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Mallory
2 malware families

Lemon Group

Also known asLemon Group

Lemon Group is an Android-focused threat actor associated in the provided content with large-scale mobile-device monetization and abuse. The content states the group later rebranded as Durian Cloud SMS after Trend Micro published research on its operations in February 2022; in May, the operators removed some traces of the Lemon name while keeping the same servers intact. The content also places Lemon Group among the groups associated with BADBOX 2.0. According to the provided material, Lemon Group used multiple Android malware plugins to monetize infected devices through SMS interception, proxy services, account hijacking, ad fraud, and silent app installation or removal. Its SMS capability intercepted received SMS messages and extracted one-time passwords from services including WhatsApp, JingDong, Facebook, QQ, Line, and Tinder, supporting an SMS PVA business that provided phone numbers and OTP features to customers. A proxy plugin established reverse proxies on infected phones and enabled abuse of compromised devices’ network resources, supporting the operators’ DoveProxy business. A cookie plugin hooked Facebook-related apps, dumped Facebook cookies from app data directories, uploaded stolen cookies to command-and-control infrastructure, and harvested Facebook-related data including friends lists, profiles, and email addresses. A WhatsApp plugin was used to hijack WhatsApp sessions and send unwanted messages. The content states the cookie and WhatsApp plugins were used for overseas marketing operations, including posting marketing content through compromised Facebook accounts. Additional plugins displayed intrusive ads by hooking app launch activity and silently installed or uninstalled APKs based on command-and-control tasks. The provided content says monitoring identified more than 490,000 mobile numbers used for OTP requests tied to Lemon SMS and later Durian SMS services, and that infected devices under the actor’s control were observed in more than 180 countries. The most affected countries listed were the United States, Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, South Africa, India, Angola, the Philippines, and Argentina. Known aliases directly mentioned in the content: Durian Cloud SMS.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Media & Entertainment

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇲🇽 Mexico
  • 🇮🇩 Indonesia
  • 🇹🇭 Thailand
  • 🇷🇺 Russia
  • 🇿🇦 South Africa
  • 🇮🇳 India
  • 🇦🇴 Angola
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics11 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1542
Pre-OS Boot
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1542
Pre-OS Boot
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1090
Proxy
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping8

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.