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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

Owari

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Initial accessScanningBrute forceDDOSDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxIOTNetwork device

Owari is a Mirai-derived IoT botnet that emerged in late 2017 and is associated with the threat actor known as Wicked, who also claimed involvement in the SORA botnet and was later linked to Omni and the exploit-driven WICKED propagation component. Like other Mirai descendants, Owari targets internet-exposed embedded Linux devices and routers, enrolling compromised systems into a botnet primarily used for distributed denial-of-service operations and related botnet-for-hire activity.

Early Owari activity relied on Mirai-style Telnet attacks using default or weak credentials against exposed IoT devices. As the pool of easily brute-forced devices became more saturated, Owari evolved to incorporate exploit-based propagation. High-confidence reporting links Owari to exploitation of Huawei HG532 devices via CVE-2017-17215, and related infrastructure overlaps tie it closely to Omni campaigns exploiting GPON routers via CVE-2018-10561. Owari has also been delivered through the WICKED malware component, which scans for vulnerable IoT and edge devices and uses known remote code execution and command injection flaws to fetch and execute Owari payloads.

Consistent with Mirai lineage, Owari is part of the broader ecosystem of self-propagating IoT malware that compromises devices across multiple CPU architectures, uses automated scanning and credential attacks or exploits for initial access, and incorporates botkiller behavior to remove competing malware from infected hosts. The malware family is tied to commercially motivated operations in which botnet capacity was reportedly rented to stresser services. Owari is generally discussed as one of several successive Mirai-variant projects developed in the same operator milieu as SORA, Wicked, and Omni, reflecting the post-Mirai trend from simple default-password compromise toward faster exploit-assisted propagation against unpatched IoT infrastructure.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-17215via cyfirma blogExploited in the wildRemote Command Injection in Huawei HG532 DeviceUpgrade ServiceOWARI retained the default password technique to propagate the victim device and added a few exploit scanners like CVE-2017–17215 Huawei exploit... Gafgyt primarily targets vulnerable IoT devices... It also frequently exploits known vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-17215 and CVE-2018-10561 to deliver next-stage payloads to infected devices. | OWARI, an updated version of the Mirai botnet, surfaced sometime at the end of 2017.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10561via newskysecurity blogExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Dasan GPON RoutersRoughly a week ago, a critical exploit CVE-2018–10561 found in over a million GPON home routers was reported along with POC explanation. Attackers wasted little time on taking advantage of this exploit as NewSky Security has already observed two unrelated attempted attacks by now.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Wicked

These variants include Owari, Omni, Wicked, and SORA.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

If a connection is established, it will attempt to exploit the device and download its payload... Exploits and the corresponding target ports are listed below. Port 8080: Netgear DGN1000 and DGN2200 v1 routers... Port 81: CCTV-DVR Remote Code Execution... Port 8443: Netgear R7000 and R6400 Command Injection (CVE-2016-6277)...

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

OWARI retained the default password technique to propagate the victim device and added a few exploit scanners like CVE-2017–17215 Huawei exploit...

Stealth

1 technique
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

attackers are also using techniques like Botkiller modules to kill existing malware on the device, and then run a copy of their own.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

At the same time, Mirai killed other processes running at TCP ports 23 and 2323 together with any possible competing Mirai variants.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Mirai attempted a brute-force attack with a pre-configured list of known factory defaults and most commonly used credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

I added a few exploit scanners into OWARI.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Once he'd access a device by guessing its SSH password, the infection routine would download and execute a list of Sora binaries, one by one, until it would found one appropriate for the infected device's platform.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After a successful exploit, this bot then downloads its payload from a malicious web site, in this case, hxxp://185.246.152.173/exploit/owari.{extension} .

Impact

1 technique
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence2

Mirai managed to keep 200,000 – 300,000 enslaved devices and peaked at an unbelievable 600,000... FBI special agents compared Mirai’s 1+ Tbps (1,000 Gbps)... The first Mirai incident was reported after the 18th Sep 2016 attack against popular Minecraft servers hosted on French service OVH.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.