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Malware2 associated actors

BURNTCIGAR

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovdPost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

BURNTCIGAR is a Windows defense-disabling utility and driver loader first observed in November 2021. It terminates processes associated with antivirus, endpoint detection and response, and other security products at kernel level, allowing ransomware and other malicious tools to execute with reduced interference. Its use is closely associated with Cuba ransomware operations, including activity tracked as UNC2596 and Tropical Scorpius.

Early versions deployed a legitimate but vulnerable Avast driver and abused an undocumented device-control interface to terminate selected processes. This bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique allowed the utility to disable endpoint protections before data exfiltration and ransomware encryption. Later variants installed custom malicious signed drivers rather than relying exclusively on vulnerable legitimate drivers. The loader registers and starts a driver service, then sends device-control requests identifying security processes to terminate.

Related drivers have used a leaked NVIDIA signing certificate, certificates belonging to Chinese companies, and Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher signatures. These variants illustrate a progression from vulnerable-driver exploitation to abuse of trusted signing mechanisms for malicious kernel code. BURNTCIGAR is a post-compromise tool rather than the ransomware payload itself; its principal function is to impair endpoint defenses.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cuba

“Cuba ransomware's arsenal includes unique tools like ‘BurntCigar’ malware and, more to the point, the BYOVD attack analyzed below.”

via cymulate blogcymulate.com
RomCom

Burntcigar is a utility that can terminate processes at the kernel level by exploiting a flaw in an Avast driver, which is included with the tool for a “bring your own vulnerable driver” attack.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

When executed, the loader copies the driver to %temp%, giving it a five- to seven-character filename, then creates a service entry for the driver... Then the loader starts the service.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence3

Burntcigar is a utility that can terminate processes at the kernel level by exploiting a flaw in an Avast driver, which is included with the tool for a “bring your own vulnerable driver” attack.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

When executed, the loader copies the driver to %temp%, giving it a five- to seven-character filename, then creates a service entry for the driver... Then the loader starts the service.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Because drivers pose a uniquely challenging risk to security... kernel-mode drivers can perform highly privileged operations that user-mode processes cannot leverage, potentially reducing the effectiveness of some antimalware, endpoint security, or EDR products.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Throughout 2022 and 2023, Poortry continued to evolve, optimizing its code and using obfuscation tools like VMProtect, Themida, and ASMGuard to pack the driver and its loader (Stonestop) for evasion.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

All drivers signed with the WHCP certificate were packed with the VMProtect packer... malware executables commonly use packers... to complicate analysis.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The latest report by Sophos is based on a RansomHub attack in July 2024 that employed Poortry to delete critical executable files (EXEs), dynamic link libraries (DLLs), and other essential components of security software.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence3

The kit... first gained attention when its developers found ways to get their malicious drivers signed through Microsoft's attestation signing process... Sophos also notes that the latest Poortry variants employ signature timestamp manipulation to bypass security checks on Windows... The attackers were seen employing a tactic known as 'certificate roullete,' where they deploy multiple variants of the same payload signed with different certificates...

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence6

The malicious PoorTry kernel-mode Windows driver used by multiple ransomware gangs to turn off Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions has evolved into an EDR wiper, deleting files crucial for the operation of security solutions...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"actors load tools and malware from web accessible systems"; "loaded by a PowerShell script from a remote URL"; "TERMITE loader at hxxp://45.32.229[.]66/new.dll"

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

It then sends requests to the kernel-mode component to systematically terminate security-related processes and then delete their crucial files.

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.