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Mallory
Malware10 associated actors4 associated CVEs

Rubeus

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns4Associated
Actors10Associated
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftPost exploitationPrivilege escalationLateral movement
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Rubeus is a dual-use .NET offensive security toolkit for Kerberos abuse in Windows Active Directory environments. Used in penetration testing and malicious intrusions, it supports credential access and ticket manipulation that can enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. It is a post-exploitation utility rather than a standalone ransomware or remote-access implant.

Its capabilities include Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, Kerberos ticket enumeration and extraction, pass-the-ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, and Golden and Silver Ticket operations. Roasting techniques obtain authentication material for offline password cracking, while ticket extraction and injection allow operators to reuse Kerberos authentication material. These functions can facilitate access to privileged accounts and additional domain resources.

Rubeus has been used by Wizard Spider, Conti operators, BlackSuit, Akira affiliates, and Shedding Zmiy. In an April 2024 BlackSuit intrusion, attackers loaded it into PowerShell and used Kerberoasting to compromise more than 20 accounts, including a service account with domain administrator privileges. Its deployment has also been documented in an energy-sector intrusion.

Operators deploy Rubeus as a compiled executable or through loaders that execute its assembly in memory. A phishing campaign using tax-document lures delivered it through GhostBuild-generated projects executed by the legitimate MSBuild utility. Other intrusions have loaded it through PowerShell or injected it into a legitimate Windows process. These execution mechanisms are supplied by surrounding tooling rather than constituting Rubeus's core functionality.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-42287via thecybersecguruExploited in the wildActive Directory Kerberos Domain Controller Impersonation (noPac component)The reported noPac fallback used CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 to request a ticket-granting ticket through the PaperCut server's domain computer account, impersonate the domain controller, and forge a high-privilege service ticket.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-42278via thecybersecguruExploited in the wildsAMAccountName Spoofing in Microsoft Active Directory Domain ServicesWhere LSASS memory dumping failed, agents reportedly fell back to the noPac vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287, using Rubeus or Certipy to obtain and forge high-privilege Kerberos tickets.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-53779via palo alto networks unit 42 blogBadSuccessor Privilege Escalation in Windows KerberosBadSuccessor is a critical attack vector that emerged following the release of Windows Server 2025. Under certain conditions, this server version enables users to leverage delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs) to elevate privileges within Active Directory environments running Windows Server 2025. At the time of writing this article, no patch exists for this issue.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-36942via splunk researchPetitPotam (Windows LSA Spoofing)This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs to identify TGT requests with unusual fields, which may indicate the use of tools like Rubeus following the exploitation of CVE-2021-36942 (PetitPotam).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

10 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Shedding Zmiy

Rubeus.exe was downloaded to the initial foothold during the energy-sector intrusion.

via rt solarrt-solar.ru
WIZARD SPIDER

Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Vanilla Tempest

SystemBC Cobalt Strike Rubeus Mimikatz

via hunter strategy blogblog.hunterstrategy.net
Conti

Operators may opt to perform a kerberoasting attack using something like Rubeus.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
Ke3chang

The attacker then downloaded a custom payload that allowed them to load Rubeus, a toolkit for Kerberos abuse, into PowerShell, rather than ingress a compiled binary.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
Akira

Akira creates new local accounts for persistence and relies on Mimikatz, LaZagne, and Rubeus for credential theft.

via malware newsmalware.news

+4 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1588.002ToolEvidence4

They unleashed hundreds of AI agents built on OpenAI’s Codex harness paired with a DeepSeek model, combined with publicly available offensive tools such as Mimikatz, Certipy, Rubeus, and Impacket.

T1608.002Upload ToolEvidence1

Listed in the Earth Krahang resource-development TTP table.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

You can specify if you want to use Kerberos or NTLM authentication. If you choose Kerberos, the tool will create a sacrificial token and use Rubeus to import/ask for the ticket. If NTLM is specified, the tool will use SharpKatz SetThreadToken or LogonUser impersonation.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

load Rubeus, a toolkit for Kerberos abuse, into PowerShell, rather than ingress a compiled binary

Persistence

6 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

You can specify if you want to use Kerberos or NTLM authentication. If you choose Kerberos, the tool will create a sacrificial token and use Rubeus to import/ask for the ticket. If NTLM is specified, the tool will use SharpKatz SetThreadToken or LogonUser impersonation.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence2

Shadow Credentials - это атака на механизм хранения учётных данных в Active Directory, которая позволяет добавить в атрибут msDS-KeyCredentialLink объекта (пользователя или компьютера) пару ключей, а затем использовать их для получения билета Kerberos (TGT) от имени этого объекта.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

net user Mishky Password123 /add ... net user Mishky Password123 /add /domain ; net group "Domain Admins" Mishky /add /domain

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

When the state is set to 2 (Completed), the Windows Domain Controller (the KDC) says: “Okay, the migration is completed. This new dMSA is now the official replacement. I will give this dMSA all the powers and group memberships that the old account used to have.”

T1556.001Domain Controller AuthenticationEvidence1

мы можем добавить свой ключ и залогиниться... есть протокол (PKINIT), который позволяет логиниться без пароля. Есть хранилище ключей (msDS-KeyCredentialLink). Есть права, которые позволяют в это хранилище писать.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“By default, there is one and only one attribute that is written from an Entra user to an Active Directory user and that is the searchableDeviceKey -> msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute flow… an abuse primitive known as ‘Shadow Credentials’… if we can add a public key to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of a user, we can obtain a TGT for that user with the private key.”

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

After approximately 5 minutes, the malicious actors executed the Exec IcedID command to execute code by injecting the code into a cmd.exe instance.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

Where memory dumping came up empty, the agent fell back to the noPac vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. | “Where memory dumping came up empty, the agent fell back to the noPac vulnerabilities, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287.”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

You can specify if you want to use Kerberos or NTLM authentication. If you choose Kerberos, the tool will create a sacrificial token and use Rubeus to import/ask for the ticket. If NTLM is specified, the tool will use SharpKatz SetThreadToken or LogonUser impersonation.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence2

Shadow Credentials - это атака на механизм хранения учётных данных в Active Directory, которая позволяет добавить в атрибут msDS-KeyCredentialLink объекта (пользователя или компьютера) пару ключей, а затем использовать их для получения билета Kerberos (TGT) от имени этого объекта.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence2

Access Token Manipulation (ATT&CK technique: T1134) ... this section will explain how attackers can abuse access tokens and target the fundamental trust relationships in Windows domains to compromise entire networks.

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

The createnetonly action will use the CreateProcessWithLogonW() API to create a new hidden (unless /show is specified) process with a SECURITY_LOGON_TYPE of 9 (NewCredentials), the equivalent of runas /netonly.

T1134.005SID-History InjectionEvidence1

The KDC automatically copies the Security Identifiers (SIDs) of the Domain Admin and all their powerful groups (like “Schema Admins” or “Enterprise Admins”) into the dMSA’s ticket.

T1484.002Trust ModificationEvidence1

[*] Delegation rights modified succesfully! [*] S-1-5-21-3104832133-133926542-3798009529-1106 can now impersonate users on WORKSTATION$ via S4U2Proxy

Stealth

9 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

After approximately 5 minutes, the malicious actors executed the Exec IcedID command to execute code by injecting the code into a cmd.exe instance.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The problem was that all the *.exes I had on Kali were things like Rubeus and Mimikatz, hence Windows Defender deleted them before AppLocker could even begin to do it’s job.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

You can specify if you want to use Kerberos or NTLM authentication. If you choose Kerberos, the tool will create a sacrificial token and use Rubeus to import/ask for the ticket. If NTLM is specified, the tool will use SharpKatz SetThreadToken or LogonUser impersonation.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence2

Access Token Manipulation (ATT&CK technique: T1134) ... this section will explain how attackers can abuse access tokens and target the fundamental trust relationships in Windows domains to compromise entire networks.

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

The createnetonly action will use the CreateProcessWithLogonW() API to create a new hidden (unless /show is specified) process with a SECURITY_LOGON_TYPE of 9 (NewCredentials), the equivalent of runas /netonly.

T1134.005SID-History InjectionEvidence1

The KDC automatically copies the Security Identifiers (SIDs) of the Domain Admin and all their powerful groups (like “Schema Admins” or “Enterprise Admins”) into the dMSA’s ticket.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Sliver – We tested ... execute-assembly against Seatbelt and Rubeus ... Watching execute-assembly Rubeus.exe kerberoast complete successfully against a domain controller, through a WASM-bridged COM call into the CLR running a loaded Rubeus assembly, was significantly more rewarding ...

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

The createnetonly action will use the CreateProcessWithLogonW() API to create a new hidden (unless /show is specified) process

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence5

T1620 – Reflective Code Loading ( Assembly.Load in memory).

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1484.002Trust ModificationEvidence1

[*] Delegation rights modified succesfully! [*] S-1-5-21-3104832133-133926542-3798009529-1106 can now impersonate users on WORKSTATION$ via S4U2Proxy

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

When the state is set to 2 (Completed), the Windows Domain Controller (the KDC) says: “Okay, the migration is completed. This new dMSA is now the official replacement. I will give this dMSA all the powers and group memberships that the old account used to have.”

T1556.001Domain Controller AuthenticationEvidence1

мы можем добавить свой ключ и залогиниться... есть протокол (PKINIT), который позволяет логиниться без пароля. Есть хранилище ключей (msDS-KeyCredentialLink). Есть права, которые позволяют в это хранилище писать.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“By default, there is one and only one attribute that is written from an Entra user to an Active Directory user and that is the searchableDeviceKey -> msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute flow… an abuse primitive known as ‘Shadow Credentials’… if we can add a public key to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of a user, we can obtain a TGT for that user with the private key.”

Credential Access

13 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence6

Customers leveraging the Palo Alto Networks AutoFocus tool can track initially identified samples and tools under the Fireye_RedTeam_Tools, Rubeus, AndrewSpecial, KeeFarce, SafetyKatz, InveighZero, GadgetToJScript, SeatBelt, RuralBishop, SharpView, and SharpZeroLogon tags.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence2

Workstations store Kerberos tickets in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory after user authentication. Attackers with administrative privileges on compromised systems can extract these tickets using tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus.

T1187Forced AuthenticationEvidence2

On our low privilege machine, we can use MS-RPRN, as an example, to force the domain controller to connect to WinServ-2022.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

When the state is set to 2 (Completed), the Windows Domain Controller (the KDC) says: “Okay, the migration is completed. This new dMSA is now the official replacement. I will give this dMSA all the powers and group memberships that the old account used to have.”

T1556.001Domain Controller AuthenticationEvidence1

мы можем добавить свой ключ и залогиниться... есть протокол (PKINIT), который позволяет логиниться без пароля. Есть хранилище ключей (msDS-KeyCredentialLink). Есть права, которые позволяют в это хранилище писать.

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

“By default, there is one and only one attribute that is written from an Entra user to an Active Directory user and that is the searchableDeviceKey -> msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute flow… an abuse primitive known as ‘Shadow Credentials’… if we can add a public key to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of a user, we can obtain a TGT for that user with the private key.”

T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos TicketsEvidence34

The team used a password hash to request a Kerberos TGT and then a Kerberos service ticket; it also used Rubeus asktgs to request service tickets used for Seamless SSO.

T1558.001Golden TicketEvidence3

Both the Sapphire and Diamond Ticket attacks decrypt a legitimate TGT and change its PAC, and in order to do that, the adversary needs to have access to the KRBTGT account’s key (the password hash). | Diamond and Sapphire Tickets are forged TGTs created by modifying a legitimate TGT, which gives it additional privileges or a new identity.

T1558.002Silver TicketEvidence1

Our update allows you to apply the Diamond forgery technique to service tickets, which are normally issued based on a legitimate TGT. With this change, you can now forge a TGS directly using: A legitimate or forged Kerberos ticket blob The AES service key (i.e., the key used to encrypt the service ticket) | Originally limited to TGTs, this advancement calls into question the continued relevance of Silver Tickets, which lack the visible legitimacy of a genuine authentication flow and are easier to detect in modern environments.

T1558.003KerberoastingEvidence26

Functions: Kerberos ticket manipulation, Kerberoasting, Golden/Silver tickets, pass-the-ticket, AS-REP roasting, Overpass-the-Hash.

T1558.004AS-REP RoastingEvidence6

One additional account, which was the only one with preauthentication disabled, was compromised via AS-REP roasting.

T1606.002SAML TokensEvidence2

It requested a ticket-granting ticket through the PaperCut server’s own domain computer account, exploited the S4U2self flaw to impersonate the domain controller, and forged a high-privilege service ticket.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Certipy identifies misconfigured certificate templates (ESC1). Certificate request submitted for Domain Admin. Rubeus uses the forged certificate to request a TGT as a Domain Admin.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Rubeus extracts the root Active Directory (AD) domain’s Kerberos policies and password policies primarily from the GptTmpl.inf file, which is stored in the SYSVOL directory for Group Policy Objects (GPOs).

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

Rubeus has an /ldap function that leverages LDAP queries and mounts the SYSVOL share of a domain controller to retrieve critical information for constructing a PAC.

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

Python scripts ... ensure [tasks] have actually completed. These include tasks like administrator access, account verification, Active Directory collection, domain and network discovery.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

Observed post-exploitation activity included ... commands used to identify hosts, users, processes, and sensitive configuration data.

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

In order to be able to conduct the AS-REP Roasting technique the vulnerable accounts needs to be enumerated. ADSearch is a tool that can perform LDAP queries in order to enumerate active directory objects.

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Mounting Process: Uses SMB (port 445) to authenticate to the DC and access SYSVOL. Accesses: \\<DC>\IPC$ → Used for administrative access (initial connection) \\<DC>\SYSVOL → Stores domain-wide GPOs (superseding connection)

T1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialEvidence3

Recent tooling developed attack paths involving UnPAC the hash (Shadow Credentials and Golden Certificates), Sapphire Tickets, and RBCD from SPN-less accounts, all of which take advantage of U2U.

T1550.002Pass the HashEvidence1

Pass the Hash T1550.002

T1550.003Pass the TicketEvidence9

Attackers extract valid tickets from memory and inject them elsewhere, gaining authenticated access across the network without password knowledge... Pass-the-ticket attacks enable lateral movement through stolen Kerberos tickets.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

57 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors10Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping38Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.