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Mallory
Malware4 associated actors

msoRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Platforms
Windows

msoRAT is a Windows remote access trojan used in financially motivated intrusions associated with the CryptoMimic/CryptoCore activity cluster and reported as part of tooling linked by multiple researchers to Lazarus-aligned operations, including TA444/APT38/Bluenoroff overlap. It has been observed as a later-stage payload downloaded and executed by the VBScript-based Cabbage RAT-C during targeted attacks against financial organizations, especially cryptocurrency exchanges and related businesses.

The malware is a packed DLL executed through rundll32 and uses obfuscated arguments protected with Base64 and RC4. It communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over encrypted channels and reads from and writes to data associated with msomain.sdb, a trait that has been highlighted as distinctive across related samples. Reported functionality includes remote command execution, host reconnaissance, process management, file upload and download, file deletion, compression, registry modification, and payload execution. Analyses also describe PE injection into explorer.exe and injection activity involving lsass.exe, along with API-call obfuscation intended to hinder reverse engineering.

msoRAT appears in post-compromise phases rather than as an initial delivery implant. In observed intrusions, operators first gained access through spearphishing or LinkedIn lures leading to malicious shortcut-based and script-based staging, then deployed Cabbage RAT components, browser credential theft tooling, msoRAT, and additional credential-stealing malware. The broader campaigns emphasized theft from cryptocurrency organizations and other financial targets, with operators conducting interactive post-exploitation, credential access, and cleanup. msoRAT has also been described in some reporting as part of a post-exploitation backdoor set used by TA444 in cryptocurrency-focused operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

msoRAT was downloaded and executed... DLL file that has RAT function... Can perform tasks in accordance with the order received from C&C server.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
CryptoMimic

msoRAT was downloaded and executed... DLL file that has RAT function... Can perform tasks in accordance with the order received from C&C server.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
APT38

Their collection of post-exploitation backdoors has included the msoRAT credential stealer, the SWIFT money laundering framework DYEPACK, and various passive backdoors and virtual "listeners" for receiving and processing data from target machines.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
BlackAlicanto

Their collection of post-exploitation backdoors has included the msoRAT credential stealer, the SWIFT money laundering framework DYEPACK, and various passive backdoors and virtual "listeners" for receiving and processing data from target machines.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The group executed windows commands using Cabbage RAT-C.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The attacker launched several Windows commands on the victim host via these RATs... cmd.exe, cmdkey.exe, copy.exe, find.exe, ipconfig.exe, net.exe, netstat.exe, ping.exe, systeminfo.exe, whoami.exe, wevutil.exe.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The VBScript embedded in the website is then read and executed by mshta.exe. The script subsequently downloads other scripts and finally gains functionality as a RAT.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence1

The command in Figure 33 sets a DLL file named ‘bcs’ as Security Packages.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

msoRAT injects a DLL file by adding the registry key ‘Security Packages’... msoRAT injected something into lsass.exe process.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Execute a command after assigning SeDebugPrivilege privilege to designated user.

T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence1

The command in Figure 33 sets a DLL file named ‘bcs’ as Security Packages.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

msoRAT injects a DLL file by adding the registry key ‘Security Packages’... msoRAT injected something into lsass.exe process.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

browser info stealer itself and its output were deleted after execution... lsass.exe deleted credential stealer.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Change date of creation, last access and last update for designated file.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Execute a command after assigning SeDebugPrivilege privilege to designated user.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

RAT accesses file “msomain.sdb” and decrypts it. This file contains information of C&C servers... Unique wrapper function for decrypting RC4 and Base64.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

lsass.exe deleted Windows event log via wevutil.exe.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

Something was injected into lsass.exe process.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

11:47 msoRAT injected something into lsass.exe process.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The attacker stole information on the victim host or investigated other hosts on the same network by leveraging these commands... netstat.exe, ping.exe, net.exe view.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Cabbage RAT-B collects and sends the system and task information of its working environment to the C&C server.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Can send victim’s information to C&C server periodically.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

“l” “/” Send Directory Information.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

The attacker launched several Windows commands... net.exe group, net.exe localgroup, net.exe user, whoami.exe.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

Compress designated directory and upload... Compress ‘c:\windows\apppatch\msomain.sdb’ and send to C&C server.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Send HTTP request to C&C server, and execute the code included in response data

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Cabbage RAT-A initiated HTTP access to C&C server... msoRAT has RAT functionality... One of its other characteristics is that it uses HTTPS to communicate with the C&C server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Cabbage RAT-C downloaded and executed browser info stealer... Cabbage RAT-C downloaded and executed msoRAT... msoRAT downloaded credential stealer.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Encode file in designated file path using Base64 and upload to C&C server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.