TEMPLEDROP
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
TEMPLEDROP is a Windows passive backdoor associated with the Iranian state-linked threat cluster UNC1860, which is assessed to be affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It has been used in intrusions targeting high-priority organizations in the Middle East, particularly government and telecommunications networks, and appears to be reserved for higher-value victims as part of UNC1860’s long-term persistence toolkit.
A defining characteristic of TEMPLEDROP is its repurposing of a legitimate Windows file system filter driver from the Iranian antivirus product Sheed AV. UNC1860 uses this driver to protect TEMPLEDROP itself and other deployed malware from modification, strengthening stealth and resilience on compromised systems. This behavior reflects the actor’s broader emphasis on passive implants, kernel-level tradecraft, and defense evasion designed to reduce visibility to endpoint and network monitoring.
Within UNC1860 operations, TEMPLEDROP fits into a broader post-compromise workflow in which the actor commonly gains initial access by exploiting vulnerable internet-facing servers, deploys web shells and droppers, and then installs more covert implants for sustained access. UNC1860 is widely assessed to function in part as an initial access provider for other Iranian operators, and its tooling is designed to maintain footholds that can later support follow-on espionage, lateral movement, and broader network operations. TEMPLEDROP’s file-protection role and passive backdoor design make it particularly suited for stealthy persistence in strategically important environments.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
This driver is used in TEMPLEDROP, a passive backdoor that protects its own files and other malware it deploys, preventing modification and enhancing its evasion capabilities.
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Among these main-stage backdoors includes a Windows kernel mode driver repurposed from a legitimate Iranian anti-virus software filter driver... The passive backdoor TEMPLEDROP repurposed an Iranian AV software Windows file system filter driver named Sheed AV...
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Both passive implants TOFUDRV and TOFULOAD leverage undocumented Input/Output Control commands for communication... using them promises lower detection rates and possibilities akin to filtering drivers, which act as middlemen allowing for the inspection, modification, or blocking of network traffic before it reaches the device or application, as well as assets like file system objects and registry entries.
Among these main-stage backdoors includes a Windows kernel mode driver repurposed from a legitimate Iranian anti-virus software filter driver... The passive backdoor TEMPLEDROP repurposed an Iranian AV software Windows file system filter driver named Sheed AV...
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
This driver is used in TEMPLEDROP, a passive backdoor that protects its own files and other malware it deploys, preventing modification and enhancing its evasion capabilities.
A .NET-based utility for defense evasion tracked as TEMPLELOCK... is capable of terminating threats associated with the Windows Event Log service and restarting the service’s operation on demand.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
UNC1860 relies on custom-made passive backdoors like TOFULOAD and WINTAPIX, which leverage undocumented Input/Output Control (IOCTL) commands for communication, bypassing standard detection mechanisms used by EDR systems. These implants operate without initiating outbound traffic, making them difficult to detect through traditional network monitoring tools.
"Because the group's implants utilize HTTPS-encrypted traffic, victims will not be able to decrypt its commands or payloads."
Observables
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.