Emmenhtal
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Initial accessDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingClickfixMalvertisingLanding pageLure
- Platforms
- Windows
Emmenhtal is a multistage malware loader targeting Microsoft Windows, with activity dating to at least April 2024. It is primarily used in financially motivated malware distribution and malware-as-a-service operations to download and execute additional payloads. Delivered malware includes Amadey, SmokeLoader, Lumma Stealer, Danabot, CryptBot, and Amatera. Its final-stage PowerShell downloader is also tracked as PEAKLIGHT.
Emmenhtal combines HTA, JavaScript, and PowerShell stages, frequently abusing the legitimate Windows HTML Application host to execute malicious scripts. Initial components can be concealed in polyglot files that combine executable script content with apparently benign audio or executable data. Its evasion techniques include character-code encoding, layered encryption, extensive junk operations, hidden execution, and in-memory payload loading through .NET reflection. Observed variants incorporate script-block smuggling and AMSI bypass attempts. Some chains recover encrypted payloads from steganographic images and load them reflectively without writing the final executable to disk.
Distribution includes payment- and invoice-themed phishing emails containing archives or shortcuts, as well as ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA pages promoted through malvertising and compromised websites. ClickFix lures persuade victims to paste and execute malicious commands through the Windows Run dialog. Operators also abuse public GitHub repositories to host loader components and subsequent payloads. Documented campaigns have targeted Ukrainian entities, including a bank. The loader is used across multiple operations rather than being exclusively associated with a single established threat actor.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Around mid-October, an infection chain leveraged lure documents related to the 21st Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) conference in Munich, possibly targeting organizations in the European energy sector. Threat actors distributed LNK files ... in order to deploy the Emmenhtal loader.
Techniques & procedures
24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
These fake CAPTCHAs arrive via phishing emails, URL redirection or malvertisement, or SEO poisoning.
Attackers also use SEO poisoning to lure victims to fake CAPTCHA landing pages.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Users encounter a CAPTCHA page that mimics a legitimate human verification prompt, often while browsing seemingly harmless content websites.
These fake CAPTCHAs arrive via phishing emails, URL redirection or malvertisement, or SEO poisoning.
In some cases, the phishing emails attach a PDF instead of including a direct link. Once opened, the PDF redirects the user to a fake CAPTCHA landing page.
The embedded URLs in each phishing email exploit the credibility of legitimate domains such as https://xxx[.]51.ca and hxxps://www[.]xxxnet.dk, to appear trustworthy to unsuspecting users. Once clicked, however, these URLs redirect users to the landing pages of the fake CAPTCHA domains.
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
The command uses ROT cipher or XOR obfuscation... powershell.exe -ep bypass -c iex ...
The scheduled task launches PowerShell through a wildcard path with -EncodedCommand; the next stage runs entirely in memory.
Talos discovered another unique file on the “Milidmdds” GitHub account during this research — a malicious Python script named “checkbalance.py”.
These sites are now hosting specially crafted .mp3 files containing injected and highly obfuscated JavaScript.
A compromised site has an injected snippet which delivers a fake captcha prompt... instructs the end user to press Windows Key + R... [then] Control + V and enter... detonates the command.
When the user clicks “I'm not a robot”, they are prompted to copy and execute malicious code on their machine.
The victim pastes and runs the command, which downloads and executes a second-stage payload.
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
When lyricalsync.mp3 is executed via mshta, it initiates a multistage deobfuscation process designed to evade detection mechanisms.
The malicious HTA data located in the padding of this PE file corresponds to Emmenhtal‘s first stage
Emmenhtal recovers its payload from a steganographic JPEG hosted on a legitimate image CDN; pixel-block averages encode the encrypted payload.
Talos identified Emmenhtal samples masquerading as MP4 files.
Talos identified Emmenhtal samples masquerading as MP4 files.
The JavaScript is decrypted using a key... to get a PowerShell script (PS_A)... which uses AES decryption with a hardcoded key, to get another PowerShell script (PS_B).
The script then uses Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta) or base64-encoded PowerShell to execute a highly obfuscated command.
Emmenhtal reflectively loads the payload as an in-memory PE with no file on disk.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The inner PowerShell bypasses Constrained Language Mode and patches amsiContext to 0x41414141 to blind the Antimalware Scan Interface.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
then of downloading from another C2 a final stage using HTTP GET.
It then creates a WebClient object to connect and download a file from another URL, https://bi[.]yuoie[.]shop/750413b4e6897a671bc759e04597952a0be747830189873b.xlsx.
Observables
98 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.