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Malware2 associated actors

TruffleHog

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Capabilities
Credential theftReconnaissance
Platforms
WindowsLinuxmacOS

TruffleHog is a legitimate secret-scanning tool used to discover credentials, API keys, access tokens, and other sensitive authentication material in filesystems, configuration files, Git repositories, and commit history. It is not inherently malware, but attackers abuse it for credential discovery and collection in compromised developer workstations and CI/CD environments. Targeted secrets include npm publishing tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, and cloud-service credentials.

The Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm downloads and executes TruffleHog to scan compromised systems, then collects its results for exfiltration. Stolen credentials support subsequent repository access and propagation through compromised package-publishing accounts; these behaviors belong to the surrounding malware rather than TruffleHog itself. Shai-Hulud variants scan home directories or broader filesystems and may cache the scanner for reuse. TruffleHog has also been incorporated into credential-stealing tooling associated with Famous Chollima's StegaBin activity. Its abuse spans Windows, Linux, and macOS environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TeamPCP

The first IP to touch the stolen keys ran TruffleHog to validate that the credentials were live. The TruffleHog user agent appears directly in CloudTrail.

via kudelskisecuritykudelskisecurity.com
Contagious Interview

“...contained nine modules enabling keylogging, credential theft, browser and cryptocurrency exfiltration, TruffleHog secrets scanner downloads, and persistence.”

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

5 techniques
T1590Gather Victim Network InformationEvidence1

PentestMCP on port 8000 focuses on reconnaissance and crawling. Pentest-Recon on port 8001 expands this with secrets detection and historical URL mining using TruffleHog, GitLeaks, and the Wayback Machine.

T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

“Used GitHub access tokens stolen from TruffleHog to authenticate to GitHub API and enumerate repositories accessible to the victim.”

T1593Search Open Websites/DomainsEvidence5

The Android APK scanning pipeline was paired with a second credential-harvesting stream focused on GitHub. The attackers collected organization email addresses and searched for exposed GitHub Personal Access Tokens.

T1593.003Code RepositoriesEvidence3

GitHub dorking (T1593.003). Разработчики регулярно коммитят секреты в публичные репозитории - API-ключи, пароли от баз, приватные ключи.

T1596.001DNS/Passive DNSEvidence1

yar is an OSINT tool for reconnaissance of repositories/users/organizations on Github. Yar clones repositories of users/organizations given to it and goes through the whole commit history in order of commit time, in search for secrets/tokens/passwords

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

Whenever yar finds a secret, it will print it out for you to further assess. Yar searches for secrets either by regex, entropy or both

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

Public PHP2Shell PoCs, gitleaks, trufflehog, linPEAS, LSE, pspy, Dropbear, Dirty COW

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence11

“With those credentials, you access services” and “Eventually we found a working pair and got into a database.”

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence6

APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

A malicious update to @ctrl/tinycolor (2.2M weekly downloads) was detected on npm as part of a broader supply chain attack that impacted more than 40 packages spanning multiple maintainers.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“Shai-hulud deploys a ‘bundle.js’ script that downloads and executes TruffleHog.”

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence11

“With those credentials, you access services” and “Eventually we found a working pair and got into a database.”

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence6

APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

In the next stage of the attack, they used TruffleHog (a tool for scanning and validating cloud credentials) to search for additional secrets, then attached a newly created access key to an existing user to evade detection before conducting further reconnaissance and stealing data.

T1136.003Cloud AccountEvidence1

In the next stage of the attack, they used TruffleHog (a tool for scanning and validating cloud credentials) to search for additional secrets, then attached a newly created access key to an existing user to evade detection before conducting further reconnaissance and stealing data.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence11

“With those credentials, you access services” and “Eventually we found a working pair and got into a database.”

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence6

APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attack employs several evasion techniques including silent error handling (swallowed via catch {} blocks), no logging output, and disguising TruffleHog execution as a legitimate "security scan."

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence11

“With those credentials, you access services” and “Eventually we found a working pair and got into a database.”

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence6

APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

схема работы всегда одинакова: декомпиляция, например в JADX, и поиск по регуляркам.

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

threat actors used the Trufflehog open source tool to validate those credentials. The team observed Trufflehog validation activity for AWS access keys, Azure application secrets, and various SaaS tokens.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence13

“Shai-Hulud can self-replicate and steal credentials, tokens, and repository secrets; GitHub access tokens, Continuous Integration (CI)/Continuous Delivery (CD) pipeline secrets.”

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The simulation confirmed the exact set of exfiltrated credentials: two distinct AWS key pairs with broad permissions

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence23

From there the group reached a large BigQuery instance, used the secret-scanning tool TruffleHog to find further credentials.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence19

Secrets in configs, .env files and git history

T1552.004Private KeysEvidence1

CISA still hadn’t invalidated an RSA private key exposed in the Private-CISA repo that granted access to a GitHub app which is owned by the CISA enterprise account and installed on the CISA-IT GitHub organization with full access to all code repositories.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence24

Git Repositories: Scans commit history for buried secrets.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence5

Once installed, the malicious packages will attempt to collect and exfiltrate credentials and tokens for NPM GitHub, Azure, GCP, and AWS accounts

Discovery

9 techniques
T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence2

The attacker then enumerated IAM users, roles, Lambda functions, DynamoDB tables, CloudFormation stacks, and scanned every S3 bucket's ACL and public access configuration.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The first IP to touch the stolen keys ran TruffleHog to validate that the credentials were live. The attacker then enumerated IAM users, roles, Lambda functions, DynamoDB tables, CloudFormation stacks, and scanned every S3 bucket's ACL and public access configuration.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence6

the malware runs these tools against the compromised server's filesystem, including: Git Repositories... Directories: /tmp, /var/www, /opt, /etc , and user home directories.

T1087.004Cloud AccountEvidence2

Within 24 hours of validating stolen secrets, the group transitions to discovery operations in compromised AWS environments.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence4

TruffleHog validation attempts may appear as rapid sequential API calls testing credential validity across multiple services.

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence17

When executed, the infected packages are reported to attempt downloading and running TruffleHog, an open-source tool to scan for and collect available tokens and secrets from the host.

T1580Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryEvidence1

T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery The adversary performed enumeration of the environment, including gathering OneDrive metadata (drive IDs and child item counts) and user roles.

T1613Container and Resource DiscoveryEvidence3

The attacker scanned 24 S3 buckets, including 9 terraform state buckets.

T1619Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryEvidence1

The attacker scanned 24 S3 buckets, including 9 terraform state buckets.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence10

The malware uses TruffleHog’s filesystem scanner to sweep the victim’s home directory for hardcoded secrets

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence3

“Scan a GitHub repo including issues and pull requests ... issue text, comments, PR bodies, and PR comments.”

T1530Data from Cloud StorageEvidence3

From there the group reached a large BigQuery instance... and claimed close to a petabyte of stolen data including call records, voice recordings and source code.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

“Downloaded and ran TruffleHog on infected hosts to scan for secrets and credentials.”

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Cieľom útoku je zneužiť nástroj TruffleHog na vyhľadávanie citlivých údajov... a odoslať ich na server pod kontrolou útočníka.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

attackers stole an AWS API key that gave them control over AWS accounts. From there, they used Trufflehog to discover more AWS credentials, carried out reconnaissance activities, and then exfiltrated data from the environment.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

creates GitHub actions for data exfiltration through webhook sites... The malware employed dual exfiltration channels, creating dedicated GitHub repositories and implementing GitHub Actions workflows with webhook endpoints, while encoding sensitive data in GitHub Actions logs.

T1567.001Exfiltration to Code RepositoryEvidence1

harvests secrets using TruffleHog, exfiltrates to attacker-controlled GitHub repos

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.