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Malware4 associated actors

NOOPDOOR

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 16 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injection
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

NOOPDOOR, also known as HiddenFace, is a modular Windows backdoor observed since at least 2021. It is associated with Earth Kasha, also known as MirrorFace, and espionage activity linked to the broader APT10 ecosystem. It has been selectively deployed following LODEINFO or ANEL infections to maintain access to targets of particular interest. Associated campaigns have primarily targeted Japan, with additional targeting in Taiwan and India, across government, advanced technology, manufacturing, aviation, academia, and organizations concerned with national security and international relations. Infection chains have included spear-phishing and exploitation of public-facing VPN and file-storage services.

NOOPDOOR uses position-independent code and supports active outbound command-and-control communication and, in some variants, a passive inbound listener. Active mode uses a domain-generation algorithm that changes command-and-control domains daily by default, supports HTTP proxies during weekday business hours, and negotiates symmetric encryption using RSA-2048. Passive mode can create an inbound Windows Firewall exception and encrypts communications using AES. Its built-in capabilities include program execution, file upload and download, timestamp modification, and, in passive mode, shellcode execution and working-directory changes. Additional encrypted modules support scheduled or on-demand execution.

The backdoor incorporates anti-analysis measures and encrypts and decrypts selected functions at runtime to impede memory-based detection. Its associated NOOPLDR loaders use machine-specific encryption to protect stored payloads. The loader implementations support execution through MSBuild or DLL sideloading, persistence through scheduled tasks or services, and injection into legitimate processes. These mechanisms enable concealed, long-term access while complicating payload recovery and analysis.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Earth Kasha

“NOOPDOOR, observed since at least 2021, is a modular backdoor with more advanced capabilities.”

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
MirrorFace

また、コンピュータをCobalt Strike BEACON、LODEINFO、NOOPDOOR と呼ばれるマルウェアに感染させた事例を把握しています。

via npa japannpa.go.jp
menuPass

Cybereason’s Cuckoo Spear reporting ties multiple incidents to the APT10 intrusion set and describes long-duration stealthy persistence in Japanese victim networks, with NOOPDOOR and NOOPLDR as important elements of the newer arsenal.

via krypt3ia wordpresskrypt3ia.wordpress.com
Cuckoo Spear

Cybereason’s Cuckoo Spear reporting ties multiple incidents to the APT10 intrusion set and describes long-duration stealthy persistence in Japanese victim networks, with NOOPDOOR and NOOPLDR as important elements of the newer arsenal.

via krypt3ia wordpresskrypt3ia.wordpress.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"PLAYFULGHOST Delivered via Phishing and SEO Poisoning"; "Victims get infected via phishing emails"; "phishing campaign" (multiple entries)

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

APT10 has used spear-phishing with malicious Office documents, executables disguised as documents, and malicious files requiring user execution. MITRE maps this behavior to T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment and T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The group harvests documents and data of intelligence value from compromised hosts.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

ANEL, HiddenFace and the customised AsyncRAT beacon to C2 over web protocols.

Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.