CaddyWiper
- Type
- Wiper
- Capabilities
- Post exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
CaddyWiper is destructive Windows malware first observed by ESET on March 14, 2022, in attacks against Ukrainian organizations during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has been deployed by Russian state-linked threat actors, including Sandworm, also known as IRIDIUM and associated with Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU. Targets have included organizations involved in electricity generation, water supply, and transportation. CaddyWiper also accompanied the April 2022 Industroyer2 operation against a Ukrainian energy provider.
Implemented as a 32-bit C++ executable, CaddyWiper destroys user data and partition information on attached drives. It recursively enumerates files, takes ownership and changes permissions to enable destructive access, and overwrites the first 10 MiB of targeted files with zeros. It also modifies physical-drive partition layouts, targeting both Master Boot Record and GUID Partition Table information. Before wiping, it checks whether the host is a domain controller and exits if it is, leaving those systems intact. The malware uses stack strings to obscure strings and hinder static analysis.
CaddyWiper has been deployed through Active Directory Group Policy Objects after attackers had already gained control of victim networks. Its destructive role is operational disruption rather than financial extortion. Despite appearing alongside other Ukraine-targeting wipers, it does not share significant code similarity with HermeticWiper or IsaacWiper.
Associated threat actors
6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CaddyWiper was probably set to hinder recovery processes.
2022-03-15 ⋅ ESET Research ⋅ CaddyWiper: New wiper malware discovered in Ukraine
Slovak cybersecurity company ESET dubbed the third wiper "CaddyWiper," which it said it first observed on March 14 around 9:38 a.m. UTC.
Notable attacks included the deployment of Industroyer2 against energy facilities and widespread use of CaddyWiper malware.
"CADDYWIPER is a wiper that Mandiant first identified and reported on in March 2022... The malware enumerates the file system's physical drives and overwrites both file content and partitions with null bytes."
"CADDYWIPER is a wiper that Mandiant first identified and reported on in March 2022... The malware enumerates the file system's physical drives and overwrites both file content and partitions with null bytes."
Techniques & procedures
29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Similarly to HermeticWiper deployments, we observed CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, indicating the attackers had prior control of the target's network beforehand.
“The attackers used phishing campaigns to deliver [certain wiper] malware and tried to bring some disruption to Ukrainian IT systems,” Zhora said.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
"...створено об'єкт групової політики (GPO), що, у свою чергу, забезпечував створення відповідних запланованих завдань." and "Windows_Security_Update_HxW (Scheduled Task)"
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) has the ability to dynamically resolve and use APIs, including `SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege`.(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
"...створено об'єкт групової політики (GPO), що, у свою чергу, забезпечував створення відповідних запланованих завдань." and "Windows_Security_Update_HxW (Scheduled Task)"
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
Similarly to HermeticWiper deployments, we observed CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, indicating the attackers had prior control of the target's network beforehand.
Privilege Escalation
6 techniques
Privilege Escalation
"...створено об'єкт групової політики (GPO), що, у свою чергу, забезпечував створення відповідних запланованих завдань." and "Windows_Security_Update_HxW (Scheduled Task)"
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
Similarly to HermeticWiper deployments, we observed CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, indicating the attackers had prior control of the target's network beforehand.
If it finds a file that is not a folder and has a hidden system attribute, it will adjust the Security identifier permission of its process as well as its TokenPrivileges to “SeTokenOwnershipPrivilege” to be able to access those files.
According to ESET, the infection mechanism is similar to the HermeticWiper malware in that it operates via Default Domain Policy.
If the initial attempt to change the DACL fails, the code enables the privilege of ‘SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege.’ It then makes the local system’s administrators group the owner of the object.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
To obfuscate strings, one can create a string on the stack, character for character, or in small groups of characters. The concatenation of these characters lead to the existence of the complete string on the stack.
Caddy uses the process environment block (PEB) to resolve the required Windows application programming interface (API). This is to evade static and dynamic scanners.
The wiper enumerates through the files, takes ownership of the files overrides File Permissions with SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege and AdjustTokenPrivileges APIs and overwrites 10485760 bytes of data with zeroes.
Similarly to HermeticWiper deployments, we observed CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, indicating the attackers had prior control of the target's network beforehand.
If it finds a file that is not a folder and has a hidden system attribute, it will adjust the Security identifier permission of its process as well as its TokenPrivileges to “SeTokenOwnershipPrivilege” to be able to access those files.
The wiper checks if the infected machine is a Domain Controller via the DsRoleGetPrimaryDomainInformation API.
The content includes environment-aware checks such as "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "CaddyWiper can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller," and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."
Defense Impairment
4 techniques
Defense Impairment
The wiper changes the DACL of a file object by taking ownership of that object.
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can modify ACL entries to take ownership of files.(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
According to ESET, the infection mechanism is similar to the HermeticWiper malware in that it operates via Default Domain Policy.
"The attacker additionally attempted to exclude the file from antivirus scans."
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can obtain a list of current processes.(Citation: Malwarebytes IssacWiper CaddyWiper March 2022 )
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can use `DsRoleGetPrimaryDomainInformation` to determine the role of the infected machine. [CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller.(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Malwarebytes IssacWiper CaddyWiper March 2022 )
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can enumerate all files and directories on a compromised host.(Citation: Malwarebytes IssacWiper CaddyWiper March 2022 )
"CaddyWiper will also attempt to wipe any network mapped drive attached to the system."
CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, a circumstance that suggests the attackers had initially compromised the target’s Active Directory server.
The wiper checks if the infected machine is a Domain Controller via the DsRoleGetPrimaryDomainInformation API.
The content includes environment-aware checks such as "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "CaddyWiper can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller," and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object (GPO) to copy CaddyWiper's executable msserver.exe from a staging server to a local hard drive before deployment.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
"...з метою централізованого розповсюдження шкідливих програм, створено об'єкт групової політики (GPO)..." and paths under "\\%DOMAIN%\\SYSVOL...\\news.bat" / "upd.exe"
Impact
6 techniques
Impact
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) can work alphabetically through drives on a compromised system to take ownership of and overwrite all files.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
"GRU operations... frequently end with the deployment of wipers... CADDYWIPER... overwrites both file content and partitions with null bytes."
The malware was designed to wipe the Master Boot Record, MBR, and proceed to corrupt the files on disk, destroying all traces of the data.
The adversary uses a legitimate code signing certificate to sign the malware binary and abuses a legitimate driver to corrupt data.
The corpus contains multiple technical analyses of wiper malware and “The Anatomy of Wiper Malware” focused on destructive techniques.
[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) has the ability to destroy information about a physical drive's partitions including the MBR, GPT, and partition entries.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
Observables
14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
69 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.