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Malware2 associated actors

Laret

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs2Tracked

Laret is a 32-bit .NET reverse tunneling tool used by the Iran-aligned threat group BladedFeline, which ESET assesses with medium confidence to be a subgroup or sub-cluster of OilRig (APT34/Hazel Sandstorm). It is used to maintain access to compromised networks as part of long-term cyberespionage operations. Reporting places its use against Kurdish and Iraqi government officials, Kurdistan Regional Government environments, and related regional targets; BladedFeline activity also affected a regional telecommunications provider in Uzbekistan. Laret uses SSH-based port forwarding and relies on an external configuration file for command-and-control parameters. Unlike the related tunneling tool Pinar, Laret does not include built-in persistence. It has been observed alongside other BladedFeline tooling including Whisper, PrimeCache, Shahmaran, Slippery Snakelet, Hawking Listener, Flog, P.S. Olala, and Sheep Tunneler.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BladedFeline

We analyze two reverse tunnels (Laret and Pinar), a backdoor (Whisper), a malicious IIS module (PrimeCache), and various supplementary tools.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
OilRig

The threat group has also deployed newer implants like Slippery Snakelet and Hawking Listener, as well as tunneling tools Laret and Pinar for persistence.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

BladedFeline uses IPs for network infrastructure, including distributing malware and C&C servers.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

P.S. Olala is a 32-bit .NET binary named for its intended function (executing PowerShell scripts)... Essentially, P.S. Olala is an executor of the PowerShell script stored in %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\InputPersonalization\TrainedDataStore.ps1.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Both have timestomped PE compilation timestamps – a tactic that is common amongst Middle Eastern (and particularly Iran-nexus) threat groups... Both these versions of Whisper have timestomped compilation timestamps... BladedFeline routinely timestomps the compilation timestamps of malware that the group develops.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The config file... is in XML format with its key and value strings base64 encoded... Whisper decrypts the operator commands. It does so by first base64 decoding the string containing the command...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

PrimeCache action... u AES-encrypted file content Local filename Creates a local file with the specified name and content... In the case where we do not have a location on disk for Laret... Laret was downloaded from http://178.209.51[.]61:8000/wincapsrv.exe via PowerShell.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.