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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Wicked

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2016-6277via web archiveExploited in the wildRemote OS command injection in NETGEAR routersOthers integrated Mirai code with multiple exploits targeting both known and unknown vulnerabilities, similar to a new variant recently discovered by FortiGuard Labs, which we now call WICKED. | Port 8443: Netgear R7000 and R6400 Command Injection ( CVE-2016-6277 )View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Wicked

These variants include Owari, Omni, Wicked, and SORA.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

If a connection is established, it will attempt to exploit the device and download its payload... Exploits and the corresponding target ports are listed below. Port 8080: Netgear DGN1000 and DGN2200 v1 routers... Port 81: CCTV-DVR Remote Code Execution... Port 8443: Netgear R7000 and R6400 Command Injection (CVE-2016-6277)...

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Port 8443: Netgear R7000 and R6400 Command Injection ( CVE-2016-6277 )

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The original Mirai used traditional brute force attempts to gain access to IOT devices. The WICKED bot, on the other hand, uses known and available exploits, with many of them already being quite old.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Port 80: Invoker shell in compromised web servers The next item on the list does not directly exploit the device, but instead takes advantage of compromised web servers with malicious web shells already installed.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Wicked bot scans port 8080, 8443, 80, and 81 by initiating a raw socket SYN connection.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After a successful exploit, this bot then downloads its payload from a malicious web site, in this case, hxxp://185.246.152.173/exploit/owari.{extension} .

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.