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Malware5 associated actors2 associated CVEs

ManusCrypt

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK66Techniques
IOCs344Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingLureWatering holeDrive by
Platforms
WindowsLinuxmacOS
Also known asCOPPERHEDGE

Manuscrypt is a remote access trojan family associated with the North Korean Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra. Primarily documented on Windows, it also has Linux and macOS variants. Its core capabilities include arbitrary command execution, system reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. Manuscrypt has been deployed against defense enterprises internationally and cryptocurrency-related organizations, including in TraderTraitor activity. Cryptocurrency-focused deployments have sought wallet keys and credentials to facilitate theft of digital assets.

COPPERHEDGE is a Manuscrypt variant used against South Korean organizations and cryptocurrency-sector targets. Documented delivery chains include social-engineering lures leading to trojanized cryptocurrency applications and compromised websites exploiting vulnerable Windows certificate-signing software. COPPERHEDGE has been recovered from attacks abusing AnySign4PC, and infections have resulted in organizational data theft. Manuscrypt configurations can contain session identifiers, sleep intervals, infection dates, and command-and-control server information.

ThreatNeedle is based on Manuscrypt. PseudoManuscrypt is a separately identified malware family whose loader resembles Manuscrypt; that similarity does not establish that the two families share attribution or capabilities.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-4947via securelistExploited in the wildType Confusion in Google Chrome V8 MaglevGoogle released an update and thanked us for discovering this attack... CVE-2024-4947... The exploit contains code for two vulnerabilities: the first is used to gain the ability to read and write Chrome process memory from the JavaScript... CVE-2024-4947 ... is the vulnerability in this new compiler. | We closely monitor their activities and quite often see them using their signature malware in their attacks — a full-feature backdoor called Manuscrypt.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-55182via lazarusholic blueskyExploited in the wildReact2Shell"APT-C-26(Lazarus)组织利用CVE-2025-55182与Copperhedge组件的攻击行动分析" published by Qihoo360. | "APT-C-26(Lazarus)组织利用CVE-2025-55182与Copperhedge组件的攻击行动分析"View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TraderTraitor

The IOC section identifies “win32.bin, Manuscrypt RAT” and “darwin64.bin, Manuscrypt RAT (macOS variant),” alongside two Esilet-prefixed macOS samples.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
Lazarus

FlashHole coincided with a fresh wave of COPPERHEDGE attacks against South Korean organizations; one infection resulted in data exfiltration to ULOSE.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
APT37

Jinhospy used by APT37 [RokRAT RokRAT Manuscrypt Selina RokRAT]

via i blackhat archivei.blackhat.com
APT38

We closely monitor their activities and quite often see them using their signature malware in their attacks — a full-feature backdoor called Manuscrypt.

via securelistsecurelist.com
Contagious Interview

Listed in the Wiz “TraderTraitor: Deep Dive” entry alongside GolangGhost and other tooling.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

66 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

"...most of the C2 servers were legitimate but compromised websites in South Korea (T1584.001)..."

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence5

공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"...utilizes macro-embedded Office documents..."

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.

Execution

10 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information, download additional malicious content and execute commands on infected devices. CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT and is a remote access tool that can be used to run arbitrary commands...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Shell commands use the shell path recorded in configuration and execute in the form /c "<command> > <temp file> 2>&1".

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The decrypted data is written as a file to the system’s temporary directory... and executed using the child_process.exec() method of Node.js, which spawns a shell as a child process of the current Electron application.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

These malicious apps – built on JavaScript [T1059.007] and Node.js using the Electron framework

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

payloads delivered by the macros discussed in Operation Blockbuster Sequel ... malware used in the HiddenCobra threat group ... source code was reused between previously reported samples and the cluster of new samples

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Use Trojanized application to drop malicious backdoor

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence2

CreateServiceW creates the service... ImagePath is set to %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs ... StartService runs the service.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

svchost.exe가 자동으로 실행하도록 만들기 위해, 새로운 서비스명을 생성하지 않고 netsvcs 그룹에 이름은 등록되어 있으나 실제 서비스 키가 존재하지 않는 빈 슬롯을 찾아 하이재킹 대상으로 삼는다.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

the malware used in the attack loads its payload from the system registry and decrypts it. The payload’s location in the registry is unique for each infected system.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

TYPE 1 dropper does not create a new service name... it finds an empty slot in the netsvcs group and hijacks it... the loader DLL is made to run automatically by svchost.exe.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”

T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence2

Persistence is secured through SSP registration. The loader filename is added to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages so lsass.exe automatically loads the DLL at boot.

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Registry keys, scheduled tasks… keep the beachheads…”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The ultimately executed malware communicates via HTTP/HTTPS... to perform remote command execution, file theft, shellcode execution, and process injection.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

At this point, the attackers need additional vulnerabilities to escape the Chrome process and gain full access to the system. In the best practices of sophisticated attackers, they run a validator in the form of a shellcode... to decide whether to provide the next stage (another exploit) or not.

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

Appendix lists Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

“…and hijacking services keep the beachheads…”

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

TYPE 1 dropper does not create a new service name... it finds an empty slot in the netsvcs group and hijacks it... the loader DLL is made to run automatically by svchost.exe.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Registry keys… keep the beachheads for future callback usage…”

T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence2

Persistence is secured through SSP registration. The loader filename is added to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages so lsass.exe automatically loads the DLL at boot.

Stealth

22 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The C2 server could respond with an encrypted second stage payload (using AES-256 [T1027]) that the app would decrypt and execute

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

When the malware runs, it randomly generates dropped filenames and adds 60MiB ~ 80MiB of junk data.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

9e4bd9676bb3460be68ba4559a824940a393bde7613850eda9196259e453b9f3 ... Ikarus Trojan.Win64.Themida

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Repeatedly reads hidden additional module data from two PNG file paths stored in configuration, decrypts it, and injects it into explorer.exe.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

API 이름은 XOR로 암호화되어 있다. 실행 시점에 복호화되어 API 함수 주소를 동적으로 resolve한다.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The identified malware commonly constructed a multi-stage loading chain that decrypts subsequent payloads using ChaCha20 or AES-128 algorithms...

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

It targets an empty slot whose name is already listed in netsvcs but has no actual service key... the service name is originally registered in Windows, making maliciousness hard to judge from the execution subject alone.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Dropped files are created in C:\Windows\System32 ... names such as edgsvc.dll, gsosvc.dat resemble normal system files... the dropper itself uses the normal system process name smss.exe.

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence1

PNG hiding uses normal image files with real PNG signatures... image viewers open them normally.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The ultimately executed malware communicates via HTTP/HTTPS... to perform remote command execution, file theft, shellcode execution, and process injection.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

먼저 설정 데이터가 담긴 레지스트리 값을 삭제하고, 로더와 백도어 데이터를 각각 메모리에서 읽은 뒤 로더와 백도어를 삭제한다.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

During initialization, it deletes the registry value containing configuration data, reads loader and backdoor data into memory, and then deletes the loader and backdoor files.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Appendix C. Command code 0x2016 Timestamp modification.

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence1

On shutdown, the loader, backdoor, configuration data, and Security Packages entry are restored...

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

Appendix lists Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The malware decrypts subsequent payloads using ChaCha20 or AES-128 algorithms to run in memory.

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

"...adopting remote template injection techniques."

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1

If a 34-character argument is not passed, the malicious logic does not execute... Without the registry-stored configuration data, the loader cannot obtain the backdoor decryption key... TYPE 3 must read key and IV from its own :kgb ADS.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

If the 34-character argument is absent, malicious logic does not execute... sandbox automatic analysis evasion... The backdoor waits until the configured activation time before beginning communications.

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence4

Encrypted payloads and configuration data were hidden in normal Windows system components, such as the registry and NTFS ADS...

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

svchost.exe가 자동으로 실행하도록 만들기 위해, 새로운 서비스명을 생성하지 않고 netsvcs 그룹에 이름은 등록되어 있으나 실제 서비스 키가 존재하지 않는 빈 슬롯을 찾아 하이재킹 대상으로 삼는다.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

Backdoor is not created as a file and is executed in memory through a self-implemented PE loader logic... Also the backdoor can execute received payloads in the current process reflectively (0x2028).

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

the malware used in the attack loads its payload from the system registry and decrypts it. The payload’s location in the registry is unique for each infected system.

Discovery

12 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

"...create a malicious service (T1569.002, T1007)..."

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

Collects ... IPv4 address of network adapters...

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Collects computer name, username...

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

"...gather basic system information (T1082, T1083, T1057, T1049, T1016, T1087.001)..."

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Command code 0x2012 process information collection.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence8

CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT and is a remote access tool that can be used to run arbitrary commands, perform system reconnaissance, and exfiltrate data.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Command codes include file list query, directory statistics collection, and designated drive information query.

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence1

"...gather basic system information (T1082, T1083, T1057, T1049, T1016, T1087.001)..."

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

"...attempt to find valuable hosts to perform lateral movement (T1087.002, T1135)."

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

It monitors logical drive changes every 2 seconds to detect changes... such as removable storage connection.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence2

Drive information query checks not only local drives but also the existence of \\tsclient\<drive letter> paths.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

If the 34-character argument is absent, malicious logic does not execute... sandbox automatic analysis evasion... The backdoor waits until the configured activation time before beginning communications.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The malware communicates... to perform ... file theft.

T1560.002Archive via LibraryEvidence1

Appendix lists Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library.

Command and Control

11 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

This variant also obfuscates Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header strings using a custom character manipulation where the certain ranges of characters are modified by either adding or subtracting a constant value 9.

T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence2

These domains and IPv4 addresses are used to generate crafted TLS sessions similarly to the 'fake TLS' communication mechanisms ... includes a legitimate domain name in its SNI field yet is sent to a command and control IPv4 address.

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

The configuration contains multiple C&C URLs... confirmed C&C server URLs are three, all domestic servers.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The update function makes an HTTP POST request to a PHP script hosted on the TraderTraitor project’s domain at either the endpoint /update/ or /oath/checkupdate.php.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

MITRE Tactic Technique & ID ... Command & Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) Malware uses HTTPS callbacks to C2 servers.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

These are used to accomplish the following: Install and invoke an APK Write an ELF file to disk on the client

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

통신 데이터와 헤더는 각각 ChaCha20 및 XOR로 암호화된 후 Base64로 인코딩되어 URL 파라미터에 연결된다.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

Transmission data and headers are encrypted and then Base64-encoded before being attached to URL parameters.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Observed payloads include updated macOS and Windows variants of Manuscrypt, a custom remote access trojan (RAT), that collects system information and has the ability to execute arbitrary commands and download additional payloads.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Transmission data is encrypted with ChaCha20 and XOR then Base64-encoded... TYPE 2 responses are AES-CBC-128 decrypted.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information... CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT ... and exfiltrate data.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

344 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
polyswarmNews · Nov 6, 2026FBI Attributes $6.3 Billion Binance Heist to North Korea as Pyongyang Denies InvolvementA remote access trojan represented by Windows and macOS samples in the historical TraderTraitor-associated IOC list. The content describes no specific capabilities beyond its RAT classification and does not link these samples to the Binance theft.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Oct 27, 2026Lazarus Abuses South Korean Security Software to Deploy Malware Using Post-Quantum EncryptionLazarus backdoor mentioned in SyncHole, Operation Double Barrel, and attacks concurrent with FlashHole. One infection was linked to data exfiltration to a dark-web leak site. The comparison to Gunra attacks does not establish a ransomware association.Read more ↗securelist ruNews · Oct 21, 2026Разбор "Операции FlashHole" - сложной кампании группы Lazarus | SecurelistBackdoor previously present in SyncHole's second stage and subsequently observed with its own loader in a separate activity cluster. That cluster appears financially motivated, with reported ransomware deployment and data leakage, unlike FlashHole's espionage focus.Read more ↗securelistNews · Oct 21, 2026Dissecting Operation FlashHole, a complex attack by Lazarus | SecurelistBackdoor previously used in SyncHole and subsequently observed in a separate cluster with its own loader and distinct tools. The report connects this cluster with monetization, including a reported Gunra ransomware infection and a separate data-exfiltration incident involving a dedicated leak site.Read more ↗
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IOC matching344Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping66Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.