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Malware8 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Plink

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors8Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs28Tracked
Capabilities
PersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

Plink, also known as PuTTY Link, is a legitimate command-line connection utility in the PuTTY suite that threat actors abuse for encrypted SSH tunneling and remote access. It supports local and remote port forwarding, allowing attackers to expose internal services through attacker-controlled infrastructure. Observed malicious uses include tunneling RDP and HTTP traffic, accessing internal servers, transferring tools, and supporting lateral movement. Outbound reverse tunnels can bypass inbound firewall restrictions, while encryption obscures the traffic carried within them.

Plink is commonly deployed after compromise rather than serving as an initial infection mechanism. It has been downloaded and executed through web shells and other post-exploitation components on compromised Windows systems, including Microsoft Exchange and ManageEngine servers. Attackers sometimes rename the utility to conceal its identity. Modified versions have added Windows service execution and removal functionality or embedded SSH credentials and server configurations to automate reverse tunnels and maintain access.

Documented users include Agrius, Chafer, PHOSPHORUS, POLONIUM, TunnelVision, TEMP.Veles, actors associated with xHunt, and Stonefly. Its abuse spans espionage, ransomware, and extortion operations. Plink is a dual-use administrative tool, not inherently a malware family; malicious behavior depends on its configuration, modifications, and operational use.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-34473via deepinstinct blogExploited in the wildProxyShell: Microsoft Exchange Pre-authentication Path ConfusionThe threat actor is known to exploit Fortinet CVE-2018-13379, Exchange ProxyShell, and the log4j vulnerabilities. Thanks to Deep Instinct’s prevention capabilities the threat actor was unsuccessful in executing the payloads in a customer environment despite successful exploitation of the Exchange server.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-13379via sentinelone labsUnauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL VPN"The most commonly deployed tunneling tools used by the group are Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) and Plink."View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-44228via sentinelone labsLog4Shell"The most commonly deployed tunneling tools used by the group are Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) and Plink."View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

8 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT39

A slightly modified version of PLINK, part of the PuTTY suite, was also revealed by Bitdefender telemetry in late September 2018.

via bitdefender labsbitdefender.com
Magic Hound

we were able to retrieve the “pl” file; it is a Plink executable... The file is used to create a SSH tunnel to the attacker’s machine while exposing RDP port

via deepinstinct blogdeepinstinct.com
POLONIUM

POLONIUM’s tunnels module uses the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
tunnelvision

The most commonly deployed tunneling tools used by the group are Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) and Plink.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Agrius

Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Sandworm

...deploying tunneling utilities such as Chisel, plink, and rsockstun to established dedicated conduits into affected network segments.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com

+2 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence4

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The threat actors exploited the ProxyShell and Log4j vulnerabilities to deploy TunnelFish, a custom Fast Reverse Proxy client (FRPC) variant and enable remote access to vulnerable systems.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

TunnelVision activities are characterized by wide-exploitation of 1-day vulnerabilities in target regions. During the time we’ve been tracking this actor, we have observed wide exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2018-13379), Microsoft Exchange (ProxyShell) and recently Log4Shell.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) was used to execute Plink in order to open port-forwarding on the compromised host, allowing for remote RDP access.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells, executed via the Tomcat process.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The threat actors exploited the ProxyShell and Log4j vulnerabilities to deploy TunnelFish, a custom Fast Reverse Proxy client (FRPC) variant and enable remote access to vulnerable systems.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The group has recently adopted NSSM to maintain persistence and install the service which runs Plink on the compromised computer.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The group has recently adopted NSSM to maintain persistence and install the service which runs Plink on the compromised computer.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

a renamed version of Plink (msssh.exe)... This masqueraded Plink (mssh.exe) was executed repeatedly... On August 7 and again on August 12, Plink was downloaded... and saved as \ProgramData\Adobe.exe.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The commands show the actor: Removing evidence of their presence by deleting (T1070.004) BumbleBee after they were done issuing commands.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

FireWall Provides six example commands to add, delete and show rules from the local Windows Firewall using the 'netsh' application.

Lateral Movement

5 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

This allows the attacker to log in to the compromised system via RDP, even if the RDP is not exposed directly to the internet.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence8

The adversary also used various methods to steal high-level credentials and moved freely across the network using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

15:49:30 net use \\<redacted IP #3>\C$ /user:<redacted domain>\<redacted username #2> <redacted password #1> T1021.002

T1021.004SSHEvidence16

The threat actor used Plink and PuTTY for lateral movement. Artifacts of Plink were used for encrypted sessions in the system registry hive.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

Use a compromised host as a pivot to move through the network

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“Sliver… penetration testing framework. Chisel… creates a TCP/UDP tunnel… over HTTP… secured via SSH… FastReverseProxy (FRP)… to expose local servers to the public internet.”

T1090ProxyEvidence8

“The main purpose of this tool is to give the attacker access to the internal network of the victim.”

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence6

Plink (msssh.exe), was used to configure port-forwarding rules allowing for RDP access from a remote host... This effectively sets up a tunnel that allows the attackers to access a remote service such as RDP through the SSH connection.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Plink is then used to open reverse SSH sessions from the attacker's server to the RDP port on the victim computer.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure. REPTILE can use TLS over raw TCP for secure C2.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

The downloaded files were hosted on attacker-controlled sub-domain google.onedriver-srv[.]ml.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer : Powershell cmdlet Invoke-WebRequest(IWR) used to download additional remote access tools

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

CrowdStrike said the OWASSRF exploit was used to drop remote access tools such as Plink and AnyDesk on Rackspace-compromised servers. BleepingComputer also found that Play ransomware tooling found online by researchers also contains the ConnectWise remote administration software, which will likely be deployed in attacks.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence14

T1572 Protocol Tunneling : Chisel, Golang implementation of protocol tunneling tool - similar to Plink. Tunneling over socks proxy with Chisel.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Technical details | Exfiltration TA0010 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Usage of data exfiltration with Rclone, Chisel and Plink has also been observed by researchers.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

28 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching28Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors8Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.