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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Turla

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs31Tracked
Type
Rootkit
Capabilities
PersistencePrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltrationByovd
Delivery
SpearphishingWatering holeDrive byFake update
Platforms
WindowsLinux

Turla, also known as Snake or Uroburos, is a modular cyberespionage platform used to establish concealed, persistent access to compromised systems and steal sensitive information. Its Windows components include a sophisticated rootkit that maintains a hidden encrypted virtual file system containing attacker tools and collected data. The platform supports reconnaissance of other computers, lateral movement, and data exfiltration through distributed command-and-control infrastructure. Turla has also exploited legitimate vulnerable drivers to obtain privileged execution. It is associated with the Turla threat group, which has been linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service Center 16. Its targets include government, diplomatic, military, and research organizations, with government infections documented across Europe and the United States.

Turla infections can follow a multistage intrusion beginning with the Epic backdoor. Documented delivery chains use spearphishing attachments, compromised watering-hole websites, browser and document-reader exploits, and deceptive software installers. Operators selectively deploy additional espionage components after assessing compromised systems.

Linux components extend the platform beyond Windows. An analyzed Linux backdoor is a statically linked C/C++ executable based partly on public cd00r code. It uses packet capture to detect specially crafted network packets, then establishes an outbound connection to the packet sender and accepts remote commands for execution through a system shell. This trigger-based communication mechanism reduces exposure from continuously listening network services.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

Might be Turla (most common attribution: Russia)

via crysys hucrysys.hu
Gamaredon Group

Specifically, the company found that, between February and April 2025, tools that Gamaredon had deployed were used to restart and deploy Turla malware on the systems of select victims in Ukraine.

via security weeksecurityweek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

((source=" WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source=" WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") | WHERE (Image LIKE "%reg.exe%" AND ParentImage LIKE "%cmd.exe%")

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process. Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence2

This became apparent when we investigated an incident which involved a highly sophisticated rootkit. We called it the ‘Sun rootkit’... The ‘Sun rootkit’ and Uroburos are the same.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

In addition, Agent.btz and Turla use the same XOR key to encrypt their log files

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Examples include: “ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry…”, “ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.”, and “QakBot can store its configuration information…under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"Those tools include password stealers"

Discovery

3 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The tools ... check for the existence of specific files, windows registry entries ... For example, SIG2 includes System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashImage and SIG23 includes software\microsoft\NetWin.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

"tiny programs for gathering information about the system"

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

They check for the existence of specific files, windows registry entries, and other signs ... For example, this script looks for the existence of an actual file “winver32.exe” in the very specific $docsandsettings\\$subkey\\Application Data\\winver32.exe path.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

"and document stealers"

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"The operators can download specialized tools onto an infected system, adding any functionality they want by including it in the encrypted file system"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

"store stolen information, then transmit data back to their servers"

Indicators of compromise

Observables

31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching31Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.