Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

VHD ransomware

Tracked since Nov 27, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

VHD ransomware is a ransomware family first observed in 2020 and attributed with high confidence to North Korean operators, specifically activity associated with Lazarus-linked financial intrusion clusters such as APT38. It has been reported as distributed through the MATA framework and has been observed in incidents alongside known Lazarus tooling, including campaigns targeting businesses in France and Asia and broader activity focused on the APAC region.

The malware is notable for targeted rather than indiscriminate deployment. Reporting has characterized VHD and closely related families as part of narrowly scoped revenue-generation operations rather than conventional large-scale criminal ransomware campaigns. Observed ransom demands and payments were comparatively small, and the activity has been assessed as aligned with DPRK state-backed financial objectives. In at least one broader DPRK-linked intrusion context, ransomware was reportedly used as a distraction during financially motivated operations.

VHD ransomware has also drawn attention for its self-replication behavior. Code and artifact analysis has linked it to several other small ransomware families, including BEAF, PXJ, ZZZZ, and CHiCHi, with especially strong similarity between BEAF and ZZZZ. These overlaps, together with operational context and delivery through MATA, support assessment that VHD belongs to a cluster of related DPRK-associated ransomware tooling.

The family is associated with Lazarus Group operations and fits within North Korea’s broader pattern of combining espionage, disruptive activity, and revenue-generating cyber operations. Its known use against business targets and its linkage to financially motivated DPRK campaigns make it significant less as a mass-extortion threat than as a specialized ransomware capability embedded in state-directed intrusion activity.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Lazarus

In May, researchers at cybersecurity firm Trellix tied the recently emerged VHD ransomware to the North Korean APT.

via threatpostthreatpost.com
APT38

in March 2020, a new malware family surfaced called ‘VHD ransomware’... Many in the industry attributed the VHD ransomware to DPRK hackers. It was distributed using the MATA framework

via trellix othertrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It contained a list of administrative credentials and IP addresses specific to the victim, and leveraged them to brute-force the SMB service on every discovered machine.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

In this instance, we believe initial access was achieved through opportunistic exploitation of a vulnerable VPN gateway.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Whenever a successful connection was made, a network share was mounted, and the VHD ransomware was copied and executed through WMI calls.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In this instance, there was no spreading utility, but the ransomware was staged through a downloader written in Python that we still believe to be in development.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It contained a list of administrative credentials and IP addresses specific to the victim, and leveraged them to brute-force the SMB service on every discovered machine.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It contained a list of administrative credentials and IP addresses specific to the victim, and leveraged them to brute-force the SMB service on every discovered machine.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It contained a list of administrative credentials and IP addresses specific to the victim, and leveraged them to brute-force the SMB service on every discovered machine.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

It contained a list of administrative credentials and IP addresses specific to the victim, and leveraged them to brute-force the SMB service on every discovered machine.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Whenever a successful connection was made, a network share was mounted, and the VHD ransomware was copied and executed through WMI calls.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Whenever a successful connection was made, a network share was mounted, and the VHD ransomware was copied and executed through WMI calls.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Whenever a successful connection was made, a network share was mounted, and the VHD ransomware was copied and executed through WMI calls.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

The ransomware itself is nothing special: it’s written in C++ and crawls all connected disks to encrypt files... Files are encrypted with a combination of AES-256 in ECB mode and RSA-2048.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

The program also stops processes that could be locking important files, such as Microsoft Exchange and SQL Server.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

The ransomware itself is nothing special: it’s written in C++ and crawls all connected disks to encrypt files and delete any folder called “System Volume Information” (which are linked to Windows’ restore point feature).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.