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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Ninja

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionSpoofing
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Ninja is a Windows trojan and loader framework associated with ToddyCat operations. It has been used in attacks against desktop systems since at least 2021 and provides a broad command set for execution, persistence, traffic relaying, and stealth. Observed delivery includes malicious executable files embedded in ZIP archives and loader packages distributed via Telegram, with victims required to open the embedded executable. Ninja loader components can also be executed through rundll32 and side-loaded through legitimate signed applications, including media player software, using malicious DLLs disguised with benign-looking names.

On compromised hosts, Ninja can establish persistence by creating Windows services masquerading as legitimate components. It supports defense evasion through DLL side-loading, process injection, arbitrary shellcode injection into running processes, and timestomping by altering file access and write times. It can redirect standard input and output through pipes, enabling command execution and output handling across components.

For command and control, Ninja can proxy communications for internal agents, forward TCP packets between command-and-control infrastructure and remote hosts, and build TCP proxy chains of up to 255 hops to obscure operator infrastructure and facilitate pivoting. It can also disguise malicious network traffic by mimicking legitimate services through customized HTTP paths and headers. These characteristics make Ninja a flexible post-compromise platform suited to covert access, internal relaying, and modular payload execution in espionage-oriented intrusions.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ToddyCat

(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has been distributed to victims via the messaging app Telegram.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Execution

5 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence4

The [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) loader can call Windows APIs for discovery, process injection, and payload decryption.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has gained execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can use pipes to redirect the standard input and the standard output.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can create the services `httpsvc` and `w3esvc` for persistence .(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence7

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to inject an agent module into a new process and arbitrary shellcode into running processes.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can create the services `httpsvc` and `w3esvc` for persistence .(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Ninja ... Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression; ... Samurai ... Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence5

The [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) payload is XOR encrypted and compressed.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023) [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has also XORed its configuration data with a constant value of `0xAA`.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1027.015CompressionEvidence3

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has compressed its data with the LZSS algorithm.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence5

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has used legitimate looking filenames for its loader including update.dll and x64.dll.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence7

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to inject an agent module into a new process and arbitrary shellcode into running processes.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence5

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can change or create the last access or write times.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

The [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) loader component can decrypt and decompress the payload.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) loader components can be executed through rundll32.exe.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can store its final payload in the Registry under `$HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Interface\` encrypted with a dynamically generated key based on the drive’s serial number.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence5

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can enumerate the IP address on compromised systems.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence5

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can enumerate processes on a targeted host.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can obtain the computer name and information on the OS from targeted hosts.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to enumerate directory content.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can obtain information on physical drives from targeted hosts.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

China Chopper ... Data from Local System; ... Cobalt Strike ... Data from Local System; ... LoFiSe ... Data from Local System; ... Ninja ... Data from Local System; ... Pcexter ... Data from Local System; ... Samurai ... Data from Local System

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Examples in the content include malware extracting or unpacking ZIP, RAR, CAB, tar.gz, and other archived content, such as 'Emotet has used a self-extracting RAR file to deliver modules to victims' and 'Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.'

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to modify headers and URL paths to hide malicious traffic in HTTP requests.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to mimic legitimate services with customized HTTP URL paths and headers to hide malicious traffic.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can use HTTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can proxy C2 communications including to and from internal agents without internet connectivity.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence6

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has the ability to use a proxy chain with up to 255 hops when using TCP.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can forward TCP packets between the C2 and a remote host.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can encode C2 communications with a base64 algorithm using a custom alphabet.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can XOR and AES encrypt C2 messages.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence4

[Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) can configure its agent to work only in specific time frames.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Этот крипто-вымогатель шифрует данные пользователей с помощью AES (режим GCM или похожий) + RSA-2048... К зашифрованным файлам добавляется расширение: .Void

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.