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Malware2 associated actors

MS4Killer

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovd
Platforms
Windows

MS4Killer is a Rust-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) killing tool used by the Embargo ransomware-as-a-service operation. It was developed by modifying concepts from the publicly available s4killer proof of concept and is deployed by Embargo’s MDeployer loader before ransomware execution. MS4Killer uses a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) technique to obtain kernel-level capability and terminate selected security-product processes through a minifilter communication mechanism. It performs process and service enumeration and targets endpoint security products, including Microsoft Defender and products from SentinelOne, Cylance, ESET, Bitdefender, Kaspersky, and Webroot. MS4Killer builds are custom compiled for victim environments so that their process-targeting logic corresponds to installed security tooling, reducing the value of hash-based detection. It is used against Windows systems as a defense-evasion stage preceding Embargo ransomware deployment and encryption.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Storm-0501

MS4Killer uses the vulnerable probmon.sys driver to terminate victim-specific security-product processes through a minifilter communication port.

via shroudcloudshroudcloud.io
BlackCat

At the time, Embargo relied on two EDR killers: a custom Safe Mode script, leveraging the technique already described earlier, and MS4Killer, a tool inspired by the publicly available s4killer PoC.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Script-based EDR killers use taskkill, sc, net stop, and similar commands to tamper with protection.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence1

EDR killers register scripts and services to run early at boot to interfere with EDR loading.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Some EDR killers may create services to run during Safe Mode or at next boot.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence1

EDR killers register scripts and services to run early at boot to interfere with EDR loading.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence5

MS4Killer uses the probmon.sys kernel driver, enables SeLoadDriverPrivilege, creates a kernel service, and loads the driver.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Some EDR killers may create services to run during Safe Mode or at next boot.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Commercial EDR killers especially use obfuscation and encryption (e.g., CardSpaceKiller).

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Some EDR killers embed the drivers directly into their user-mode components, often encrypted.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Embargo has encrypted both MDeployer and MS4 Killer payloads with RC4.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Embargo has leveraged MDeployer to terminate the MS4Killer process, delete the decrypted payload files and a driver file dropped by MS4killer, and reboot the system.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

MDeployer decrypts b.cache to praxisbackup.exe and a.cache to pay.exe using RC4 with a hardcoded key.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence4

MDeployer/MS4Killer disables security products, deletes Defender Safe Mode registry entries, renames security-product directories, and terminates EDR processes.

T1688Safe Mode BootEvidence1

Script-based EDR killers reboot systems into Safe Mode to tamper with security components.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Reconnaissance includes tasklist, and MS4Killer continuously scans for target security-product processes.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Specifically queries security software using sc query sense and sc query windefend.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence2

Embargo has terminated active processes and services based on a hardcoded list using the CloseServiceHandle() function. Embargo has also leveraged MS4Killer to terminate processes contained in an embedded list of security software process names that were XOR-encrypted.

Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.