Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Emmenhtal

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs98Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingClickfixMalvertisingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

Emmenhtal is a multistage malware loader targeting Microsoft Windows, with activity dating to at least April 2024. It is primarily used in financially motivated malware distribution and malware-as-a-service operations to download and execute additional payloads. Delivered malware includes Amadey, SmokeLoader, Lumma Stealer, Danabot, CryptBot, and Amatera. Its final-stage PowerShell downloader is also tracked as PEAKLIGHT.

Emmenhtal combines HTA, JavaScript, and PowerShell stages, frequently abusing the legitimate Windows HTML Application host to execute malicious scripts. Initial components can be concealed in polyglot files that combine executable script content with apparently benign audio or executable data. Its evasion techniques include character-code encoding, layered encryption, extensive junk operations, hidden execution, and in-memory payload loading through .NET reflection. Observed variants incorporate script-block smuggling and AMSI bypass attempts. Some chains recover encrypted payloads from steganographic images and load them reflectively without writing the final executable to disk.

Distribution includes payment- and invoice-themed phishing emails containing archives or shortcuts, as well as ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA pages promoted through malvertising and compromised websites. ClickFix lures persuade victims to paste and execute malicious commands through the Windows Run dialog. Operators also abuse public GitHub repositories to host loader components and subsequent payloads. Documented campaigns have targeted Ukrainian entities, including a bank. The loader is used across multiple operations rather than being exclusively associated with a single established threat actor.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Sandworm

Around mid-October, an infection chain leveraged lure documents related to the 21st Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) conference in Munich, possibly targeting organizations in the European energy sector. Threat actors distributed LNK files ... in order to deploy the Emmenhtal loader.

via github webgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

These fake CAPTCHAs arrive via phishing emails, URL redirection or malvertisement, or SEO poisoning.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Attackers also use SEO poisoning to lure victims to fake CAPTCHA landing pages.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Users encounter a CAPTCHA page that mimics a legitimate human verification prompt, often while browsing seemingly harmless content websites.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

These fake CAPTCHAs arrive via phishing emails, URL redirection or malvertisement, or SEO poisoning.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

In some cases, the phishing emails attach a PDF instead of including a direct link. Once opened, the PDF redirects the user to a fake CAPTCHA landing page.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The embedded URLs in each phishing email exploit the credibility of legitimate domains such as https://xxx[.]51.ca and hxxps://www[.]xxxnet.dk, to appear trustworthy to unsuspecting users. Once clicked, however, these URLs redirect users to the landing pages of the fake CAPTCHA domains.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The command uses ROT cipher or XOR obfuscation... powershell.exe -ep bypass -c iex ...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence6

The scheduled task launches PowerShell through a wildcard path with -EncodedCommand; the next stage runs entirely in memory.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

Talos discovered another unique file on the “Milidmdds” GitHub account during this research — a malicious Python script named “checkbalance.py”.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence3

These sites are now hosting specially crafted .mp3 files containing injected and highly obfuscated JavaScript.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

A compromised site has an injected snippet which delivers a fake captcha prompt... instructs the end user to press Windows Key + R... [then] Control + V and enter... detonates the command.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

When the user clicks “I'm not a robot”, they are prompted to copy and execute malicious code on their machine.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

The victim pastes and runs the command, which downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

When lyricalsync.mp3 is executed via mshta, it initiates a multistage deobfuscation process designed to evade detection mechanisms.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

The malicious HTA data located in the padding of this PE file corresponds to Emmenhtal‘s first stage

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Emmenhtal recovers its payload from a steganographic JPEG hosted on a legitimate image CDN; pixel-block averages encode the encrypted payload.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Talos identified Emmenhtal samples masquerading as MP4 files.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

Talos identified Emmenhtal samples masquerading as MP4 files.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The JavaScript is decrypted using a key... to get a PowerShell script (PS_A)... which uses AES decryption with a hardcoded key, to get another PowerShell script (PS_B).

T1218.005MshtaEvidence3

The script then uses Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta) or base64-encoded PowerShell to execute a highly obfuscated command.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

Emmenhtal reflectively loads the payload as an in-memory PE with no file on disk.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The inner PowerShell bypasses Constrained Language Mode and patches amsiContext to 0x41414141 to blind the Antimalware Scan Interface.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

then of downloading from another C2 a final stage using HTTP GET.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

It then creates a WebClient object to connect and download a file from another URL, https://bi[.]yuoie[.]shop/750413b4e6897a671bc759e04597952a0be747830189873b.xlsx.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

98 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+9 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching98Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.