DiceLoader, also known as Lizar, IceBot, and Tirion, is a minimal backdoor associated with FIN7 that establishes an encrypted command-and-control channel and loads shellcode modules directly in memory. The content indicates it is used as a post-exploitation tool to gain a foothold on compromised devices and support lateral movement, persistence, and follow-on payload deployment. FIN7 used the PowerShell-based in-memory loader POWERTRASH, adapted from PowerSploit, to deploy DiceLoader alongside cracked Core Impact implants. SentinelOne reporting in the content states that Diceloader version 2.0 emerged in Q1 2021 as an evolution and replacement for FIN7’s historical Carbanak private C2 framework.
Observed capabilities in the content include collecting the username from the system, searching for processes associated with antivirus products, executing PowerShell scripts, collecting usernames and passwords stored in browsers, retrieving browser history and browser database files, migrating the loader into another process, encrypting data before sending it to the server, and supporting encrypted client-server communications. The malware has been linked to FIN7 intrusions, including activity against U.S. manufacturing, legal, and public-sector organizations in broader FIN7 operations, and was also referenced by FBI/CISA as one of the malware families downloaded and executed during exploitation of PaperCut vulnerability CVE-2023-27350, though the exact attack stage was unclear. The content also notes use of Lizar in compromises where actors later moved laterally and deployed Clop ransomware.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to the active exploitation of CVE-2023-27350. This vulnerability occurs in certain versions of PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF and enables an unauthenticated actor to execute malicious code remotely without credentials. | The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons, although it is unclear at which stage in the attack these tools were executed.
5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Diceloader, aka Lizar and IceBot, is a minimal backdoor that enables the attacker to establish a C2 channel.
The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons, although it is unclear at which stage in the attack these tools were executed.
...deploy the Lizar post-exploitation tool on compromised devices. This allowed the threat actors to gain a foothold within the targeted network and move laterally to deploy Clop ransomware...
...deploy the Lizar post-exploitation tool on compromised devices. This allowed the threat actors to gain a foothold within the targeted network and move laterally to deploy Clop ransomware...
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Insikt Group discovered a custom PowerShell loader named PowerNet, which decompresses and executes NetSupport RAT.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.
Powertrash, a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script, is designed to reflectively load an embedded PE file in-memory... The payload is not designed to be dropped directly on the disk and is compiled with the ReflectiveLoader implementation to allow in-memory reflective loading.
Multiple actors and tools are described as using Mimikatz/Windows Credential Editor/LaZagne/ProcDump to “dump credentials,” often by targeting LSASS memory (e.g., “used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials,” “dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function,” “injecting itself into lsass.exe”).
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.
"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"
"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."
The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons... Associated with TrueBot C2... Associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon.
The PowerShell droppers employed in these campaigns deliver Powertrash loaders from staging servers... These Powertrash loaders allow the group to gain control over compromised victim systems by loading a backdoor payload.
“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… MacMa has used TLS encryption… Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications…”
“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”
81 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
45 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
... Lizar ... (v1.0→v2.0) ...
Lizar (v1.0→v2.0)
A payload deployed by POWERTRASH in FIN7 intrusions.
A minimal backdoor used by FIN7 to establish command-and-control, receive shellcode or position-independent modules directly in memory, and return execution output over an encrypted channel.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.