Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Pteranodon

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 10 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs183Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SpearphishingUSB
Platforms
Windows
Also known asPterodo

Pteranodon, also known as Pterodo, is a Windows backdoor family developed and used by the Russia-linked cyberespionage group Gamaredon, also tracked as Shuckworm and Armageddon. It supports intelligence-gathering operations primarily against Ukrainian organizations, including government, military, and security institutions. Delivery mechanisms include spearphishing emails containing malicious Office documents and USB propagation facilitated by a separate PowerShell script.

The family includes multiple variants and staged components that use VBScript to contact command-and-control infrastructure, retrieve additional code, and execute payloads. Pteranodon can capture screenshots at configurable intervals and exfiltrate them to its command-and-control server. Some variants also collect and transmit host identifiers, including the system-drive serial number. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and copying components into the Windows Startup folder. Execution can involve malicious VBScript, remotely hosted HTA content, and signed Windows utilities used for proxy execution.

Defense-evasion behaviors include script obfuscation, API hammering in some variants, and deletion of temporary files, initial executables, and other infection artifacts. Gamaredon has deployed multiple Pterodo variants concurrently on individual compromised systems, with separate command-and-control servers, providing redundant access. The family serves both as a persistent foothold and as a mechanism for delivering additional malware.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0199via cert uaExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code ExecutionДокументи ... містили шкідливий код для експлуатації відомої вразливості «Microsoft Office» CVE-2017-0199 ... що надає змогу зловмиснику виконати довільний код на пристрої користувача, при відкритті інфікованого файлу.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group strongly relies on LOLBins and custom malware, such as Pteranodon or QuietSieve.

via trellix othertrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Next, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks – USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Bulk mailing of spyware like Pterodo

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence7

Gamaredon’s infection chain: Spoofed emails, GammaDrop and GammaLoad

Execution

11 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware executable sets up as a task as “schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 12 /F /tn Word.Downdloads /tr” to run every 12 minutes

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

After the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload... Next, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm’s Pterodo backdoor, was executed.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

After the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers’ C&C server... Shuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can use `cmd.exe` for execution on victim systems.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can use a malicious VBS file for execution.(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The remaining lines of code end up writing a VBScript file and placing it in the user’s startup directory.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) has used various API calls.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

"...експлуатації відомої вразливості «Microsoft Office» CVE-2017-0199... що надає змогу ... виконати довільний код... при відкритті інфікованого файлу."

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

In one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Gamaredon Leverages Microsoft Office Docs to Target Ukraine Government and Military

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware executable sets up as a task as “schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 12 /F /tn Word.Downdloads /tr” to run every 12 minutes

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The first registry modification made by this macro changes the key value of AccessVBOM to 1... The second registry modification enables all macros automatically and disables warnings for future macro-enabled objects.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an rtk.lnk extension. The script uses file names such as “porn_video.rtf.lnk”, “do_not_delete.rtf.lnk” and “evidence.rtf.lnk” in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware executable sets up as a task as “schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 12 /F /tn Word.Downdloads /tr” to run every 12 minutes

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an rtk.lnk extension. The script uses file names such as “porn_video.rtf.lnk”, “do_not_delete.rtf.lnk” and “evidence.rtf.lnk” in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The macro code was obfuscated using string concatenation and procedurally generated variables — techniques that are often used to bypass static detection technologies.

T1027.004Compile After DeliveryEvidence1

"...компіляція UserSupport.cs завдяки csc.exe(компілятор С#)... до UserSupport.exe"

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence3

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can use a dynamic Windows hashing algorithm to map API components.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

One of the notable features of the malware Interop component is its usage of the fake Microsoft digital certificate belonging to Microsoft Time-Stamp Service.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can delete files that may interfere with it executing. It also can delete temporary files and itself after the initial script executes.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can decrypt encrypted data strings prior to using them.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)

T1218.005MshtaEvidence5

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can use mshta.exe to execute an HTA file hosted on a remote server.(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence4

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) executes functions using rundll32.exe.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

These documents end up leveraging a technique known as template injection, a method of loading remotely hosted Microsoft Word document templates.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The first registry modification made by this macro changes the key value of AccessVBOM to 1... The second registry modification enables all macros automatically and disables warnings for future macro-enabled objects.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

"Say.vbs перевіряє доступність ... за допомогою команди ping"; "...перевірки доступності ... з мережею інтернет: ... ping 127.0.0.1"

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

The serial number and hostname of the victim's computer are some of the first pieces of information the VBA collects.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) identifies files matching certain file extension and copies them to subdirectories it created.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Next, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks – USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

This virus collects system data, regularly sends it to command-control servers and expects further commands.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) creates various subdirectories under <code>%Temp%\reports\%</code> and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at <code>C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store</code> to store screenshot JPEG files.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence6

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can capture screenshots at a configurable interval.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Attack Pattern Automated Collection - T1119

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

In this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram’s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can use HTTP for C2.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Inside Gamaredon’s PteroLNK: Dead Drop Resolvers and evasive Infrastructure

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) can download and execute additional files.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Malware Remcos RAT Remote access trojan used for persistent access ... Malware NetSupport RAT Legitimate RMM tool abused as malware

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence1

Each external URL within these lures were configured to point to Dynamic DNS providers (ddns.net, hopto.org)... the adversary’s attempt to mask their ownership and obscure atomic indicator associations through the use of transient infrastructures.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Attack Pattern Automated Exfiltration - T1020

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

183 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

60 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+55 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching183Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.