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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors1 associated CVE

Spark

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK37Techniques
IOCs121Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

Spark is a Windows backdoor used by Molerats, also known as the Gaza Cybergang, in politically motivated cyberespionage operations. Observed since early 2019, it has targeted Palestinian individuals and entities through social engineering built around regional political events. It has also been deployed alongside other Molerats tools, including SharpStage and DropBook.

Spark supports system and user reconnaissance, remote command execution, downloading additional payloads, keylogging, microphone recording, and data exfiltration. It can identify the currently logged-in user through a built-in command and has executed the whoami command. Command-and-control communications use HTTP, with collected data subjected to encryption, Base64 encoding, and JSON wrapping before transmission. Stolen information is exfiltrated through the command-and-control channel.

Document-themed lures direct victims to archives hosted on legitimate cloud-storage services, including Dropbox and Egnyte. These archives contain executables disguised as Microsoft Word documents. AutoIt-based droppers unpack and install the backdoor, sometimes displaying a decoy document, and establish persistence through scheduled tasks or Windows Startup mechanisms.

Spark employs Enigma Packer and custom XOR payload decryption to hinder analysis and detection. It queries Windows Management Instrumentation for installed antivirus and firewall products. Analyzed variants also validate keyboard layouts and locale information for Arabic settings, withholding malicious activity when those settings are absent.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-38213via cert uaExploited in the wildcopy2pwnВідправку жертві PDF-документу з посиланням, відвідування якого, у поєднанні з експлуатацією вразливості CVE-2024-38213, призводило до завантаження на комп'ютер LNK-файлу (розширення "pdf.lnk").View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Sandworm

SPARK is listed among the tools used to implement the cyber threat; the indicators identify spark.exe as SPARK and cdnauthsoft[.]com as SPARK-associated infrastructure.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
UAC-0002

SPARK is listed among the tools used to implement the cyber threat; the indicators identify spark.exe as SPARK and cdnauthsoft[.]com as SPARK-associated infrastructure.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
UAC-0212

SPARK is listed among the tools used to implement the cyber threat; the indicators identify spark.exe as SPARK and cdnauthsoft[.]com as SPARK-associated infrastructure.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
Molerats

Spark Backdoor: Hashes (SHA-256 + SHA-1) ... Domains Brooksprofessional[.]com IPs 168.119.82.89 93.115.10.142

via cybereason blogcybereason.com
Gaza Hackers Team

"The payload in a majority of these attacks was a backdoor called Spark, which is a backdoor that allows the threat actors to open applications and run command line commands on the compromised system."

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

37 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

This latest campaign leverages phishing documents that include various themes related to current Middle Eastern events... Themes used to lure the victims included the Israeli-Saudi relations, Hamas elections, Palestinian politicians as well as other regional events

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

MITRE ATT&CK BREAKDOWN ... Spearphishing Attachment ... The targets are lured to open a document or a link attached to an email.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The target is encouraged to click on the link to read the entire article. However, the document does not link to the Egyptian Newspaper website, but instead to a file sharing website called Egnyte.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“The initial VBScript will then create a scheduled task (T1053)…”; “SCHTASKS /Create … /TN ‘runawy’ …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the Autoit code also creates the following scheduled task for persistence: SCHTASKS /Create /f /SC minute /TN runawy /mo 5 /tr C:\Users\<USER>\runawy.exe

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The extracted executable file contains a compiled Autoit script, which can be seen in the RT_RCDATA section of the file.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) can use cmd.exe to run commands.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“Once the victim then enabled the embedded macro… saves it to …Microsoft.vbs… retrieve a second VBScript…”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

When the victim double clicks on the executable file, it unpacks and installs the Spark backdoor.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“The initial VBScript will then create a scheduled task (T1053)…”; “SCHTASKS /Create … /TN ‘runawy’ …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the Autoit code also creates the following scheduled task for persistence: SCHTASKS /Create /f /SC minute /TN runawy /mo 5 /tr C:\Users\<USER>\runawy.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Once the file is unpacked, the backdoor is dropped in two different locations on the infected operating system: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\runawy.exe

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The dropper drops the Spark backdoor binary and a shortcut file used to initiate persistence in the following locations ... Blaster.lnk

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“The initial VBScript will then create a scheduled task (T1053)…”; “SCHTASKS /Create … /TN ‘runawy’ …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the Autoit code also creates the following scheduled task for persistence: SCHTASKS /Create /f /SC minute /TN runawy /mo 5 /tr C:\Users\<USER>\runawy.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Once the file is unpacked, the backdoor is dropped in two different locations on the infected operating system: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\runawy.exe

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The dropper drops the Spark backdoor binary and a shortcut file used to initiate persistence in the following locations ... Blaster.lnk

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“…used … ‘Base64 decode VBS function’ … to decode (T1027) the download function and URL to VBS before running it.”

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence6

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has been packed with Enigma Protector to obfuscate its contents.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The executable has a Microsoft Word icon to trick victims into believing they are opening a Word document.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK BREAKDOWN ... File Deletion

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has used a custom XOR algorithm to decrypt the payload.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

“…use the legitimate msiexec.exe application (T1218) to launch the downloaded … .msi file.”

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

“delivery document… attempts to load a remote template from Google Drive… The remote template… contains a macro…”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If Arabic keyboard and language settings are not found on the machine, the backdoor will not carry out its malicious activity ... It can thwart detection by automated analysis engines and sandbox solutions.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

“…limiting the execution of the Spark payload to only run on systems with an Arabic keyboard and locale…”; “checks… GetKeyboardLayoutList… GetLocaleInfoA… contain the word ‘arabic’.”

T1497.002User Activity Based ChecksEvidence4

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After unpacking itself, the Spark backdoor creates a hidden window where most of the malicious activity is handled.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

If certain security products are installed, the backdoor does not carry out its malicious activity.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The Spark backdoor allows the attackers to ... Log keystrokes.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence9

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has run the whoami command and has a built-in command to identify the user logged in.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) can collect the hostname, keyboard layout, and language from the system.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If Arabic keyboard and language settings are not found on the machine, the backdoor will not carry out its malicious activity ... It can thwart detection by automated analysis engines and sandbox solutions.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

“…limiting the execution of the Spark payload to only run on systems with an Arabic keyboard and locale…”; “checks… GetKeyboardLayoutList… GetLocaleInfoA… contain the word ‘arabic’.”

T1497.002User Activity Based ChecksEvidence4

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

One common evasive mechanism used by the Spark backdoor is its ability to check for installed security products using WMI queries (WQL). SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct SELECT * FROM FirewallProduct

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence8

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has checked the results of the <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code> and the language name returned by <code>GetLocaleInfoA</code> to make sure they contain the word “Arabic” before executing.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The Spark backdoor allows the attackers to ... Log keystrokes.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK BREAKDOWN ... Screen Capture

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK BREAKDOWN ... Automated Collection

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

The Spark backdoor allows the attackers to ... Record audio using the computer’s microphone.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with its C2 server to receive commands.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The Spark backdoor allows the attackers to ... Download additional payloads.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence4

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has encoded communications with the C2 server with base64.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The data is first encrypted and then encoded with Base64 ... the entire json object is encoded with Base64 and undergoes another stage of encryption, and then sent to the server

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

[Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

121 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching121Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping37Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.