ManusCrypt
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitation
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLureWatering holeDrive by
- Platforms
- WindowsLinuxmacOS
Manuscrypt is a remote access trojan family associated with the North Korean Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra. Primarily documented on Windows, it also has Linux and macOS variants. Its core capabilities include arbitrary command execution, system reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. Manuscrypt has been deployed against defense enterprises internationally and cryptocurrency-related organizations, including in TraderTraitor activity. Cryptocurrency-focused deployments have sought wallet keys and credentials to facilitate theft of digital assets.
COPPERHEDGE is a Manuscrypt variant used against South Korean organizations and cryptocurrency-sector targets. Documented delivery chains include social-engineering lures leading to trojanized cryptocurrency applications and compromised websites exploiting vulnerable Windows certificate-signing software. COPPERHEDGE has been recovered from attacks abusing AnySign4PC, and infections have resulted in organizational data theft. Manuscrypt configurations can contain session identifiers, sleep intervals, infection dates, and command-and-control server information.
ThreatNeedle is based on Manuscrypt. PseudoManuscrypt is a separately identified malware family whose loader resembles Manuscrypt; that similarity does not establish that the two families share attribution or capabilities.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The IOC section identifies “win32.bin, Manuscrypt RAT” and “darwin64.bin, Manuscrypt RAT (macOS variant),” alongside two Esilet-prefixed macOS samples.
FlashHole coincided with a fresh wave of COPPERHEDGE attacks against South Korean organizations; one infection resulted in data exfiltration to ULOSE.
We closely monitor their activities and quite often see them using their signature malware in their attacks — a full-feature backdoor called Manuscrypt.
Listed in the Wiz “TraderTraitor: Deep Dive” entry alongside GolangGhost and other tooling.
Techniques & procedures
66 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
"...most of the C2 servers were legitimate but compromised websites in South Korea (T1584.001)..."
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.
"...utilizes macro-embedded Office documents..."
공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.
Execution
10 techniques
Execution
“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”
The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information, download additional malicious content and execute commands on infected devices. CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT and is a remote access tool that can be used to run arbitrary commands...
Shell commands use the shell path recorded in configuration and execute in the form /c "<command> > <temp file> 2>&1".
The decrypted data is written as a file to the system’s temporary directory... and executed using the child_process.exec() method of Node.js, which spawns a shell as a child process of the current Electron application.
These malicious apps – built on JavaScript [T1059.007] and Node.js using the Electron framework
payloads delivered by the macros discussed in Operation Blockbuster Sequel ... malware used in the HiddenCobra threat group ... source code was reused between previously reported samples and the cluster of new samples
공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Use Trojanized application to drop malicious backdoor
CreateServiceW creates the service... ImagePath is set to %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs ... StartService runs the service.
svchost.exe가 자동으로 실행하도록 만들기 위해, 새로운 서비스명을 생성하지 않고 netsvcs 그룹에 이름은 등록되어 있으나 실제 서비스 키가 존재하지 않는 빈 슬롯을 찾아 하이재킹 대상으로 삼는다.
Persistence
6 techniques
Persistence
“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”
the malware used in the attack loads its payload from the system registry and decrypts it. The payload’s location in the registry is unique for each infected system.
“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”
TYPE 1 dropper does not create a new service name... it finds an empty slot in the netsvcs group and hijacks it... the loader DLL is made to run automatically by svchost.exe.
“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”
Persistence is secured through SSP registration. The loader filename is added to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages so lsass.exe automatically loads the DLL at boot.
Privilege Escalation
8 techniques
Privilege Escalation
“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”
The ultimately executed malware communicates via HTTP/HTTPS... to perform remote command execution, file theft, shellcode execution, and process injection.
At this point, the attackers need additional vulnerabilities to escape the Chrome process and gain full access to the system. In the best practices of sophisticated attackers, they run a validator in the form of a shellcode... to decide whether to provide the next stage (another exploit) or not.
Appendix lists Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token.
“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”
TYPE 1 dropper does not create a new service name... it finds an empty slot in the netsvcs group and hijacks it... the loader DLL is made to run automatically by svchost.exe.
“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”
Persistence is secured through SSP registration. The loader filename is added to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages so lsass.exe automatically loads the DLL at boot.
Stealth
22 techniques
Stealth
The C2 server could respond with an encrypted second stage payload (using AES-256 [T1027]) that the app would decrypt and execute
When the malware runs, it randomly generates dropped filenames and adds 60MiB ~ 80MiB of junk data.
9e4bd9676bb3460be68ba4559a824940a393bde7613850eda9196259e453b9f3 ... Ikarus Trojan.Win64.Themida
Repeatedly reads hidden additional module data from two PNG file paths stored in configuration, decrypts it, and injects it into explorer.exe.
API 이름은 XOR로 암호화되어 있다. 실행 시점에 복호화되어 API 함수 주소를 동적으로 resolve한다.
The identified malware commonly constructed a multi-stage loading chain that decrypts subsequent payloads using ChaCha20 or AES-128 algorithms...
It targets an empty slot whose name is already listed in netsvcs but has no actual service key... the service name is originally registered in Windows, making maliciousness hard to judge from the execution subject alone.
Dropped files are created in C:\Windows\System32 ... names such as edgsvc.dll, gsosvc.dat resemble normal system files... the dropper itself uses the normal system process name smss.exe.
PNG hiding uses normal image files with real PNG signatures... image viewers open them normally.
The ultimately executed malware communicates via HTTP/HTTPS... to perform remote command execution, file theft, shellcode execution, and process injection.
먼저 설정 데이터가 담긴 레지스트리 값을 삭제하고, 로더와 백도어 데이터를 각각 메모리에서 읽은 뒤 로더와 백도어를 삭제한다.
During initialization, it deletes the registry value containing configuration data, reads loader and backdoor data into memory, and then deletes the loader and backdoor files.
Appendix C. Command code 0x2016 Timestamp modification.
On shutdown, the loader, backdoor, configuration data, and Security Packages entry are restored...
Appendix lists Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token.
The malware decrypts subsequent payloads using ChaCha20 or AES-128 algorithms to run in memory.
"...adopting remote template injection techniques."
If a 34-character argument is not passed, the malicious logic does not execute... Without the registry-stored configuration data, the loader cannot obtain the backdoor decryption key... TYPE 3 must read key and IV from its own :kgb ADS.
If the 34-character argument is absent, malicious logic does not execute... sandbox automatic analysis evasion... The backdoor waits until the configured activation time before beginning communications.
Encrypted payloads and configuration data were hidden in normal Windows system components, such as the registry and NTFS ADS...
svchost.exe가 자동으로 실행하도록 만들기 위해, 새로운 서비스명을 생성하지 않고 netsvcs 그룹에 이름은 등록되어 있으나 실제 서비스 키가 존재하지 않는 빈 슬롯을 찾아 하이재킹 대상으로 삼는다.
Backdoor is not created as a file and is executed in memory through a self-implemented PE loader logic... Also the backdoor can execute received payloads in the current process reflectively (0x2028).
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
the malware used in the attack loads its payload from the system registry and decrypts it. The payload’s location in the registry is unique for each infected system.
Discovery
12 techniques
Discovery
"...create a malicious service (T1569.002, T1007)..."
Collects ... IPv4 address of network adapters...
Collects computer name, username...
"...gather basic system information (T1082, T1083, T1057, T1049, T1016, T1087.001)..."
Command code 0x2012 process information collection.
CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT and is a remote access tool that can be used to run arbitrary commands, perform system reconnaissance, and exfiltrate data.
Command codes include file list query, directory statistics collection, and designated drive information query.
"...gather basic system information (T1082, T1083, T1057, T1049, T1016, T1087.001)..."
"...attempt to find valuable hosts to perform lateral movement (T1087.002, T1135)."
It monitors logical drive changes every 2 seconds to detect changes... such as removable storage connection.
Drive information query checks not only local drives but also the existence of \\tsclient\<drive letter> paths.
If the 34-character argument is absent, malicious logic does not execute... sandbox automatic analysis evasion... The backdoor waits until the configured activation time before beginning communications.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
The malware communicates... to perform ... file theft.
Appendix lists Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library.
Command and Control
11 techniques
Command and Control
This variant also obfuscates Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header strings using a custom character manipulation where the certain ranges of characters are modified by either adding or subtracting a constant value 9.
These domains and IPv4 addresses are used to generate crafted TLS sessions similarly to the 'fake TLS' communication mechanisms ... includes a legitimate domain name in its SNI field yet is sent to a command and control IPv4 address.
The configuration contains multiple C&C URLs... confirmed C&C server URLs are three, all domestic servers.
The update function makes an HTTP POST request to a PHP script hosted on the TraderTraitor project’s domain at either the endpoint /update/ or /oath/checkupdate.php.
MITRE Tactic Technique & ID ... Command & Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) Malware uses HTTPS callbacks to C2 servers.
FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation.
These are used to accomplish the following: Install and invoke an APK Write an ELF file to disk on the client
통신 데이터와 헤더는 각각 ChaCha20 및 XOR로 암호화된 후 Base64로 인코딩되어 URL 파라미터에 연결된다.
Transmission data and headers are encrypted and then Base64-encoded before being attached to URL parameters.
Observed payloads include updated macOS and Windows variants of Manuscrypt, a custom remote access trojan (RAT), that collects system information and has the ability to execute arbitrary commands and download additional payloads.
Transmission data is encrypted with ChaCha20 and XOR then Base64-encoded... TYPE 2 responses are AES-CBC-128 decrypted.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information... CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT ... and exfiltrate data.
Observables
344 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.