PyPlunderPlug is a Python-based espionage malware component used by the threat actor TAG-110, also tracked as UAC-0063, in campaigns targeting government entities, diplomatic missions, and other high-value organizations in Central Asia and Europe. It has been associated with broader intelligence-gathering operations aligned with Russian strategic interests, although a definitive link to APT28 has not been established by all researchers.
PyPlunderPlug is designed to collect files from removable media. It searches attached removable drives for documents and other user data of interest, including document, image, archive, text, and temporary file types, then stages copies locally for later theft. It also maintains a local record of previously collected files to avoid redundant copying. Available reporting indicates that PyPlunderPlug does not implement its own command-and-control or direct exfiltration channel; instead, stolen data is likely removed through companion malware in the same intrusion set, particularly DownEx or CHERRYSPY/DownExPyer.
PyPlunderPlug has been observed as part of multi-stage intrusion chains involving malicious Microsoft Office documents and other TAG-110 tooling, including HATVIBE and LOGPIE. Within these operations, it functions as a specialized removable-media collection module supporting espionage objectives such as document theft and intelligence collection from compromised systems, especially where data may be transferred via USB devices.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
An USB data exfiltrator we named PyPlunderPlug was discovered on a victim's system.
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Recorded Future's Insikt Group published research today detailing a Russia-aligned threat actor tracked as TAG-110 conducting espionage against government, educational, and research-related entities in Tajikistan.
DownExPyer (also known as CherrySpy)... The C2 server can send a variety of tasks to the infected system, such as instructions to collect specific data, execute commands, or deploy additional malware components.
The documents themselves are poisoned macro-enabled Word documents, .dotm files, which 'leverage a global template file placed in the Word startup folder for persistence.'
The A3 task is designed for file exfiltration... only files matching the specified criteria are collected.
The script is designed to collect data from removable devices connected to the infected system.
The core functionality operates within a loop, with a 200-second delay between each iteration. During each cycle, the detect function is called to identify removable drives connected to the system.
Creates an HTTP request object and makes an HTTP POST to the URL http://38.180.206[.]61/engine.php
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.