SUNBURST, also known as Solorigate, is a Windows backdoor distributed through compromised SolarWinds Orion software updates during the 2020 SolarWinds supply-chain intrusion. The operation is attributed to APT29, a Russian state-sponsored espionage group associated with the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). SUNSPOT inserted SUNBURST into Orion builds, embedding the backdoor within a legitimate software library that received SolarWinds digital signatures. Up to 18,000 customers may have installed affected updates, although the attackers selected only a subset for follow-on exploitation. Victims included government agencies and technology, telecommunications, consulting, and other private-sector organizations worldwide.
SUNBURST delays activation for up to approximately two weeks and checks running processes, services, and drivers against obfuscated blocklists to identify security and forensic tools. It collects host, operating-system, user, domain, network, and process information. Its command interface supports file transfer and execution, file and directory enumeration, file deletion, registry modification, system rebooting, and disabling services. The backdoor enabled deployment of additional malware, including TEARDROP, during selected intrusions.
SUNBURST uses DNS and HTTP-based command-and-control communications and disguises web traffic as legitimate Orion Improvement Program activity. Its evasion mechanisms include encoded and compressed strings, hashed security-tool names, Base64 encoding, single-byte XOR encryption, and benign-looking message structures. It also stores reconnaissance information in legitimate application configuration data. SUNBURST is distinct from SUPERNOVA, a separate Orion-related webshell associated with a different intrusion.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
APT29 was able to get SUNBURST signed by SolarWinds code signing certificates by injecting the malware into the SolarWinds Orion software lifecycle.
“This attack code, called SUNBURST by security researchers, notified the threat actors that it had been installed each time a company performed its Orion updates.”
...18,000 of its 300,000 customers downloaded a version of its Orion software that was tainted with the Sunburst malware, the attackers activated the malware only on a handful of customers networks.
The malicious builds were later used to deliver a backdoor tracked as Sunburst to "fewer than 18,000," but, luckily, the threat actors only picked a substantially lower number of targets for second-stage exploitation.
Kaspersky also made a connection between the Russian Turla hacking group and the SolarWinds hackers after finding feature overlaps between the Sunburst backdoor and the Kazuar backdoor linked to Turla in the past.
Once installed, SUNBURST would sleep for 12-14 days before it contacted the group’s C&C domain via DNS.
95 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
In the SolarWinds incident, attackers embedded their malicious payload on a legitimate component of the SolarWinds Orion Platform software... FireEye named the backdoored version of the DLL file as SUNBURST. The SUNBURST backdoor delivers different payloads, such as... TEARDROP... deploys... Cobalt Strike Beacon.
Disable any accounts utilized by SolarWinds Orion to access other devices or communicate in your network.
Are any suspicious OAUTH applications allowed Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions (or excessive permissions) within Office 365?
This was executed by trojanizing SolarWinds Orion business software updates that inserted a vulnerability (SUNBURST) within their Orion Platform software builds
In this case, they were actually deploying it through SolarWinds own distribution channels.
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
State-sponsored threat actors have demonstrated their ability to compromise service providers such as MSPs as a method of infiltrating the supply chain of organizations of strategic interest, establishing persistence, and securing access to downstream targets.
Malwarebytes said its intrusion is not related to the SolarWinds supply chain incident since the company doesn't use any of SolarWinds software in its internal network.
"It is distributed through a wide-scale malicious email campaign operated by NOBELIUM"
“On May 25, 2021, the campaign escalated as NOBELIUM leveraged the legitimate mass-mailing service, Constant Contact, to masquerade as a US-based development organization and distribute malicious URLs…”
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) used the WMI query <code>Select * From Win32_SystemDriver</code> to retrieve a driver listing.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
RunTask ... ProcessStartInfo(fileName, arguments) ... if (process.Start())
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) used VBScripts to initiate the execution of payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
SolarStorm threat actors created a legitimate digitally signed backdoor, SUNBURST, as a trojanized version of a SolarWinds Orion plug-in.
The trojanized updates included a custom, digitally signed backdoor called SUNBURST.
Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution
Microsoft gives a detailed description ... of how the threat actor activated the SUNBURST backdoor for installing the second stage malware in a very stealthy operation using hands-on keyboard activity, scripts and malware loaders customised per victim.
That intrusion involved malicious code being surreptitiously inserted into updates shipped by SolarWinds for some 18,000 users of its Orion network management software...
Hardcoded named pipe name 583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e – Does not indicate that the backdoor code was initiated, but is the first action taken after the 12-14 day dormant period.
During the installation of the SolarWinds application or update, the tampered DLL file is loaded by the legitimate SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe or SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe and installed as a Windows service.
SUNSPOT monitors and hijacks processes involved in the compilation of code and replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor.
Is the backdoor Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) still present on the Orion servers?
SUNBURST deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values.
Disable any accounts utilized by SolarWinds Orion to access other devices or communicate in your network.
Are any suspicious OAUTH applications allowed Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions (or excessive permissions) within Office 365?
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\\[service_name]\\Start</code> registry entries to value 4.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020) It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Haavoittuvuuden kohde Takaovi on löydetty SolarWinds Orion Platform -versioista: 2019.4 HF 5 - 2020.2.1.
replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor
These malicious builds were later used to deploy a backdoor tracked as Sunburst to "fewer than 18,000" victims
Were any accounts added or reenabled on the Orion servers or any systems or applications to which Orion had administrative access?
If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process <code>dllhost.exe</code> to trigger the installation of [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154).(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Are there any suspicious ASEPs on the servers or remote access software?
DeviceEvents | where ActionType contains "ExploitGuardNonMicrosoftSignedBlocked" | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "svchost . exe " and FileName contains " NetSetupSvc . dll "
Use the backdoor access on compromised devices to steal credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally across on-premises environments to gain the ability to create SAML tokens
Disable any accounts utilized by SolarWinds Orion to access other devices or communicate in your network.
Are any suspicious OAUTH applications allowed Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions (or excessive permissions) within Office 365?
These malicious builds were later used to deploy a backdoor tracked as Sunburst to "fewer than 18,000" victims
Were any accounts added or reenabled on the Orion servers or any systems or applications to which Orion had administrative access?
If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process <code>dllhost.exe</code> to trigger the installation of [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154).(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Are there any suspicious ASEPs on the servers or remote access software?
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
Further, instead of sending the encrypted data directly... the data is steganographically sent in a faux JSON blob.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to [SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562).(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) strings were compressed and encoded in Base64.(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
The malware disguises its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol
RedCurl mimicked legitimate file names and scheduled tasks, e.g. MicrosoftCurrentupdatesCheck and MdMMaintenenceTask to mask malicious files and scheduled tasks.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) created VBScripts that were named after existing services or folders to blend into legitimate activities.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
DeviceEvents | where ActionType contains "ExploitGuardNonMicrosoftSignedBlocked" | where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "svchost . exe " and FileName contains " NetSetupSvc . dll "
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) had a command to delete files.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) also removed the firewall rules it created during execution.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) removed IFEO registry values to clean up traces of persistence.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Disable any accounts utilized by SolarWinds Orion to access other devices or communicate in your network.
Are any suspicious OAUTH applications allowed Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions (or excessive permissions) within Office 365?
SolarStorm threat actors created a legitimate digitally signed backdoor, SUNBURST, as a trojanized version of a SolarWinds Orion plug-in.
The first DWORD (4 bytes) of the sequence represents the size of the remaining data, which is validated and then the next byte is an XOR key. The rest of the data is then XOR decrypted by the key byte and then decompressed.
Signs of cmd.exe or rundll32.exe spawned from solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) used Rundll32 to execute payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
“Once the threshold is met, the sample creates the named pipe… to ensure only one instance of the backdoor is running.”
if (Array.IndexOf<ulong>(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.assemblyTimeStamps, hash) != -1) { return true; } ... SearchConfigurations ... SearchServices ... if (TrackProcesses(true)) { return false; }
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) remained dormant after initial access for a period of up to two weeks.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
Sunburst malware “...stores reconnaissance results within legitimate plugin configuration files, allowing it to blend in with legitimate SolarWinds activity.”
SUNSPOT monitors and hijacks processes involved in the compilation of code and replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor.
Is the backdoor Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) still present on the Orion servers?
SUNBURST deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\\[service_name]\\Start</code> registry entries to value 4.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020) It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) was digitally signed by SolarWinds from March - May 2020.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020)
Use the backdoor access on compromised devices to steal credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally across on-premises environments
move laterally across on-premises environments to gain the ability to create SAML tokens
Once inside the victim's network, the threat actors are elevating privileges to a global admin account or gain access to the victim's trusted SAML token signing certificate.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected a list of service names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected the registry value <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid</code> from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected all network interface MAC addresses that are up and not loopback devices, as well as IP address, DHCP configuration, and domain information.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
Once SUNBURST has been deployed, the adversary will most likely begin to perform reconnaissance actions using the privileges of the Orion system and explore what is available in terms of additional assets to compromise
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected the username from a compromised host.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected a list of process names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected hostname and OS version.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) had commands to enumerate files and directories.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
Access cloud resources to search for accounts of interest and exfiltrate emails
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected device `UPTIME`.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
As described above this tools is often used by threat actors to enumerate active directory trust with “domain_trust”... nltest /domain_trusts
if (Array.IndexOf<ulong>(OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.assemblyTimeStamps, hash) != -1) { return true; } ... SearchConfigurations ... SearchServices ... if (TrackProcesses(true)) { return false; }
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) remained dormant after initial access for a period of up to two weeks.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
the security product status payload is optionally provided if select security product services were found as running.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) checked for a variety of antivirus/endpoint detection agents prior to execution.(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020)
once they had initial access through the back door, they tended to opt for the quieter route of using real stolen credentials to gain remote access to a victim’s machines.
the malware creates the named pipe 583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e to ensure only one instance of the backdoor is running
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) collected information from a compromised host.(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
Separately on Wednesday, the US Department of Justice said that its Microsoft Office 365 email system had been compromised as a result of the SolarWinds attack.
Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) added junk bytes to its C2 over HTTP.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Additional Details Dec 2020)(Citation: Symantec Sunburst Sending Data January 2021)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) masqueraded its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
includes a backdoor that communicates to a third-party servers using HTTP
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) used DNS for C2 traffic designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
this.proxy = HttpProxySettings.Instance.AsWebProxy(); ... this.proxy = WebRequest.GetSystemWebProxy();
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) delivered different payloads, including [TEARDROP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0560) in at least one instance.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) used Base64 encoding in its C2 traffic.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
These binaries, which are related to the SolarWinds Orion Platform, could be used by attackers to remotely access devices.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) dynamically resolved C2 infrastructure for randomly-generated subdomains within a parent domain.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
These lists are all observed hostnames for the DGA domain and any observed IPV4 or IPV6 address.
The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.
[SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)
Objective: Lateral Movement, Data Exfiltration, Credential Theft
The trojan dynamically constructed these hostnames with domain generation algorithms (DGAs) to exfiltrate data. Specifically, the subdomains were generated in the form DGAstring.appsync-api.region.avsvmcloud[.]com. The DGA strings encoded victims' identities.
reboot the machine, and disable system services
if (jobEngine == ... Reboot) { OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.NativeMethods.RebootComputer(); } | private enum JobEngine { ... Reboot, ... } ... NativeMethods.InitiateSystemShutdownEx(..., true, true, ...)
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.
1,938 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
200 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.