Laret
Laret is a 32-bit .NET reverse tunneling tool used by the Iran-aligned threat group BladedFeline, which ESET assesses with medium confidence to be a subgroup or sub-cluster of OilRig (APT34/Hazel Sandstorm). It is used to maintain access to compromised networks as part of long-term cyberespionage operations. Reporting places its use against Kurdish and Iraqi government officials, Kurdistan Regional Government environments, and related regional targets; BladedFeline activity also affected a regional telecommunications provider in Uzbekistan. Laret uses SSH-based port forwarding and relies on an external configuration file for command-and-control parameters. Unlike the related tunneling tool Pinar, Laret does not include built-in persistence. It has been observed alongside other BladedFeline tooling including Whisper, PrimeCache, Shahmaran, Slippery Snakelet, Hawking Listener, Flog, P.S. Olala, and Sheep Tunneler.
Hunt this family in your stack
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Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
We analyze two reverse tunnels (Laret and Pinar), a backdoor (Whisper), a malicious IIS module (PrimeCache), and various supplementary tools.
The threat group has also deployed newer implants like Slippery Snakelet and Hawking Listener, as well as tunneling tools Laret and Pinar for persistence.
Techniques & procedures
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Both have timestomped PE compilation timestamps – a tactic that is common amongst Middle Eastern (and particularly Iran-nexus) threat groups... Both these versions of Whisper have timestomped compilation timestamps... BladedFeline routinely timestomps the compilation timestamps of malware that the group develops.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
PrimeCache action... u AES-encrypted file content Local filename Creates a local file with the specified name and content... In the case where we do not have a location on disk for Laret... Laret was downloaded from http://178.209.51[.]61:8000/wincapsrv.exe via PowerShell.
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Tunneling tool used by BladedFeline to support persistence (exact protocol/implementation not detailed in the content).
Tunneling tool used to maintain access to target networks.
A 32-bit .NET reverse tunnel that reads a local configuration file, establishes an SSH connection to a C2 server, enables port forwarding, and can optionally execute a specified file before tunneling.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.