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Malware1 associated actor

SwiftSlicer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Exfiltration
Platforms
Windows

SwiftSlicer is a destructive Windows wiper written in Go and publicly linked to Sandworm, the Russian GRU-associated threat actor also tracked as APT44 and Seashell Blizzard. It was identified in January 2023 during attacks against organizations in Ukraine, including local government entities. The malware has been associated with Sandworm’s broader pattern of disruptive and destructive operations against Ukrainian targets, particularly in campaigns that combine domain compromise, centralized deployment, and rapid system destruction.

SwiftSlicer is designed to render systems unusable by deleting shadow copies, overwriting files with randomly generated data, and forcing a reboot after completing its destructive actions. Reported behavior includes recursive overwriting of files in key Windows system areas, Active Directory database-related locations, and on non-system drives. Its overwrite routine uses fixed-size blocks filled with random bytes, indicating an intent to corrupt both operating system components and organizational data rather than to support extortion or recovery.

Observed deployment via Active Directory Group Policy indicates operation after compromise of the victim’s domain environment and suggests the attackers had obtained high-privilege control over enterprise administration infrastructure. This deployment pattern aligns with Sandworm tradecraft seen in multiple wiper incidents in Ukraine, where destructive payloads are pushed centrally across Windows estates once administrative control has been established.

SwiftSlicer fits Sandworm’s long-running sabotage-focused malware portfolio, which has included other wipers and disruptive tooling used against Ukrainian government, energy, media, and other critical or public-sector organizations. Its role is post-compromise destruction rather than covert persistence or espionage collection, and its operational context strongly indicates use in state-aligned disruptive campaigns.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

Dubbed SwiftSlicer, the destructive malware was spotted on the network of a targeted organization on January 25th. It was deployed through Group Policy, which suggests that the attackers had taken control of the victim’s Active Directory environment.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

It was deployed through Group Policy, which suggests that the attackers had taken control of the victim’s Active Directory environment.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

It was deployed through Group Policy, which suggests that the attackers had taken control of the victim’s Active Directory environment.

Impact

3 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence4

In two recent major geopolitical conflicts, in Ukraine and in Israel, wipers - malware used to destroy access to files and commonly used to halt telecom operations - were used to destroy digital infrastructure.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

Once executed it deletes shadow copies, recursively overwrites files located in %CSIDL_SYSTEM%\drivers, %CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE%\Windows\NTDS and other non-system drives and then reboots computer.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Once executed it deletes shadow copies, recursively overwrites files located in %CSIDL_SYSTEM%\drivers, %CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE%\Windows\NTDS and other non-system drives and then reboots computer.

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.