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Malware1 associated actor

Exaramel

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Fake update
Platforms
WindowsLinux

Exaramel is a backdoor family targeting Windows and Linux systems, associated with TeleBots and Sandworm operations. Identified by ESET in April 2018, its Windows variant shares code and functional similarities with the backdoor component of Industroyer. These similarities provide a technical link between the toolsets but do not establish that Exaramel itself performs industrial-control-system attacks.

Exaramel provides remote command execution and bidirectional file transfer. The Windows variant supports process creation, shell commands, VBScript execution, and file writing, and establishes persistence through a Windows service. It uses XML-based configuration and communication and can compress and encrypt files before exfiltration. The Linux variant is written in Go, communicates with command-and-control servers over HTTPS, stores an encrypted configuration, and supports shell execution, file upload and download, self-updating, and self-deletion. Linux persistence mechanisms include cron and init systems. Campaigns have also used command-and-control naming that impersonates ESET to make malicious infrastructure appear legitimate.

Exaramel has been detected at a non-industrial organization in Ukraine and on compromised Centreon monitoring servers in France. The French campaign ran from late 2017 through 2020 and primarily affected IT service providers, particularly web hosting providers. Linux Exaramel implants were found alongside P.A.S. webshells on obsolete, internet-exposed Centreon installations. The initial compromise method in that campaign was not established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

“An employee runs it, and the Exaramel backdoor takes hold.”

via cyberbit blogcyberbit.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

hackers with tools and techniques it links to Sandworm have stealthily hacked targets in that country by exploiting an IT monitoring tool called Centreon

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

"Persistence T1503.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron Exaramel can use Cron" and "Logs indicating daily execution of respawner.sh by CRON were observed"

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

it found on them two different pieces of malware: one publicly available backdoor called PAS, and another known as Exaramel

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

"Execution T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter - Unix Shell Linux shell use" and "OS.ShellExecute – runs a shell command"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

It supported a fairly sophisticated API, including the ability to create processes as a specific user, start and stop Windows services, and evaluate arbitrary VBS code.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

"Persistence T1503.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron Exaramel can use Cron" and "Logs indicating daily execution of respawner.sh by CRON were observed"

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

ANSSI has been informed of an intrusion campaign targeting the monitoring software Centreon distributed by the French company CENTREON which resulted in the breach of several French entities.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

"Persistence T1543 Create or Modify System Process Exaramel can use Upstart" and "Exaramel is run by root and the startup system is systemd/upstart/SystemV"

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

"Persistence T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service Exaramel can use systemd"

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

including the ability to create processes as a specific user, start and stop Windows services

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

"Persistence T1503.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron Exaramel can use Cron" and "Logs indicating daily execution of respawner.sh by CRON were observed"

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

"Persistence T1543 Create or Modify System Process Exaramel can use Upstart" and "Exaramel is run by root and the startup system is systemd/upstart/SystemV"

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

"Persistence T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service Exaramel can use systemd"

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

including the ability to create processes as a specific user, start and stop Windows services

Stealth

1 technique
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

"Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information P.A.S. 3.1.4 encryption" and "Exaramel - RC4 encryption of the configuration file"

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

It was also bundled with an embedded credential stealer, which harvested passwords from a long list of web browsers and FTP clients.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

"Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery Folder parsing" and P.A.S. "Explorer" / "Searcher" menus

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

the French agency also says it's seen overlap in command and control servers used in the Centreon hacking campaign and previous Sandworm hacking incidents.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Exaramel - HTTPS communications"

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

"Command and Control T1573 Encrypted Channel Exaramel - HTTPS communications"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

"Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel Exaramel - HTTPS exfiltrations" and "IO.ReadFile – copies a file from Exaramel host to Command and Control server"

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.