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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

CHERRYSPY

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

CHERRYSPY, also known as DownExPyer, is a Python-based Windows backdoor used by the Russia-aligned cyberespionage actor UAC-0063, also tracked as TAG-110. It provides persistent, covert remote access to compromised systems and supports espionage operations targeting government and research organizations. Documented deployments include attacks against Ukrainian state bodies and a Ukrainian scientific research institution.

CHERRYSPY is deployed after initial compromise, including through infection chains in which malicious Microsoft Word macros install HATVIBE, which subsequently fetches and executes the backdoor. Spearphishing campaigns have used government-themed document lures and compromised employee email accounts to distribute malicious attachments. Earlier CHERRYSPY versions used pyArmor obfuscation; a variant observed in July 2024 was compiled as a Python extension DLL and deployed alongside a Python interpreter.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

HATVIBE acts as a loader, fetching and executing CHERRYSPY, which provides persistent, clandestine backdoor access.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
UAC-0063

...на комп'ютер в каталог "C:\ProgramData\Python" згодом завантажено Python-інтерпретатор та файл шкідливої програми CHERRYSPY, який, на відміну від попередньої версії, обфускованої за допомогою pyArmor, скомпільовано в .pyd (DLL) файл.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Recorded Future's Insikt Group published research today detailing a Russia-aligned threat actor tracked as TAG-110 conducting espionage against government, educational, and research-related entities in Tajikistan.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

На етапі первинного ураження зловмисник, маючи доступ до облікового запису електронної пошти співробітника установи, здійснив відправку копії нещодавно відправленого листа десяткам адресатів (включаючи самого відправника), замінивши оригінальний документ-вкладення іншим документом, в який було вбудовано макрос.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The A5 task results in a command execution... For example: A5(... command=['', '', '', 'taskkill /f /im pythonw.exe'])

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Present with the files is a VBA macro that's responsible for placing the document template in the Microsoft Word startup folder for automatic execution and subsequently initiating communications with a command-and-control (C2) server and potentially executing additional VBA code supplied with C2 responses.

T1059.006PythonEvidence2

...на комп'ютер в каталог "C:\ProgramData\Python" згодом завантажено Python-інтерпретатор та файл шкідливої програми CHERRYSPY...

Persistence

1 technique
T1137.001Office Template MacrosEvidence1

The documents themselves are poisoned macro-enabled Word documents, .dotm files, which 'leverage a global template file placed in the Word startup folder for persistence.'

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

If the fourth parameter is an empty string, the script invokes the systeminfo function, which sends the following system information to the C2

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The A6 task provides file listing capabilities... The issued A6 tasks specifically target shared folders, indicating that attackers likely use this task to search for files of interest.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The A3 task is designed for file exfiltration... only files matching the specified criteria are collected.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The A7 task enables screen capturing... The screenshots are captured using the mss Python module and uploaded to the C2 as .png files

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

files selected for exfiltration are combined into archives, each no larger than 16MB, and uploaded to the C2 server.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Decoded HATVIBE script shows that an HTTP PUT request is sent to the C2 server, transmitting the victim's ID, hostname, and username as a JSON payload.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Використовуючи створену технічну можливість прихованого віддаленого управління ЕОМ, на комп'ютер в каталог "C:\ProgramData\Python" згодом завантажено Python-інтерпретатор та файл шкідливої програми CHERRYSPY...

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Once the scan is complete... file metadata is grouped into chunks of 10,000 entries and uploaded to the C2 server as .logs files. Next, files selected for exfiltration are combined into archives... and uploaded to the C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.