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MalwareUsed by 7 actorsExploits 1 CVE

njRAT

Also known asBladabindiLVNjw0rm

njRAT, also known as Bladabindi and sometimes referred to as NJW0rm/LV in the provided content, is a long-running commodity Remote Access Trojan first noted in the content as dating back to 2012. It is described as a VB.NET/.NET RAT, including references to njRAT v0.7d, and is widely used in cybercrime activity. The malware is designed to collect and steal sensitive information from compromised Windows systems and provide remote access to operators. Reported capabilities in the content include keylogging, remote desktop access, execution of PowerShell commands, reading specific registry values, identifying remote hosts on connected networks, detecting whether the victim system has a camera, detecting removable drives, activating microphones and webcams, exfiltrating the title of the current user window, stealing passwords saved in web browsers, and receiving stolen information over HTTP. The content also states that njRAT uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic and has used auto-run registry key persistence. One cited variant was observed with the ability to overwrite the Windows Master Boot Record (MBR). The malware has been associated with SilverTerrier/Nigerian BEC activity and is described as predominantly used in the Middle East region. It also appears in reporting on surveillance-oriented campaigns against activists and opposition targets in Syria and the UAE, where njRAT was among the commodity RATs used. The content further notes that njRAT started as a cybercrime tool and was later adopted by APT groups, and that other malware has reused njRAT-derived class architecture. A specific IOC-like detail directly mentioned is an njRAT sample communicating with 196.251.107.24 on port 5552.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

7 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
APT-C-36

TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
TAG-144

TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
Group5

"However, the ultimate malware payload in this case is njRat, another well-known RAT tool."

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca
RATicate

"Some of the payloads identified for campaign 2... included... RAT Bladabindi"

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
M38dHhM

This article presents a reverse engineering analysis of njRAT v0.7. njRAT, also known as Bladabindi, is a remote access tool (RAT) with user interface which allows the operator to control the victim’s computer.

via iss4cf0ng githubiss4cf0ng.github.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Additionally, the branding of trusted organizations (for example the World Health Organization (WHO)) is abused in order to build credibility and trust in order to have people, for example, open malicious attachments or web pages.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

By relying on basic social engineering – an attack technique that takes advantage of human traits such as curiosity, trust and greed in order to obtain confidential information or to have the victim perform a certain action – it is suffice to say that certain threat actors (both criminal and nation state) are exploiting these unprecedented times for various nefarious means.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.006HTML SmugglingEvidence1
TacticStealth

HTML smuggling, a highly evasive malware delivery technique that leverages legitimate HTML5 and JavaScript features, is increasingly used in email campaigns... When a target user opens the HTML in their web browser, the browser decodes the malicious script, which, in turn, assembles the payload on the host device.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots...

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

C2 Tracker is a free-to-use-community-driven IOC feed that uses Shodan and Censys searches to collect IP addresses of known malware/botnet/C2 infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence4

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

115 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
48 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
66 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

139 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching115

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution7

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping29

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.