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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

HATVIBE

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs58Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

HATVIBE is an HTML Application (HTA)-based loader targeting Windows systems, used by the cyberespionage actor UAC-0063, also tracked as TAG-110. It establishes an initial foothold and retrieves and executes additional payloads, notably CHERRYSPY, also known as DownExPyer. HATVIBE-associated operations have targeted government entities, diplomatic missions, and research institutions in Central Asia, Europe, and Ukraine.

HATVIBE is commonly delivered through spearphishing with weaponized Microsoft Word documents and VBA macros. Campaigns have reused legitimate documents stolen from previously compromised organizations and sent malicious attachments through compromised employee email accounts. The infection chain creates an encoded HTA payload, executes it through the Windows HTML Application host, and establishes persistence with scheduled tasks; observed configurations run the loader every four minutes. HATVIBE has also been distributed through exploitation of CVE-2024-23692 in Rejetto HTTP File Server.

The loader communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using HTTP PUT requests containing a victim identifier, hostname, and username in JSON format. It interprets response markers to execute returned hexadecimal-encoded code, run VBScript, or drop files. These functions provide remote tasking and payload deployment. Its frequent pairing with CHERRYSPY supports sustained espionage access, while file theft, screenshot collection, and keylog retrieval are functions of follow-on implants rather than established native HATVIBE capabilities.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-23692via mkd cirtExploited in the wildUnauthenticated template-injection RCE in Rejetto HTTP File ServerВо јули 2024 година, повеќе актери за сајбер-закани биле забележани како ја злоупотребуваат ранливоста за доставување криптовалутни мајнери и тројанци, како и малициозен софтвер познат како HATVIBE. | The article notes that, in July 2024, multiple threat actors exploited CVE-2024-23692 to deliver cryptocurrency miners, trojans, and malware known as HATVIBE.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

HATVIBE acts as a loader, fetching and executing CHERRYSPY, which provides persistent, clandestine backdoor access.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
UAC-0063

...з використанням шкідливих програм HATVIBE та CHERRYSPY... буде створено ... HTA-файлу шкідливої програми HATVIBE "RecordsService"...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Слід додати, що в червні 2024 року зафіксовано численні випадки встановлення бекдору HATVIBE шляхом експлуатації вразливості (вірогідно, CVE-2024-23692) в програмному продукті HFS HTTP File Server...

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Recorded Future's Insikt Group published research today detailing a Russia-aligned threat actor tracked as TAG-110 conducting espionage against government, educational, and research-related entities in Tajikistan.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

На етапі первинного ураження зловмисник, маючи доступ до облікового запису електронної пошти співробітника установи, здійснив відправку копії нещодавно відправленого листа десяткам адресатів (включаючи самого відправника), замінивши оригінальний документ-вкладення іншим документом, в який було вбудовано макрос.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

For delivery of these weaponized documents, threat actors send emails with URL links in their body instead of directly attaching these documents to emails.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Previously, TAG-110 leveraged macro-enabled Word documents to deliver HATVIBE, an HTA-based malware, for initial access. The newly detected documents do not contain the embedded HTA HATVIBE payload for creating a scheduled task and instead leverage a global template file placed in the Word startup folder for persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...буде створено та відкрито ще один документ (DOC) з макросом, який, у свою чергу, забезпечить створення на ЕОМ закодованого HTA-файлу шкідливої програми HATVIBE "RecordsService", а також, файлу запланованого завдання "C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\vManage\StandaloneService", призначеного для запуску останньої.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence4

Once macros are enabled, the built-in subroutine Document_Open() is automatically executed. | the generated HTA file contains an encoded VBScript (VBE) payload to interact with the C2 server, receive commands, and execute malicious actions

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

After opening these documents, users encounter a deceptive display: blurred pages accompanied by a standard warning banner that 'Macros have been disabled.' This social engineering technique aims to pressure the user into enabling macros | These documents were all designed to deploy the HATVIBE loader using a combination of VBA scripts.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Previously, TAG-110 leveraged macro-enabled Word documents to deliver HATVIBE, an HTA-based malware, for initial access. The newly detected documents do not contain the embedded HTA HATVIBE payload for creating a scheduled task and instead leverage a global template file placed in the Word startup folder for persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...буде створено та відкрито ще один документ (DOC) з макросом, який, у свою чергу, забезпечить створення на ЕОМ закодованого HTA-файлу шкідливої програми HATVIBE "RecordsService", а також, файлу запланованого завдання "C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\vManage\StandaloneService", призначеного для запуску останньої.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malicious script continues by making registry changes, specifically setting the AccessVBOM registry value to 1 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Security key

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

Previously, TAG-110 leveraged macro-enabled Word documents to deliver HATVIBE, an HTA-based malware, for initial access. The newly detected documents do not contain the embedded HTA HATVIBE payload for creating a scheduled task and instead leverage a global template file placed in the Word startup folder for persistence.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

...буде створено та відкрито ще один документ (DOC) з макросом, який, у свою чергу, забезпечить створення на ЕОМ закодованого HTA-файлу шкідливої програми HATVIBE "RecordsService", а також, файлу запланованого завдання "C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\vManage\StandaloneService", призначеного для запуску останньої.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1218.005MshtaEvidence3

...забезпечить створення на ЕОМ закодованого HTA-файлу шкідливої програми HATVIBE "RecordsService"...

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

window.resizeTo(0, 0); window.moveTo(-2000, -2000); These commands effectively hide the HTA window by resizing it to zero dimensions and moving it off-screen.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malicious script continues by making registry changes, specifically setting the AccessVBOM registry value to 1 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Security key

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Decoded HATVIBE script shows that an HTTP PUT request is sent to the C2 server, transmitting the victim's ID, hostname, and username as a JSON payload.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the C2 server’s response... can contain: A string prefixed with 65mnn4mmk3mv3ac : This indicates that a file should be dropped on the victim's system.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

58 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching58Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.