and Control
16 techniques
Command and Control
C2 is encrypted via RC4 and XORing algorithm where each character of the string is XORed with the preceding character which was already XORed
If none of the hardcoded servers responds, a Zloader bot can use its DGA as a fallback mechanism.
The following commands are accepted: user_execute ... user_cookies_get ... user_url_block ... bot_uninstall ... user_password_get ... user_files_get
there is a GET request sent to the C2 (hxxps://tanikku.com/kku.php) which provides a status report on the successful infection.
“…Zloader variant linked to Black Basta ransomware, employing Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling for stealthy command and control…”
Zloader components injected into browsers are responsible for redirecting traffic via proxy
Threads are spawned that execute functions to install a fake certificate and run a local proxy
We also discovered infection chains that deliver multiple payloads to a single victim as part of a multi-stage infection process.
Interestingly, this Smoke Loader instance also downloads Raccoon Stealer and ZLoader.
Anybody with previous experience working with encoded content will easily see that base64 encoding is used.
Zloader downloads and executes VNC tool to control victim machine
Zloader contains a domain generation algorithm (DGA) embedded within the malware that creates additional domains as a fallback or backup communication channel for the botnet.
The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.
README.md ... Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) of Malware reimplemented in Python.
However, the network encryption is now using 1,024-bit RSA with RC4 and the Zeus “visual encryption” algorithms.
All communication between bots and their C&C servers is performed over HTTP/HTTPS, and regardless of which is used the data is encrypted using RC4.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Data collected by Zloader, such as stolen cookies, screenshot, and process list, are exfiltrated to C&C server
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
Deploying ransomware through which cyber actors remove victim access to data (usually via encryption), potentially causing significant disruption to operations.
T1489 Service Stop Some of the Zloader distribution methods disable the Windows Defender service.
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Some of the Zloader distribution methods disable Windows recovery function through bcdedit.exe .
shutdown /s /f /t 01
Observables
1,293 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
116 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.