MS4Killer is a Rust-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) killing tool used by the Embargo ransomware-as-a-service operation. It was developed by modifying concepts from the publicly available s4killer proof of concept and is deployed by Embargo’s MDeployer loader before ransomware execution. MS4Killer uses a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) technique to obtain kernel-level capability and terminate selected security-product processes through a minifilter communication mechanism. It performs process and service enumeration and targets endpoint security products, including Microsoft Defender and products from SentinelOne, Cylance, ESET, Bitdefender, Kaspersky, and Webroot. MS4Killer builds are custom compiled for victim environments so that their process-targeting logic corresponds to installed security tooling, reducing the value of hash-based detection. It is used against Windows systems as a defense-evasion stage preceding Embargo ransomware deployment and encryption.
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
MS4Killer uses the vulnerable probmon.sys driver to terminate victim-specific security-product processes through a minifilter communication port.
At the time, Embargo relied on two EDR killers: a custom Safe Mode script, leveraging the technique already described earlier, and MS4Killer, a tool inspired by the publicly available s4killer PoC.
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Script-based EDR killers use taskkill, sc, net stop, and similar commands to tamper with protection.
EDR killers register scripts and services to run early at boot to interfere with EDR loading.
Some EDR killers may create services to run during Safe Mode or at next boot.
EDR killers register scripts and services to run early at boot to interfere with EDR loading.
MS4Killer uses the probmon.sys kernel driver, enables SeLoadDriverPrivilege, creates a kernel service, and loads the driver.
Some EDR killers may create services to run during Safe Mode or at next boot.
Commercial EDR killers especially use obfuscation and encryption (e.g., CardSpaceKiller).
Some EDR killers embed the drivers directly into their user-mode components, often encrypted.
Embargo has encrypted both MDeployer and MS4 Killer payloads with RC4.
Embargo has leveraged MDeployer to terminate the MS4Killer process, delete the decrypted payload files and a driver file dropped by MS4killer, and reboot the system.
MDeployer decrypts b.cache to praxisbackup.exe and a.cache to pay.exe using RC4 with a hardcoded key.
MDeployer/MS4Killer disables security products, deletes Defender Safe Mode registry entries, renames security-product directories, and terminates EDR processes.
Script-based EDR killers reboot systems into Safe Mode to tamper with security components.
Reconnaissance includes tasklist, and MS4Killer continuously scans for target security-product processes.
Specifically queries security software using sc query sense and sc query windefend.
Embargo has terminated active processes and services based on a hardcoded list using the CloseServiceHandle() function. Embargo has also leveraged MS4Killer to terminate processes contained in an embedded list of security software process names that were XOR-encrypted.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.